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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three essays on the economics of people and places. The essays share
a common goal of understanding the long-run consequences of economic and social processes on
people, places, and the economy. The essays also share a common approach of combining newly
available administrative data with transparent empirical methodologies.
The first chapter paper examines the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession on educa-
tional attainment and income. Using confidential Census data linked to county of birth, I relate
cross-county variation in the severity of the recession to differences in long-run outcomes between
individuals who were younger versus older when the recession began. Individuals who were born
in counties with a more severe recession and were children or adolescents during the recession are
less likely to obtain a college degree and, as adults, earn less income. My estimates, combined with
the large number of potentially affected individuals, suggest that the 1980-1982 recession could
depress economic output today. Every U.S. recession since 1973 resembles the 1980-1982 reces-
sion in persistently decreasing earnings per capita in negatively affected counties, which suggests
that other recessions might also have significant long-run effects.
The second chapter, with Evan Taylor, examines the role of social interactions in location deci-
sions. We study over one million long-run location decisions made during two landmark migration
episodes by African Americans born in the U.S. South and whites born in the Great Plains. We
develop a new method to estimate the strength of social interactions for each receiving and send-
ing location. Social interactions strongly influenced the location decisions of black migrants, but
were less important for white migrants. Social interactions were particularly important in provid-
ing African American migrants with information about attractive employment opportunities and
played a larger role in less costly moves.
xv
The third chapter, also with Evan Taylor, estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime
across U.S. cities from 1960-2009. We use a new source of variation in social connectedness
stemming from social interactions in the migration of millions of African Americans out of the
South. Cities with higher social connectedness had considerably fewer murders, rapes, robberies,
assaults, burglaries, and larcenies, with a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness
reducing the murder rate by 14 percent. As predicted by a simple economic model, effects on
city-level crime rates are stronger in cities with a higher African American population share.
xvi
CHAPTER I
The Long-Run Effects of Recessions on Education and Income
1.1 Introduction
Do recessions have long-run effects on education and income? Understanding the determi-
nants of human capital attainment and labor market productivity is a high priority for researchers
and policy makers, but there is little direct evidence on this question (Almond and Currie, 2011;
Heckman and Mosso, 2014). Long-run effects of recessions on education and income could have
substantial welfare consequences, given recessions’ frequency and the possibility that each reces-
sion affects millions of people. Furthermore, these effects could inform issues of long-standing
interest and debate, including the welfare costs of recessions and the relationship between reces-
sions and subsequent economic growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; Lucas, 1987; Caballero and
Hammour, 1994; Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996; Barlevy, 2002; Lucas, 2003; Yellen and
Akerlof, 2006; Foster, Grim and Haltiwanger, 2016).
This paper provides new evidence on the long-run effects of recessions on education and in-
come. I focus on the 1980-1982 double-dip recession, which followed large increases in the price
of oil and interest rates.1 The recession was concentrated in certain industries, like durable goods
manufacturing and wood products, and counties with pre-existing specialization in these industries
experienced a more severe recession. This setting is valuable because the severity of the reces-
1The NBER recession dates are January to July 1980 and July 1981 to November 1982. I treat these as a single
episode.
1
sion generated substantial variation in local economic activity, and its timing permits the study of
pre-recession economic conditions and individuals’ long-run outcomes. Notably, I show that the
recession led to a persistent relative decrease in local earnings per capita, employment-population
ratios, and median family income in negatively affected counties.
I estimate the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession on individuals who were chil-
dren, adolescents, and young adults when the recession began using a generalized difference-in-
differences framework that leverages newly available confidential data. I link the 2000 Census and
2001-2013 American Community Surveys to the Social Security Administration NUMIDENT file,
which provides adult outcomes and county of birth for 23 million individuals born from 1950-1979.
The first difference of my empirical strategy compares the long-run outcomes of individuals born
in counties with a more versus less severe recession. I isolate the effect of local labor demand shifts
that emerged during the recession by instrumenting for the 1978-1982 change in log real earnings
per capita with the log employment change predicted by the interaction of a county’s pre-existing
industrial structure and aggregate employment changes.2 The second difference compares out-
comes of individuals who were younger versus older when the recession began. Individuals who
were 29 years old in 1979 largely completed their schooling before the recession, so they form
a valuable comparison group for estimating the effect of the recession on education. However,
the recession might have led to a lasting income decrease for older individuals in my compari-
son group, which means that the estimated effect of the recession on younger individuals’ income
could be biased upwards.
Economic theory does not provide a sharp prediction about whether the persistent decline in
local economic activity that emerges during a recession will increase or decrease educational at-
tainment and income. Parental investments in childhood human capital could rise or fall, as both
the opportunity cost of spending time with children and income decline, and community invest-
ments could fall, due to a decline in school or neighborhood quality. In the presence of credit
constraints, a recession could limit individuals’ ability to pay for college. At the same time, a
2Following Freeman (1980) and Bartik (1991), many papers use this instrumental variable strategy to study local
labor markets (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2013; Diamond, 2016).
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recession could increase educational attainment by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling.
I find that the 1980-1982 recession led to sizable long-run reductions in education and income.
Individuals who were born in severe recession counties and were children or adolescents during the
recession are less likely to obtain a college degree, especially from a four-year college. Consistent
with some substitution from four- to two-year colleges, they are more likely to have a two-year
degree. I find little evidence of an effect on college attendance or high school graduation. The
negative effects on four-year college graduation are most severe and essentially constant for indi-
viduals age 0-13 in 1979. This age profile suggests that the underlying mechanisms are a decline
in childhood human capital or a cumulative decline in parental resources to pay for college. Be-
cause I estimate small and insignificant effects on college graduation for individuals age 14-19 in
1979, short-term credit constraints in paying for college appear to be less important. As adults,
individuals born in severe recession counties earn less income and have higher poverty rates. For
individuals age 0-10 in 1979, my estimates imply that a 10 percent decrease in real earnings per
capita during the recession, which is slightly smaller than one standard deviation, leads to a 3.0
percentage point (9.4 percent) decrease in four-year degree attainment, a $1,314 (3.2 percent) de-
crease in earned income, and a 1.7 percentage point (13.9 percent) increase in the probability of
living in poverty.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of my empirical strategy. First, I show that
economic activity evolved similarly from 1969-1979 in counties with a more versus less severe
recession. Second, I find no evidence of a relationship between the severity of the recession and
the evolution of maternal education, infant birth weight, or infant mortality for births before 1980.
Because I study individuals born before the recession, my results are unlikely to be influenced
by selective pre-recession migration or fertility. Finally, I conduct placebo tests by estimating the
effect of the recession on education for individuals age 23-28 in 1979, using 29 year olds as a
comparison group. Reassuringly, I find no evidence of an effect for 23-28 year olds, who mostly
completed their schooling before the recession.
My estimates, combined with the large number of potentially affected individuals, suggest that
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the 1980-1982 recession could depress aggregate economic output today. I construct back of the
envelope calculations that scale my estimates by the 105 million individuals born from 1951-1979.
Depending on the assumed evolution of earnings per capita in the absence of the recession, these
calculations suggest that the 1980-1982 recession led to 0.9-2.1 million fewer four-year college
graduates, $64-$145 billion less earned income per year (as of 2000-2013), and 0.5-1.3 million
more adults living in poverty each year. These numbers amount to 1.3-3.0 percent of the stock of
college-educated adults in 2015, 0.4-0.8 percent of 2015 GDP, and 1.3-2.9 percent of the number
of individuals in poverty in 2015. As these simple calculations depend on extrapolating difference-
in-differences estimates, they could understate or overstate the true aggregate effects. Nonetheless,
my results provide evidence of a new channel through which recessions could affect welfare and
economic growth.
This study contributes most directly to the literature examining whether economic conditions
affect individuals’ long-run outcomes. Using country- and state-level variation, Cutler, Huang and
Lleras-Muney (2016) and Rao (2016) find a positive relationship between economic activity in
childhood and later-life education and income.3 These papers estimate the effect of a temporary
positive or negative deviation of economic activity from trend, while I focus on variation arising
from a recession. This distinction matters because, as I show, recessions in the U.S. generate
persistent relative decreases in local economic activity. Other work, based mainly on downturns
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, yields mixed evidence on whether recessions affect late-life
health (van den Berg, Lindeboom and Portrait, 2006; Cutler, Miller and Norton, 2007; Banerjee
et al., 2010; Cutler, Huang and Lleras-Muney, 2016). While recessions reduce college graduates’
earnings for several years (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012), the broader
long-run effects of recessions are uncertain.
This study complements the mixed evidence on whether parental job loss affects children’s
3Using several European surveys, Cutler, Huang and Lleras-Muney (2016) find that childhood exposure to a pos-
itive nationwide GDP fluctuation is associated with more income and education in adulthood. As they acknowledge,
a limitation of their empirical strategy is that they cannot control flexibly for non-economic determinants of long-run
outcomes that vary at the country-by-birth cohort level. Rao (2016) uses American Community Survey data to re-
late long-run outcomes to the unemployment rate in individuals’ state of birth during childhood. The estimates are
sensitive to controls for time-varying region- and state-specific determinants of long-run outcomes.
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long-run education and income (Page, Stevens and Lindo, 2007; Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage, 2008;
Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008; Coelli, 2011; Hilger, 2016). These papers do not directly
assess the long-run effects of recessions, which might operate through additional channels besides
parental job loss, such as schools, neighborhoods, and peers. This study also complements recent
work by Chetty and Hendren (2016a,b) documenting the cross-sectional characteristics of places
that lead to improved economic outcomes for children. Unlike Chetty and Hendren (2016b), my
results indicate an important role for local economic activity in children’s long-run outcomes.
Finally, this paper builds on a vast literature examining how economic conditions affect individuals
in other ways.4
This paper shows that the 1980-1982 recession persistently decreased earnings per capita in
negatively affected counties, and individuals born in these counties who were children or adoles-
cents during the recession have less education and income as adults. I also show that every U.S.
recession since 1973 resembles the 1980-1982 recession in persistently decreasing earnings per
capita in negatively affected counties, which suggests that other recessions might have significant
long-run effects. Similar long-run effects could arise from other shocks leading to a persistent
decline in local economic activity, such as Chinese import competition (Autor, Dorn and Hanson,
2013) and NAFTA (McLaren and Hakobyan, 2016).
1.2 Background: The 1980-1982 Recession
This paper uses within-state variation in the severity of the 1980-1982 recession driven by
counties’ pre-existing industrial structure. Certain industries, like durable goods manufacturing
and wood products, experienced large employment losses in response to the rapid increase in inter-
4Previous studies examine the contemporaneous effects of recessions on health and children (Ruhm, 2000; Chay
and Greenstone, 2003; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; Ananat et al., 2013; Currie, Duque and Garfinkel, 2015;
Lindo, 2015; Ruhm, 2015; Stevens et al., 2015; Golberstein, Gonzales and Meara, 2016; Page, Schaller and Simon,
2016), the effects of job displacement on adults (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Stephens, 2001, 2002; Charles
and Stephens, 2004; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009; Davis and von Wachter, 2011; Schaller and Stevens, 2015), and
the short-run effects of parental job displacement on children (Lindo, 2011; Rege, Telle and Votruba, 2011; Stevens and
Schaller, 2011; Schaller and Zerpa, 2015). More broadly, a large literature studies the relationship between parental
income and children’s outcomes; Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011) provide recent reviews, and Løken,
Mogstad and Wiswall (2012) use the oil boom in Norway to study this relationship.
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est rates, the appreciation of the U.S. dollar and associated import competition, high oil prices, and
the decline in aggregate demand. Historical accounts suggest that the recession led to a persistent
decrease in local economic activity in some counties. For example, the recession pushed employ-
ers to shut down tire factories with dated production technology across the U.S. (Behr, 1980), and
many lumber mills in the Northwest closed permanently, due in part to their near-obsolescence
after 30 years of use (Wells, 2006). Consistent with these accounts, I show that the 1980-1982
recession generated a sharp decrease in local economic activity in negatively affected counties,
and that this decrease was persistent on average.
1.2.1 Evidence of a Sharp, Persistent Decrease in Local Economic Activity
My primary measure of local economic activity is earnings per capita for a county’s residents.
This is available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts
starting in 1969. The earnings variable, which primarily comes from administrative unemploy-
ment insurance and tax data, is comprehensive: it includes income from the labor market and asset
ownership, but does not include government transfers. The denominator of earnings per capita
comes from Census annual population estimates. Throughout, I use the CPI-U to express all mon-
etary variables in 2014 dollars. I also use BEA data on county-level employment and Census
County Business Patterns (CBP) data on county-by-industry-level employment.5 BEA and CBP
employment data do not distinguish between full- and part-time jobs and, unlike the earnings data,
are reported by county of work.
For each county, I measure the severity of the recession as the 1978-1982 decrease in log
real earnings per capita. This variable captures several ways a recession might affect a county’s
residents, such as extensive margin employment changes, replacement of full-time with part-time
jobs, replacement of high-wage with low-wage jobs, and decreasing wages or hours within a job.
The NBER dates the start of the first recession as January 1980, but I use 1978 as the pre-recession
5CBP data frequently suppress employment for county-by-industry cells to protect respondent confidentiality, but
never suppress the number of establishments within establishment size categories. As in Holmes and Stevens (2002),
I impute CBP employment using the number of establishments and nationwide information on employment by estab-
lishment size. See Appendix A.1 for details.
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year because some economic indicators, including earnings per capita, began to decline in 1979.
Figure 1.1 shows that the 1980-1982 recession generated a sharp, persistent relative decrease
in earnings per capita in negatively affected counties. The figure plots population-weighted mean
real earnings per capita from 1969-2002 for counties with a recession more and less severe than the
nationwide (1978 population-weighted) median.6 To focus on the evolution of earnings per capita
over time, I shift the less severe recession line down by $2,110 so that the two lines are equal in
1978. Mean earnings per capita evolves identically in more versus less severe recession counties
from 1969-1978, then diverges sharply with the onset of the recession. From 1978-1982, mean
real earnings per capita falls by $2,708 (10.4 percent) in more severe recession counties, while
increasing by $44 (0.2 percent) in less severe recession counties. After 1982, mean earnings per
capita evolves similarly in both sets of counties, including during later recessions, leaving severe
recession counties with a persistent relative decline. The employment-population ratio displays a
similar pattern (Appendix Figure A.2).
The persistent relative decrease in earnings per capita in Figure 1.1 might seem surprising,
given the conventional wisdom that local wages and employment rates steadily converge after
negative labor demand shocks (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). However, several studies find lasting
wage and employment rate reductions (Bartik, 1991, 1993; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Greenstone
and Looney, 2010; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2016; Yagan, 2016),
and economic forces can rationalize this finding.7 For example, in areas experiencing a decline
in comparative advantage, a recession could trigger a lasting reduction in economic activity by
inducing employers to pay fixed adjustment costs and shut down or move to other areas.8 Another
6I limit the figure to 2002 to focus on years that are most relevant for long-run effects on educational attainment,
as the youngest cohort in my sample is 23 years old in 2002. Appendix Figure A.1 contains results for 1969-2013.
7My results on the persistence of the 1980-1982 recession for counties agree closely with Greenstone and Looney
(2010), but differ from the conclusion of Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007), who find rapid recovery of unemployment
rates following steel and auto job losses. I discuss the relationship between my work and these papers in detail in
Appendix A.2.
8Foote (1998) discusses this point in the context of a (S, s) adjustment model with trend growth. Recent findings
similar in spirit to Figure 1.1 are that almost all of the decline in routine employment since the early 1990’s and almost
all of the decline in hires and separations since 2000 have been concentrated in recessions (Jaimovich and Siu, 2015;
Hyatt and Spletzer, 2013). This explanation appears in historical accounts of the tire and lumber industries (Behr,
1980; Wells, 2006).
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possible explanation is a persistent shift in labor demand at the industry level; the U.S. trade deficit
widened after 1982, following a period of high interest rates, large budget deficits, and a strong
dollar.9 The tendency of high earnings individuals to out-migrate more following a decrease in
local labor demand could also contribute to a lasting decrease in earnings per capita (Topel, 1986;
Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2013).
Figure 1.2 displays the considerable cross-county variation in the severity of the 1980-1982
recession. Categories on the map correspond to deciles, with darker shades of red indicating a
more severe recession. Twenty percent of counties experienced a decline in earnings per capita
of 16.5 percent or more, while twenty percent grew.10 Clear regional patterns stand out: oil-
exporting states, like Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, benefited from high oil prices, and states
specializing in durable goods manufacturing, like Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, saw particularly
large earnings decreases. New England, with more high tech and defense-related manufacturing,
fared relatively well, while the Pacific Northwest, which specialized in logging, fared poorly. Parts
of the agricultural upper Midwest also fared poorly, in conjunction with the “farm crisis” (Barnett,
2000). Although the regional patterns are striking, 92 percent of the variation in the severity of the
recession is within-region and 63 percent is within-state.
1.2.2 Pre-Existing Industrial Specialization and Recession Severity
Earnings per capita in a county might have decreased from 1978-1982 because of a decrease
in labor demand or an unrelated decrease in the share of high income residents (i.e., a labor sup-
ply shock). As discussed in Section 1.3, a labor demand shock might affect children’s long-run
9The auto industry illustrates both explanations. By the early 1970’s, foreign automakers - primarily from Japan
and specializing in small, fuel-efficient cars - established a stable presence in the U.S. market. Imports’ market share
rose from 18 percent in 1978 to 27 percent in 1980 along with the price of gasoline. Although the price of gasoline
returned to its pre-recession level, the market share of domestic automakers did not. Foreign automakers established
U.S. production facilities, starting with Volkswagen in 1978 and followed by five Japanese automakers from 1982-
1989 (Klier, 2009). Foreign automakers did not build their facilities in traditional car-making locations: Honda’s
facility was in Marysville, Ohio, and Toyota’s in Georgetown, Kentucky. Alder, Lagakos and Ohanian (2017) also
note that Rust Belt firms faced more competitive pressures in the 1980’s due to entry from domestic and foreign firms.
10The unweighted average decrease in log real earnings per capita is 7.4 percent, and the standard deviation is 12.0
percent. Using 1978 population weights, the average decrease is 5.8 percent, and the standard deviation is 7.6 percent.
The histogram of log earnings per capita changes closely approximates a normal distribution (Appendix Figure A.3).
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outcomes via parents’ budget constraint, community investments, and the opportunity cost of ed-
ucation. An unrelated labor supply shock might affect some of these channels, but the resulting
effects on children likely would be attenuated.
To isolate variation in the severity of the recession driven by local labor demand, I construct an
instrumental variable that predicts the 1978-1982 log employment change using a county’s 1976




ηc,j,1976(e−s(c),j,1982 − e−s(c),j,1978). (1.1)
In equation (1.1), ηc,j,1976 is the share of county c’s employment in two-digit industry j in 1976,
and (e−s(c),j,1982 − e−s(c),j,1978) is the log employment change from 1978-1982 for industry j in
all states in the same region besides the state of county c.11 I interpret D78−82c as a shift to local
labor demand for county c. This variable exploits the fact that the recession was more severe in
counties that specialized in industries, like durable goods manufacturing or lumber products, that
were more sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates, oil prices, or the business cycle.
Figure 1.3 shows that cross-county variation in the severity of the recession follows the pre-
dicted log employment change, as expected. A regression of the 1978-1982 log earnings per capita
change on the predicted log employment change and state fixed effects, which I include in my
baseline specification for estimating effects on individuals, implies that a 10 percent predicted em-
ployment decrease is associated with a 3.5 percent decrease in earnings per capita; when clustering
standard errors by state, the F-statistic on this coefficient is 26.
Table 1.1 provides details on the aggregate patterns that underlie the predicted log employment
change. The manufacturing sector lost 881,000 jobs from 1978-1982, and the construction sector
lost 171,000 jobs. Within manufacturing, 546,000 jobs were lost in three industries alone: trans-
11There are 69 two-digit industries. I use the predicted log employment change because earnings data are not avail-
able at a sufficiently detailed industry level. Freeman (1980) uses a similar variable to study changes in employment
across occupations, and many authors use this strategy to predict changes in local labor demand (e.g., Bartik, 1991;
Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2013; Diamond, 2016). I exclude the contribution
from a county’s own state to remove a mechanical relationship between the actual and predicted change in economic
activity. Using other states in the same region, as opposed to all other states, slightly improves explanatory power by
allowing industry-level employment changes to differ by region.
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portation equipment, primary metal (which includes steel mills), and lumber and wood products.
Total employment increased by 4.5 million over this period, with notable growth in the mining
sector (which includes oil and gas extraction) and the service sector.
1.2.3 The Evolution of Median Family Income from 1950-2000
To provide evidence on the validity of my empirical strategy, I next examine the relationship
between the evolution of median family income from 1950-2000 and the severity of the recession
predicted by pre-existing industrial specialization. My empirical strategy, which compares long-
run outcomes of individuals born from 1950-1979, could confound the effect of the recession with
pre-recession economic conditions if severe recession counties were on a downward trend from
1950-1980. In fact, I show that counties with a more severe recession saw greater income growth
from 1950-1970, and this trend can be controlled for easily.




R78−82c 1(t = k)αk + xc,tβ + γc + θs(c),t + εc,t, (1.2)
where yc,t is log real median family income in county c and year t.12 The key explanatory variable is
the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita,R78−82c . In some specifications, xc,t contains
time-varying covariates described below. The regression includes county fixed effects, γc, to absorb
time-invariant differences across counties and state-by-year fixed effects, θs(c),t, which I include in
my baseline specification when estimating long-run effects on individuals. I normalize α1980 = 0,
so that (α1950, α1960, α1970) describe how the pre-recession evolution of log median family income
is correlated with the severity of the 1980-1982 recession, and (α1990, α2000) describe the post-
recession evolution. I estimate equation (1.2) with two stage least squares (2SLS), where the
instrument for R78−82c is the predicted log employment change, D
78−82
c . I cluster standard errors
12I use median family income because it is available at the county-level from decennial censuses for 1950-2000 and
is an important measure of local economic conditions. Unfortunately, county-level census data do not consistently
report other quantiles of the family income distribution from 1950-2000. Earnings per capita, from the BEA, is only
available for 1969-forward.
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by state to allow for arbitrary serial and spatial correlation within states. I initially exclude the 526
counties with at least 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector, which includes oil and
gas extraction, to minimize the countercyclical boom-bust cycle in this sector. These high-mining
counties account for only 6 percent of the U.S. population, but receive considerably more weight in
2SLS estimates of equation (1.2) because pre-existing industrial specialization strongly influences
their earnings per capita.
The estimates of αt in Figure 1.4 characterize the 1980-1982 recession as a reversal of post-
war fortune: counties with a more severe recession saw greater median family income growth
from 1950-1970. This pattern arises from estimates of model 1, which contains county and state-
by-year fixed effects but no other covariates. Model 2, which adds an interaction between year
and the 1950-1970 log median family income change, eliminates this pre-trend. The model 2
estimates imply that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 led to an 10
percent decrease in real median family income in 1990 and an 11 percent decrease in 2000.13 In
sum, the results in Figure 1.4 support the validity of my empirical strategy and underscore the
lasting effect of the recession on local economic conditions.
1.2.4 Additional Results on the Cost of Housing and Government Expenditures
The effect of the recession on income could overstate the effect on purchasing power if the
recession also reduced the cost of housing. Appendix A.3 provides evidence of a decline in median
house values and rents from 1980-1990 in severe recession counties, but by less than the decline
in median family income. As a result, the housing cost decline partly offset the income decline for
renters, but led to a decrease in wealth for homeowners.14
Appendix A.4 examines the effects of the recession on local government expenditures and
revenues, which could affect individuals’ long-run education and income. Expenditures per capita
13When including the 526 counties with at least 5 percent of 1976 employment in mining, log median family
income evolves similarly from 1950-1970, but does not decline after the recession (Appendix Figure A.6). Because
relatively few people live in high mining counties, my estimates of long-run effects on children more closely reflect
the persistence seen in Figure 1.4, which excludes high mining counties.
14Appendix A.3 also shows that commuting zones, which are aggregations of counties, also experience a persistent
relative decrease in earnings per capita after the recession.
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fell starting in 1992 in counties with a more severe recession, but there is little evidence of a
decrease before then, likely due to higher federal transfers. The decline in expenditures is driven
by spending on welfare and health, and not education. As a result, the decrease in local government
expenditures might have had negative effects on individuals who were adolescents in the 1990’s.
1.3 Possible Long-Run Effects of a Recession on Education and Income
This section draws on previous theoretical and empirical work to describe the possible long-
run effects of a recession on education and income. Economic theory does not provide a sharp
prediction about the magnitude or even sign of any long-run effects, but it does highlight potentially
important channels.
First, a recession could affect educational attainment and lifetime income by decreasing human
capital obtained during childhood. The stock of childhood human capital depends on a sequence of
material and time investments from parents, a sequence of community investments from schools,
neighborhoods, and peers, and an initial human capital endowment (Almond and Currie, 2011;
Heckman and Mosso, 2014). A recession-induced decrease in the local wage could produce in-
come and substitution effects. The income effect, due to a decrease in family earnings, predicts a
decrease in parents’ material investments.15 The substitution effect, due to a decrease in the price
of spending time with children, predicts an increase in parents’ time investments, though this ad-
ditional time might have limited benefits, or even be harmful, if the recession increases parental
stress.16 Community investments could fall due to a reduction in government expenditures or the
quality of schools, neighborhoods, or peers.17 I focus on individuals born before 1980, for whom
15Some studies find that children’s long-run outcomes are sensitive to family resources (Aizer et al., 2016; Hoynes,
Schanzenbach and Almond, 2016), while others do not (Jacob, Kapustin and Ludwig, 2015; Bleakley and Ferrie,
2016).
16Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013) show that parents spent more time with children during the Great Re-
cession, and Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2014) find that parental time produces cognitive skills in children. On
economic shocks and parenting behavior, see McLoyd et al. (1994); Leininger and Kalil (2014); Akee et al. (2015);
Brand (2015).
17Existing work documents spillover effects of disruptive peers (Figlio, 2007; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Carrell,
Hoekstra and Kuka, 2016) and finds that neighborhoods affect children’s long-run outcomes (Chetty and Hendren,
2016a; Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016; Chyn, 2016).
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the recession does not affect initial human capital endowments.18
A recession also could affect educational attainment and lifetime income by shaping the deci-
sion to finish high school or obtain a college degree. In choosing their desired level of schooling,
individuals trade off higher lifetime earnings against the opportunity cost of forgone earnings and
the cost of tuition (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967). A recession could reduce the
opportunity cost by reducing the earnings of less educated workers, leading to long-run increases in
education and income.19 However, in the presence of credit constraints, a recession might decrease
parents’ ability to pay for tuition, leading to long-run decreases in education and income.20
The conceptual framework informs the unit of geography I use to measure recession exposure
in my empirical analysis. A recession could have long-run effects on individuals because of me-
diating effects on parents, schools, neighborhoods, peers, and the local labor market (through the
opportunity cost of schooling). Unfortunately, I am unable to link individuals to their parents,
school district, neighborhood, or peer group, and data do not exist that measure the severity of the
recession for these groups.
The most detailed unit of geography in my data is county of birth. While counties do not
map exactly to school districts, neighborhoods, or peer groups, they resemble these sources of
local community investments more closely than do commuting zones or other aggregations of
counties. One possible concern with using counties is that they inadequately reflect local labor
market opportunities. However, the BEA data report earnings by county of residence, and so
reflect individuals’ commuting throughout the local labor market without imposing the assumption
18Previous work finds that infant health improves with the unemployment rate (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004)
and recession-driven reductions in air pollution (Chay and Greenstone, 2003). My results are not affected by selective
fertility or in utero recession exposure, which are the primary mechanisms considered by these authors.
19Empirical work finds an important role for opportunity cost in educational attainment (Black, McKinnish and
Sanders, 2005; Cascio and Narayan, 2015; Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo, 2015; Atkin, 2016). Bound and Holzer
(2000) and Hoynes, Miller and Schaller (2012) show that the 1980-1982 recession especially reduced the wages and
employment of less educated workers.
20Several studies conclude that short-term credit constraints are relatively unimportant for college attendance or
graduation (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008), but
evidence from college decisions made in the early 2000’s suggests a larger role for credit constraints (Belley and
Lochner, 2007; Bailey and Dynarski, 2011; Lovenheim, 2011). Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2015) find that the
early 2000’s housing boom decreased college enrollment, consistent with opportunity cost being more important than
parental resources in their setting.
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that commuting zones perfectly capture commuting patterns. If individuals’ perceptions of labor
market opportunities depend especially on the experiences of individuals who live nearby, then
earnings per capita for residents in the same county is more meaningful than earnings per capita
throughout the local labor market. These considerations suggest that counties, although imperfect,
are preferable to commuting zones. Another advantage of using counties is that birth county fixed
effects more flexibly control for time-invariant components of initial human capital endowments,
parents, and communities that shape long-run outcomes. I examine the sensitivity of my results to
measuring exposure to the recession using individuals’ county of birth, commuting zone of birth,
and a weighted average of nearby counties. Results using these different units of geography are
broadly consistent (for comparisons see Appendix A.9).
1.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Data on Long-Run Outcomes and County of Birth
To estimate the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession, I link the 2000 Census and 2001-
2013 American Community Surveys to the Social Security Administration NUMIDENT file. The
resulting data contain adult outcomes and county of birth for millions of people. My sample con-
sists of individuals born in the U.S. from 1950-1979 who were age 25-64 at the time of the survey.
I exclude individuals living in group quarters, who are not in the 2001-2005 ACS data, and in-
dividuals with imputed values of age, sex, race, or state of birth. I also exclude individuals with
imputed dependent variables, leading to three nested samples. My first sample contains 23.5 mil-
lion individuals with non-imputed years of education. My second sample contains 18.4 million
individuals that also have non-imputed labor market outcome variables, and my third sample con-
tains 15.6 million individuals that also have positive personal income, family income, and hourly
wage. These samples balance the goals of using as much information as possible, given non-trivial
imputation rates for labor market outcomes, and limiting the number of samples to ensure that no
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confidential information is disclosed.21 I limit the sample to the 89 percent of individuals with a
unique PIK, which is an anonymized identifier, and unique birth county.22
1.4.2 Difference-in-Differences Specification using Pre-Existing Industrial Structure and
the 1980-1982 Recession
I estimate the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession with a generalized difference-in-
differences framework that compares education and income in adulthood of individuals born in
counties with a more versus less severe recession (first difference) and individuals who were
younger versus older when the recession began (second difference). I use 2SLS to isolate vari-
ation in the severity of the recession driven by the interaction of a county’s pre-existing industrial
specialization and aggregate employment changes in certain industries following the increase in
interest rates, the strengthening of the U.S. dollar, high oil prices, and the decline in aggregate
demand.




R78−82c 1(a = k)πk + xi,a,c,tβ + γc + θa,s(c) + δt + εi,a,c,t, (1.3)
where yi,a,c,t is a measure of educational attainment or income in adulthood of individual i, who
was age a in 1979, born in county c, and observed in survey year t. The explanatory variable of
21In publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data, for people born in the U.S. from 1950-1979 who were age
25-64 at the time of the survey, 8.1 percent of individuals have imputed values of age, sex, race, or state of birth,
with state of birth being imputed most frequently. Among individuals with no imputations in these basic demographic
variables, 1.8 percent are in group quarters. A further 1.1 percent of individuals have imputed years of education, and
21.3 percent have imputed education or labor market variables (any of the seven individual income variables, total
family income, weeks worked, hours worked, marital status, and labor force status). I limit the sample to individuals
who tell the Census Bureau that they were born in the U.S. to reduce false birth county matches.
22The Census Bureau assigns Protected Identification Keys (PIKs) to individuals in the Census and ACS using
information on respondents’ name, address, date of birth, and gender. Sometimes a PIK is assigned to more than one
respondent in a survey year. While technically possible (e.g., if an individual receives a survey at multiple residences),
this outcome likely reflects an error in PIK assignment. An individual may be assigned to multiple birth counties if the
12-character string from the NUMIDENT does not identify a single county. For example, there are two towns named
Arcadia in North Carolina, and a respondent who writes “Arcadia” could be matched to two counties. Appendix
A.5 describes the algorithm that identifies individuals’ county of birth using the 12-character string for place of birth
from the NUMIDENT, which comes from Social Security card applications. The algorithm was developed alongside
Martha Bailey, Evan Taylor, and Reed Walker. For researchers in a secure Census Bureau computing environment, we
provide additional detail in Taylor, Stuart and Bailey (2016).
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interest is R78−82c , which measures recession severity as the decrease in log real earnings per capita
from 1978-1982 in county c. I use the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982, D78−82c ,
as an instrumental variable for R78−82c (see Figure 1.3). The vector xi,a,c,t includes indicators for
sex and race, a cubic in age at the time of the survey to capture life-cycle patterns, and interactions
between age in 1979 and the 1950-1970 change in log median family income to control for the
pre-recession trend in economic activity (see Figure 1.4). Birth county fixed effects, γc, absorb
cross-county differences in initial human capital endowments, as discussed in Section 1.3, plus
fixed characteristics of parents and communities. Age in 1979-by-birth state fixed effects, θa,s(c),
control for changes over time in state-level higher education access, transfer programs, and other
factors.23 Survey year fixed effects, δt, absorb differences across survey years.
The parameter of interest, πa, measures the effect of the recession on individuals who were age
a in 1979. Section 1.2 shows that 1980-1982 recession led to a persistent decline in local economic
activity, and πa reflects this persistence. I allow πa to vary flexibly with age in 1979 because the
operative mechanisms, sensitivity to the recession, and stock of childhood human capital might
vary with individuals’ age when the recession begins. I normalize the parameter for individuals
age 29 in 1979, π29 = 0, so the identified parameters can be interpreted as the effect for individuals
age a in 1979 minus the effect for 29 year olds, πa − π29. For education outcomes, 29 year
olds provide a useful comparison group because they mostly completed their schooling before the
recession. Individuals between the ages of 23-28 also mostly completed their schooling before the
recession, which suggests a placebo test of whether πa = 0 for a = 23, . . . , 28.24 For income, this
approach could yield estimates that are biased upwards if 29 year olds also experienced a lasting
decrease in income (i.e., π29 < 0) because of job loss (Davis and von Wachter, 2011) or a decline
23The determinants of higher education access include cohort size, state appropriations, tuition, and financial aid.
Given balanced budget requirements, higher education appropriations tend to fall when tax revenue falls or expendi-
tures on other, less flexible items rise (Kane, Orszag and Apostolov, 2005; Delaney and Doyle, 2011). Appropriations
and tuition depend on a variety of factors besides the economy, including state politics and institutional features such
as who sets tuition (Kane, Orszag and Apostolov, 2005; Doyle, 2012). Given the conceptual and measurement chal-
lenges involved with controlling for non-recession related changes in higher education access, transfer programs, and
other factors, my preferred specification includes age in 1979-by-birth state fixed effects.
24For individuals born from 1957-1964, about 75 percent of four-year college degree attainment is completed by
age 25 and 85 percent is completed by age 29 (see Appendix Figure A.10).
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in local job quality (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2013; Kahn and McEntarfer, 2015). Because I find
negative effects on income, this suggests that my estimates might be too conservative.
To reduce computational burden, I collapse Census and ACS individual-level data into cells
defined by age in 1979, birth county, survey year, race, and sex, and I estimate grouped regressions
with weights given by the number of observations in each cell. This grouped regression produces
point estimates that are nearly identical to those from an individual-level regression.25 I cluster
standard errors by birth state to allow for arbitrary serial and spatial correlation within states.
1.4.3 Addressing Measurement Error in Recession Exposure
Estimates of πa are likely biased towards zero because some individuals’ pre-recession location
differed from their county of birth, which is all I observe. To see this, let R̃78−82a,c be the true average
exposure to the recession for individuals who were age a in 1979 and born in county c. As I define
it, true recession exposure depends on where individuals lived in 1979, but does not depend on
post-recession migration, which is one of many actions that parents might take to mitigate the
effects of the recession.




R78−82c 1(a = k)λk + xa,cβ̃ + θ̃a,s(c) + va,c, (1.4)
where xa,c contains the share of individuals who are female and non-white (corresponding to the
sex and race indicators in equation (1.3)), plus interactions between age in 1979 and the 1950-1970
change in log median family income.26 If unobserved measurement error, va,c, is uncorrelated with
unobserved determinants of long-run outcomes, εi,a,c,t, conditional on the covariates in equations
(1.3) and (1.4), then plim π̂a = π̃aλa, where π̂a is the OLS or 2SLS estimate of the effect of
25If I used indicator variables instead of a cubic for age, the grouped regression would produce identical point esti-
mates as the individual-level regression. Isen, Rossin-Slater and Walker (Forthcoming) also use a grouped regression
to reduce computational burden.
26Equation (1.4) does not contain the cubic in age, survey year fixed effects, or birth county fixed effects that are
in equation (1.3). I do not include birth county fixed effects in equation (1.4) because the attenuation bias arises from
cross-county variation. Furthermore, including a birth county fixed effect, say γ̃c, in equation (1.4) is not feasible: this
would yield a term γ̃c1(a = k) which is collinear with R78−82c 1(a = k).
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Consequently, the estimated effects of the recession will be attenuated if λa ∈ (0, 1), and I can
eliminate this attenuation bias with an estimate of λa.
To quantify the extent of attenuation, I estimate λa using two data sets that provide valuable,
but imperfect, information.28 First, I use 2000-2013 Census/ACS data for individuals born from
1990-2013. These data contain county of birth from the NUMIDENT, like the data I use to estimate
the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession, and county of residence. However, they measure
the relationship between county of birth and county of residence after the 1980-1982 recession and
might not accurately characterize the relevant measurement error if family migration patterns have
changed over time. To address this limitation, I use confidential Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data. PSID data allow me to estimate λa for individuals born from 1968-1979 and observed
in 1979, but they only contain information on county of residence.29 As seen in Appendix Figure
A.11, point estimates of λa from Census/ACS data range from 0.75 for 0 year olds to 0.58 for
17 year olds. Point estimates from PSID data display a similar age profile, but are larger because
county of residence is more strongly related to county of residence in early life than county of birth.
Appendix Figure A.11 strongly suggests that my estimates of the recession’s long-run effects are
attenuated. These estimates are consistent with a lack of anticipatory migration before the recession
on average. If families anticipated the severity of the recession in local areas and moved to areas
where the recession would be less severe, then estimates of λa could be negative.
Below, I adjust for this attenuation using the Census/ACS data because they contain the relevant
information on place of birth. The validity of this adjustment depends on two assumptions. First, I
assume that unobserved measurement error, va,c, is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of
long-run outcomes, εi,a,c,t, conditional on the covariates in equations (1.3) and (1.4). For example,
this rules out the possibility that families with young children from counties with high observed
determinants of long-run outcomes, εi,a,c,t, anticipated the recession and moved to less severe
27See Bound et al. (1994) for an in-depth discussion of the consequences of measurement error.
28The ideal data set is the 1980 Census linked to the NUMIDENT. Unfortunately, these files are not currently linked.
29I limit the PSID sample to individuals who are first observed before age 3 to make early life county of residence
a better proxy for county of birth.
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recession counties before 1980. The suddenness of changes in local economic activity provide
some support for this assumption. Second, I assume that estimates of λa for individuals born from
1990-2013 accurately characterize the measurement error relationship for individuals born from
1950-1979. While I cannot test this assumption directly, support for it comes from the fact that
estimates of λa are stable across the 1968-2013 birth cohorts in the PSID (Appendix Table A.12).30
1.4.4 Potential Threats to Empirical Strategy
One threat to my empirical strategy is that, even in the absence of the 1980-1982 recession,
long-run outcomes of individuals born in counties with a more severe recession would have evolved
differently across cohorts than for individuals born in the same state in counties with a less severe
recession. A confounding variable would have to be orthogonal to the pre-recession evolution of
log median family income, for which I control. Because I estimate equation (1.3) with 2SLS, the
relevant measure of recession severity is the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982.
For example, a relative decline in infant health from 1950-1979 in counties with a larger predicted
log employment decrease would threaten my strategy.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that this potential threat is unimportant. My empirical strat-
egy exploits sharp changes in local economic activity driven by the interaction of pre-existing
industrial specialization and aggregate employment changes that emerged during the 1980-1982
recession. This design mitigates many potential concerns about confounding selective migration
or fertility before 1980. As shown in Figure 1.4, the type of industrial specialization that hurt
counties during the 1980-1982 recession was uncorrelated with median family income growth
from 1970-1980 and positively correlated with income growth from 1950-1970, for which I con-
trol. Furthermore, there is little correlation between the predicted log employment change from
30My adjustment divides point estimates π̂a by λ̂a. I use the estimate of λa for 17 year olds in Appendix Figure
A.11 for individuals 18 and older in 1979. Migration rates increase after age 17, as children leave their parents’
household, but parents’ location seems most relevant for educational attainment. Because the unadjusted estimates
of πa are close to zero for individuals age 18 and older in 1979, the adjusted estimates will be small regardless of
the specific approach. As additional information, Appendix Figure A.12 displays the share of individuals born from
1990-2013 that are living outside of their county, commuting zone, and state of birth. Appendix Figure A.13 compares
the share of individuals living outside their birth county using the Census/ACS and PSID data. Appendix Figure A.14
shows that migration rates are remarkably stable across the 1968-2013 birth cohorts in the PSID.
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1978-1982 and the severity of other economic shocks arising from recessions or Chinese import
competition.31
To provide direct evidence on the pre-recession evolution of infant health and parental charac-
teristics, I use county-level birth certificate data to estimate 2SLS regressions similar to equation
(1.2). As detailed in Appendix A.7, there is no evidence that the evolution of infant mortality from
1950-1979 is correlated with the severity of the 1980-1982 recession. There is also no evidence
of a relationship between the severity of the recession and the 1970-1979 evolution of maternal
education, various measures of low birth weight, or median birth weight.
1.5 The Long-Run Effects of the Recession on Education
Before discussing the estimated long-run effects of the recession on education, I describe the
effects predicted by potentially important economic channels. Figure 1.5 plots hypothesized ef-
fects of the recession on college degree attainment, corresponding to the parameter πa in equation
(1.3). I model the recession as a one-time, persistent decrease in local labor demand, which is con-
sistent with the evidence in Section 1.2. I assume that individuals decide whether to attend college
at age 18 and, if they graduate, do so at age 22. As a result, the recession does not affect college
degree attainment for individuals who are 22 or older in 1979. If the recession reduces childhood
human capital, several reasons suggest that effects will be more severe for younger children.32 The
opportunity cost channel predicts a positive effect on college degree attainment, and the parental
resources for college channel predicts a negative effect in the presence of credit constraints.33 Par-
31Appendix Table A.11 shows negligible within-state correlations between the change in log real earnings per
capita from 1978-1982 and during other recessions, and negligible within-state correlations between the predicted log
employment change from 1978-1982 and the log earnings per capita change during other recessions. As described
in Appendix A.3, there is little correlation between the log earnings per capita change or predicted log employment
change from 1978-1982 and exposure to Chinese import competition as measured by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013).
32First, a persistent recession could lead to several periods of reduced investment, with more severe cumulative
effects for younger children. Second, the human capital production function might feature dynamic complementarity,
so that less investment in early childhood reduces the return to investment in later childhood (Cunha and Heckman,
2007; Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010; Aizer and Cunha, 2012; Caucutt and Lochner, 2012). Finally, early
childhood might be a critical or sensitive period (Almond and Currie, 2011; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
33If parents of older children had more savings, then the negative effects under the parental resources channel would
be more severe for younger children.
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ents could also mitigate these effects by moving away from severe recession counties if there are no
associated disruption costs. My empirical strategy measures the net long-run effects, which might
depend on all of these channels. Figure 1.5 plots stylized age-effect profiles, but my regressions
do not impose these restrictions.
Figure 1.6 shows that the 1980-1982 recession led to a long-run reduction in four-year college
degree attainment. The figure displays 2SLS estimates of equation (1.3), where I use three-year
age bins to estimate πa more precisely.34 The estimates for individuals who were 23-28 years old in
1979 are small and indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.52), indicating that the severity of the reces-
sion is not related to college degree attainment for this group. Because college degree attainment is
mostly completed by age 23, this finding supports the validity of my empirical strategy. Negative
effects gradually emerge for individuals who were younger when the recession began; effects are
most severe, essentially constant, and statistically significant for individuals age 0-13 in 1979. For
this group, the point estimates imply that a decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 of 10
percent, which is slightly smaller than one standard deviation, reduces four-year degree attainment
by three percentage points, or around nine percent of mean attainment. As seen by comparing
these estimates to the hypothesized effects in Figure 1.5, the negative effects likely stem from a
decrease in childhood human capital development or a decrease in parental resources to finance
college in the presence of credit constraints. The small and insignificant effects for individuals
age 14-19 in 1979 are not consistent with the simplest model of credit constraints, which predicts
negative effects for this group because parents immediately face challenges in paying for college.
Figure 1.6 also shows the consequences of adjusting for attenuation bias due to individuals’ pre-
recession location differing from their county of birth. The adjusted effects are larger in magnitude,
but the age profiles of the unadjusted and adjusted effects are reasonably similar. In the rest of the
paper, I focus on the conservative estimates that do not adjust for pre-recession migration.
Table 1.2 reports estimates of the long-run effects of the recession on several measures of
educational attainment, grouping together individuals age 0-10, 11-19, and 20-28 in 1979. There
34The bins are for 1979 ages 0-1 (born in 1978-1979), 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, 11-13, 14-16, 17-19, 20-22, 23-25, and 26-28.
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is no evidence of an effect on the attainment of at least a high school diploma or GED. The point
estimates for college attendance are negative, but small and indistinguishable from zero. Column
3 shows sizable and statistically significant negative effects on any college degree attainment for
individuals age 0-19 in 1979. For individuals age 11-19, the effects on college attendance and
degree attainment are similar in magnitude. For individuals age 0-10, the recession reduces degree
attainment more than attendance, suggesting a decrease in college persistence. Columns 4 and
5 separate college degree attainment into two mutually exclusive categories: four- and two-year
degree attainment.35 There is evidence of an increase in two-year degree attainment for individuals
age 0-10 in 1979, consistent with substitution from four- to two-year colleges. For this group, a
10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 leads to a 1.8 percentage point (4.4
percent) decrease in any college degree attainment, a 3.0 percentage point (9.4 percent) decrease
in four-year degree attainment, and a 1.2 percentage point (12.8 percent) increase in two-year
degree attainment. Overall, the negative effects of the recession are concentrated at higher levels
of educational attainment, for which childhood human capital and parental resources seem most
valuable (Belley and Lochner, 2007; Bailey and Dynarski, 2011).
By way of providing some context, the effect of the 1980-1982 recession on any college degree
attainment for individuals age 0-10 in 1979 is comparable in magnitude to Project STAR, which
reduced class sizes from kindergarten to grade 3 and increased college degree attainment by 1.6
percentage points (Dynarski, Hyman and Schanzenbach, 2013). The effect of the recession on
four-year college degree attainment is larger than Project STAR, which increased four-year degree
attainment by 0.9 percentage points (Dynarski, Hyman and Schanzenbach, 2013), and is compara-
ble in magnitude to statewide scholarship programs that offered free tuition and fees for qualified
students, which increased four-year degree attainment by 3 percentage points (Dynarski, 2008).
Several studies find that improved local labor market opportunities reduce high school and
college enrollment, as predicted by the opportunity cost channel (Black, McKinnish and Sanders,
2005; Cascio and Narayan, 2015; Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo, 2015; Atkin, 2016). Most
35Census and ACS data measure the highest degree completed, so an individual with a two- and four-year degree is
coded as having a four-year degree.
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directly, this channel predicts positive effects of the recession on high school graduation and col-
lege attendance for individuals age 14-19 in 1979. After adjusting for pre-recession migration,
my point estimates are somewhat smaller than those in prior work, but confidence intervals admit
similar results.36
While the recession could affect children whose parents do not lose their job, the long-run
effects of parental job displacement provide another benchmark. If job loss generated all of the
county-level decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 and the recession only affected chil-
dren whose parents lost a job, the estimates in Page, Stevens and Lindo (2007), Coelli (2011), and
Hilger (2016) suggest that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita would decrease college
enrollment by 0.5-10 percentage points.37 The estimates in Table 1.2 lie within this range, but this
comparison provides limited information on how much of the effect of the recession stems from
parental job loss.
Appendix Table A.14 reports OLS and reduced-form estimates, and Appendix Table A.15 re-
ports first stage estimates.38 Appendix A.8 describes results that attempt to separate the effects of
temporary and persistent decreases in earnings per capita that emerged with the onset of the 1980-
36As shown in Appendix Figures A.16 and A.17, the upper ranges of 95 percent confidence intervals indicate that a
10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 leads to no more than a 1.7 percentage point (1.8 percent)
increase in high school graduation for individuals age 14-16 in 1979 and a 1.6 percentage point (3.0 percent) increase
in college attendance for individuals age 17-19 in 1979. Black, McKinnish and Sanders (2005), who study the coal
boom and bust in the 1970’s and 1980’s in Appalachia, find that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per worker leads
to a 4.4-7.2 percent increase in high school enrollment. Cascio and Narayan (2015), who study the fracking boom
in the 2000’s in mainly rural U.S., find that a 10 percent decrease in the high school wage premium leads to a 4.7
percent increase in high school enrollment. Charles, Hurst and Notowidigdo (2015), who study the housing boom in
the 2000’s, find that a 10 percent increase in log wages of adults age 18-25 is associated with a 1.8 percent decrease in
college attendance.
37Using the PSID, Page, Stevens and Lindo (2007) estimate a negative but insignificant effect of parental job dis-
placement, due to firm closure, on college attendance. Studying job displacements in Canada in the 1980’s, Coelli
(2011) finds that parental job displacement reduces college enrollment by 10 percentage points. Hilger (2016) studies
job displacements in the U.S. from 2000-2009 and finds a reduction in college enrollment of 0.5 percentage points.
These papers find that job displacement reduces long-run family income by around 10 percent.
38The OLS estimates typically are attenuated relative to the 2SLS estimates. One explanation is that a labor demand
shock has more severe effects than a labor supply shock, and the OLS estimates reflect labor supply shocks more than
the 2SLS estimates. A related explanation is that the local average treatment effect of an earnings decrease due to a
change in the number of jobs is larger than the effect of a general earnings decrease. A third possible explanation is
that the 2SLS estimates reduce attenuation bias from measurement error in the 1978-1982 decrease in log earnings per
capita (see also Charles and Stephens, 2013). Measurement error could arise when the BEA converts earnings reported
by place of work to place of residence; this is distinct from the measurement error that arises due to individuals’ pre-
recession location differing from their place of birth. First stage slope coefficients are centered around 0.5, with
F-statistics between 18 and 20.
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1982 recession. As detailed in Appendix A.9, my results are robust to different sets of covariates
and different measures of recession severity.
1.5.1 Heterogeneity by Sex and Race
To better understand who was affected by the recession, I separately estimate the long-run
effects on men and women. Men experienced a greater decline in employment and wages during
the recession (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Hoynes, Miller and Schaller, 2012), and if this pattern
persisted, the opportunity cost channel would predict a greater increase in educational attainment
for them.39 Because men and women grew up in the same families and neighborhoods, they were
likely exposed to similar conditions in childhood and had similar levels of parental resources when
deciding whether to attend college. However, exposure to the recession during childhood might
have different effects on men and women. Recent work finds that disadvantage in childhood has
more severe effects on the long-run outcomes of men than women (Autor et al., 2016; Chetty et al.,
2016), while other papers find that women are equally or more sensitive to childhood disadvantage
(Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016; Chyn, 2016).
Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that the recession reduced long-run educational attainment of both
men and women. The recession had more severe effects on college attendance and any college
degree attainment of men, consistent with higher sensitivity to early life disadvantage for men.
The recession had more severe effects on the four-year college degree attainment of women, and
this appears to be driven by greater substitution among women from four- to two-year colleges.
One explanation for this differential substitution is a higher return to two-year degrees for women
(Kane and Rouse, 1995; Jepsen, Troske and Coomes, 2012).
I also separately estimate the long-run effects of the recession on whites and non-whites. While
non-white workers experienced greater reductions in employment and wages during the recession
(Bound and Holzer, 2000; Hoynes, Miller and Schaller, 2012), it is unclear whether this differential
persisted. If it did, the opportunity cost channel would predict a greater increase in educational
39Nonetheless, the longer-run effects could differ by sex, and it would be interesting to study this directly.
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attainment for non-whites. However, non-whites also might have experienced greater reductions
in childhood human capital and parental resources to pay for college, which predicts a greater
decrease in education for non-whites. Another possibility is that non-whites are less likely to be
on the margin of obtaining a college degree because they face higher levels of disadvantage.40
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that the negative effects of the recession on educational attainment
are concentrated among whites. For non-whites, there is evidence of an increase in high school
graduation and college attendance, but little evidence of an effect on college degree attainment.
1.5.2 Heterogeneity by Features of Birth State and County
Next, I describe regressions that provide evidence on the underlying mechanisms and policies
that might mitigate the recession’s long-run effects. In particular, I examine interactions between
the effect of the recession and features of individuals’ birth state and county. This augments my
baseline specification in equation (1.3), which controls for time-varying state factors and time-
invariant county factors, but does not include interactions with the severity of the recession. I
focus on four-year college degree attainment because of its importance for individuals and the
economy.
The effect of a decline in local economic activity could be stronger in states with a more severe
recession if they had less capacity to direct transfers to negatively affected counties or offered fewer
opportunities for parents seeking to migrate or commute to stronger labor markets. To examine this
possibility, columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.4 divide the sample into states with a more and less severe
recession, where states with a more severe recession had an above-median decrease in log earnings
per capita from 1978-1982.41 The negative point estimates are only half as large in more severe
recession states, but the estimates are not statistically distinguishable (p = 0.62). These results
provide little evidence that the negative effects of the recession are exacerbated by effects on state
public finances or mitigated by nearby migration or commuting opportunities.
40In publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data, 32.4 percent of whites and 19.9 percent of non-whites born
from 1950-1979 attained a four-year college degree.
41Appendix Table A.23 characterizes this and other dimensions of state-level heterogeneity.
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States might have mitigated the recession’s long-run effects with more generous transfer pro-
grams, which could insure households and communities against earnings declines. In measuring
the generosity of a state’s transfer program, it is important to control for economic and demo-
graphic characteristics that are mechanically related to higher transfer expenditures. I attempt to
do so by regressing, at the state-level, log transfers per capita in 1970 on log median family in-
come in 1969 and the share of the 1970 population that is black, female, foreign born, urban, a high
school graduate, a college graduate, age 5-19, age 20-64, and age 65 and above.42 Columns 3 and
4 of Table 1.4 divide the sample into states with more and less generous transfers per capita using
the residuals from this regression. For individuals age 0-10 in 1979, the effect of the recession
is 30 percent less severe in states with more generous transfers. However, the estimates are not
statistically distinguishable (p = 0.50). As a result, there is little evidence that states with more
generous transfer programs mitigated the recession’s effects.
Another possibility is that the effect of the recession was diminished in states that tended to
transfer more money to poorer counties. To characterize states’ transfer progressivity, I regress
log transfers per capita in 1970 on log median family income in 1969, state fixed effects, and the
previously described control variables, with the dependent and explanatory variables measured at
the county-level. Columns 5 and 6 present results from dividing states into two groups using the
state-specific slope coefficient on log median family income.43 The effects of the recession are
considerably less severe in states with more progressive transfers. However, the estimates are not
statistically distinguishable (p = 0.96), so there is little evidence that states with more progressive
transfers mitigated the recession’s effects.
Benchmark models predict that a negative shock to childhood human capital will have more
severe consequences for children with lower levels of initial human capital because the marginal
product of investment is larger at lower levels of human capital (Almond and Currie, 2011; Heck-
man and Mosso, 2014). Consequently, a recession might have more severe effects in counties with
42I focus on transfers over which states have some control: retirement and disability insurance (excluding Social
Security), Medicare, public assistance medical care benefits (primarily Medicaid), income maintenance benefits (in-
cluding SSI, Food Stamps, and AFDC), unemployment insurance compensation, and education and training assistance.
43Card and Payne (2002) use a similar approach to characterize state-level school aid systems.
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higher rates of pre-recession poverty.44 Columns 7 and 8 divide the sample into counties with a
higher versus lower poverty rate in 1970. The effects are more severe in high poverty counties, as
predicted, but are not statistically different (p = 1.00). These results provide little evidence that
the recession exacerbated initial levels of disadvantage.
The comparisons in Table 1.4 examine whether the long-run effects of the recession were am-
plified by the severity of the recession at the state-level and whether they were mitigated by state
transfer programs. The comparisons also examine whether the recession deepened initial levels of
disadvantage. While point estimates suggest that the effects of the recession were more severe in
states with less generous transfers, in states with less progressive transfers, and in counties with
higher initial levels of poverty, all of the comparisons are statistically indistinguishable. More re-
search is needed to understand the factors that could exacerbate or mitigate the long-run effects on
education.
1.6 The Long-Run Effects of the Recession on Income, Wages, and Poverty
The previous section shows that the 1980-1982 recession led to a sizable long-run decrease in
college degree attainment. Standard models of worker productivity suggest that these reductions
in schooling should lower lifetime earnings and could increase economic disadvantage. To provide
evidence on this, I next examine the long-run effects on income, wages, and poverty.
Table 1.5 shows that the recession led to a lasting decrease in income and wages and a last-
ing increase in poverty. For individuals age 0-10 in 1979, the estimates imply that a 10 percent
decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 reduces personal income by 2.2 percent ($926),
earned income by 3.2 percent ($1,314), and hourly wages by 1.8 percent ($0.45).45 For the same
group, total family income falls by 3.7 percent ($2,961), and the probability of living in poverty
44Other channels, such as parental resources to pay for college, could also lead to more severe effects in high poverty
counties.
45Personal income is the sum of wage and salary, business and farm, welfare, Social Security, Supplementary
Security, investment, retirement, and other income. Earned income is wage and salary plus business and farm income.
To limit the influence of potential outliers in the self-reported income data, for each income category I replace values
above the 99.5th percentile in each survey year-by-state of residence cell with the average among those above the
99.5th percentile. I construct total and earned income as the sum of the non-imputed, top-code-adjusted components.
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increases by 13.9 percent (1.7 percentage points).46 Individuals who were age 11-19 in 1979 expe-
rience a similar decrease in income and wages and a slightly smaller increase in poverty.47 These
results indicate that the recession led to a sizable long-run decrease in individuals’ labor market
productivity and an increase in economic disadvantage. Because the recession might have nega-
tively affected individuals who were 29 years old in 1979, these estimates could be biased upwards
(i.e., too conservative).
The age-effect profiles in Table 1.5 differ somewhat from Table 1.2, which shows more se-
vere effects on college degree attainment for individuals who were younger when the recession
began. One likely explanation is life-cycle bias due to my inability to observe all individuals at
the same age (Haider and Solon, 2006). In particular, the effect of the recession on income early
in an individual’s career (i.e., for someone who was younger when the recession began) could be
biased upwards relative to the effect on lifetime income.48 Another possible explanation is that
the recession reduces the non-cognitive skills of adolescents, and that this decline in non-cognitive
skills reduces income more so than education (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Akee et al.,
46In constructing family income and poverty rates, I separate extended families living in the same household (see
Hoynes, Page and Stevens, 2006). I construct family interrelationship variables in the confidential Census/ACS data
using code that almost exactly matches the variables constructed by Ruggles et al. (2015) in IPUMS data.
47For completeness, Appendix Tables A.24 and A.25 present results for other outcomes, which are harder to inter-
pret given the possibility that the recession affected individuals who were 29 years old in 1979. In Table 1.5, the effect
of the recession on log family income is similar for individuals age 0-10 and 11-19 in 1979, but the effect on poverty
is twice as large for individuals age 0-10; this is largely explained by the fact that individuals who were 0-10 years old
in 1979 have slightly larger families, likely due to an increased propensity to live with their parents from 2000-2013.
48To see the role of life-cycle bias in my difference-in-differences model, suppose I only observe income in year
2000 for individuals born in 1950 and 1975. I divide counties into more (m) and less (`) severe recession counties.










where y251975,m is mean (residualized) income for individuals born in 1975 in a more severe recession county who
are observed at age 25. Because the recession reduces college degree attainment, the early career income difference
between individuals from a more versus less severe recession county is likely less negative than the lifetime income
difference, so that (y251975,m − y251975,`) > (ȳ1975,m − ȳ1975,`), where ȳ is mean lifetime income. In addition, the
late career income difference between individuals from a more versus less severe recession county could be more
negative than the lifetime income difference (e.g., because early career income is earned before the recession), so that
(y501950,m−y501950,`) < (ȳ1950,m−ȳ1950,`). Life-cycle bias is similar when estimating the model by 2SLS. Consequently,
both early and late career life-cycle bias could lead to an upwards bias in the difference-in-differences estimates. The
estimates in Haider and Solon (2006) suggest substantial life-cycle bias up to age 30. Because the 2000 Census has
more observations than the 2001-2013 ACS samples, my estimates place higher weight on earlier ages, which suggests
that life-cycle bias could be quantitatively important.
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2015). Even though life-cycle bias might attenuate the estimated effects on 0-10 year olds, these
results indicate that the 1980-1982 recession had considerable long-run effects on income, wages,
and poverty for individuals who were 0-19 years old in 1979.
Standard models of worker productivity suggest that the recession’s negative effects on educa-
tion should partly explain the negative effects on income and wages. To quantify the importance
of this channel, I estimate regressions that control for educational attainment (high school or GED
attainment, college attendance, two-year college degree attainment, and four-year college degree
attainment). If these controls eliminate the relationship between exposure to the recession and
income, then education could be the relevant mechanism. However, this approach might overstate
the importance of education by attributing to it any unobserved determinant of income that is pos-
itively correlated with education, such as unmeasured cognitive skills. As seen in Table 1.6, the
point estimates indicate that education can explain up to 56 percent of the effect on earned income,
90 percent of the effect on wages, and 42 percent of the effect on family income for individuals
age 0-10 in 1979. For individuals age 11-19 in 1979, education can explain up to 47 percent of the
effect on earned income, 37 percent of the effect on wages, and 32 percent of the effect on family
income.
Conditional on worker characteristics, wages vary considerably across local labor markets,
partly due to differences in employer characteristics and total factor productivity (Moretti, 2011).
As a result, the long-run effects on income and wages might arise partly from individuals’ tendency
to live and work near their place of birth, which experienced a persistent decrease in earnings per
capita following the 1980-1982 recession. To examine this, I estimates regressions that control
for individuals’ commuting zone of residence. This approach could overstate the importance of
location if unobserved determinants of income are positively correlated with living in a high in-
come labor market. For individuals age 0-10 in 1979, the point estimates in Table 1.6 indicate that
location can explain up to 65 percent of the effect on earned income, 101 percent of the effect on
wages, and 53 percent of the effect on family income. In sum, education and location could explain
a substantial, and similar amount, of the long-run effects on income and wages.
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Simple calculations reinforce the importance of education in explaining long-run effects on in-
come and wages. The effects of the recession on college degree attainment and the cross-sectional
income-schooling gradient suggest that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-
1982 should reduce earned income for individuals age 0-10 in 1979 by 2.0 percent through the
education channel alone.49 This accounts for 63 percent of the estimated effect on personal in-
come in Table 1.5, which is a 3.2 percent decrease. For individuals age 0-10 in 1979, the predicted
negative effects on wages and family income are 1.6 and 1.8 percent, while the estimated negative
effects are 1.8 and 3.7 percent.
Previous studies find that individuals who graduate from college during a recession experience
a lasting decline in earnings and wages relative to individuals who graduate into a stronger econ-
omy, partly due to working at lower paying employers (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter and
Heisz, 2012). This channel could explain some of the decrease in income and wages for individu-
als age 18-22 in 1979, as suggested by the similarity between previous estimates and the results in
Table 1.5.50 The estimates in Table 1.5 are also within the relatively wide range of effects predicted
by studies on the long-run effects of parental job displacement (Page, Stevens and Lindo, 2007;
Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage, 2008; Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008; Hilger, 2016).51
49In 2000 Census and 2001-2013 ACS data, the observed Mincerian returns to a two- and four-year degree are
0.285 log points and 0.705 log points for earned income. The returns in wages are 0.237 and 0.623, and the the returns
in family income are 0.294 and 0.696. I calculate these coefficients using an OLS regression for individuals born in
the U.S. from 1950-1979 who were age 25-64 in the survey year, controlling for a cubic in potential experience and
indicators for non-white, male, and survey year.
50The estimates in Kahn (2010) suggest that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 might
decrease wages of four-year college graduates by up to 7.6 percent in the long-run. In particular, she finds that a
1 percentage point increase in the state-level unemployment rate is associated with up to a 9.8 percent decrease in
wages 15 years after graduating from college (see column 4 of her Table 4); at the county-level, a 10 percent decrease
in earnings per capita from 1978-1982 is associated with a 7.7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate,
conditional on state fixed effects. Because 29.2 percent of individuals age 20-28 in 1979 obtain a four-year college
degree, Kahn’s estimates imply a decrease in wages for 20-28 year olds of 2.2 percent (= 0.292× 0.076) if only college
graduates’ wages decline. This prediction is slightly more negative than the point estimate in column 3 of Table 1.5,
but within the 95 percent confidence interval. Some estimates in Kahn (2010) and the estimates in Oreopoulos, von
Wachter and Heisz (2012) imply that college graduates’ wages and earnings recover after 10 or 15 years, broadly
consistent with the estimates in Table 1.5.
51Previous studies find that parental job displacement is associated with a 0 to 9 percent decrease in earnings (Page,
Stevens and Lindo, 2007; Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage, 2008; Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008; Hilger, 2016) for
children age 10-19 at the time of job loss. If job loss generated all of the county-level decrease in earnings per capita
from 1978-1982 and the recession only affected children whose parents lost a job, these estimates suggest that a 10
percent decrease in earnings per capita would decrease earned income by 0-9 percent.
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My estimates also relate to recent work by Chetty and Hendren (2016a,b), who estimate the ef-
fects on children of moving to a better neighborhood (i.e., county or commuting zone). Chetty and
Hendren study what happens when people move to worse (or better) places, where neighborhood
quality is fixed over time and measured by the income of permanent residents, while I study what
happens when the 1980-1982 recession makes places worse. For individuals age 0-10 in 1979, a
1 SD increase in recession severity has similar effects on family income as a 0.5 SD decrease in
the county quality measure of Chetty and Hendren throughout childhood.52 Chetty and Hendren
(2016b) do not find a strong correlation between local economic conditions in a county or CZ
and that place’s long-run effect on individuals. As they make clear, their empirical strategy does
not identify the causal effect of local economic conditions on long-run outcomes. In contrast, my
empirical strategy does.
1.7 Conclusion: The Long-Run Effects of Recessions
This paper provides new evidence on the long-run effects of recessions on education and in-
come. Using confidential Census data linked to county of birth and a generalized difference-in-
differences framework, I estimate the long-run effects of the 1980-1982 recession on individuals
who were children, adolescents, and young adults when the recession began. I find that the re-
cession generated sizable long-run reductions in education and income. For individuals age 0-10
in 1979, a 10 percent decrease in real earnings per capita in individuals’ birth county during the
recession leads to a 3.0 percentage point (9.4 percent) decrease in four-year college degree attain-
ment, a $1,314 (3.2 percent) decrease in earned income, and a 1.7 percentage point (13.9 percent)
increase in the probability of living in poverty as of 2000-2013.
My estimates, combined with the large number of potentially affected individuals, suggest
that the 1980-1982 recession could depress aggregate economic output today. To provide some
52A 1 SD increase in the severity of the recession amounts to a 11.4 percent decrease in earnings per capita from
1978-1982, which leads to a 4.2 percent (= 0.114 × 0.366) decrease in family income. Chetty and Hendren find that
each additional year of childhood spent in a 1 SD worse county leads to a 0.4 percent decrease in family earnings at
age 26, so spending 20 years in a 1 SD worse county leads to an 8 percent decrease in earnings (Chetty and Hendren,
2016b, p. 14).
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evidence on this possibility, Table 1.7 reports simple back of the envelope calculations that scale my
difference-in-differences estimates by the 105 million individuals who were born in the U.S. from
1951-1979.53 If I assume that all counties would have experienced no change in real earnings per
capita in the absence of the recession, these calculations suggest that the recession led to 899,000
fewer four-year college graduates, $64 billion less earned income per year, and 554,000 more
adults living in poverty each year. If I instead assume that all counties would have experienced
the average level of pre-recession growth in earnings per capita, these calculations suggest that the
recession led to 2.1 million fewer four-year college graduates, $145 billion less earned income per
year, and 1.3 million more adults living in poverty each year.54 These numbers amount to 1.3-3.0
percent of the stock of college-educated adults in 2015, 0.4-0.8 percent of GDP in 2015 and 0.9-2.0
percent of GDP in 1979, and 1.3-2.9 percent of the number of individuals in poverty in 2015.55
While these simple calculations could understate or overstate the aggregate effects, the 1980-1982
recession might considerably reduce aggregate economic output today.56
This paper shows that the 1980-1982 recession persistently decreased earnings per capita in
negatively affected counties, and individuals born in these counties have less education and income
as adults. While I have not examined whether other recessions have similar long-run effects, Figure
1.7 demonstrates a novel stylized fact that provides reason for concern: every U.S. recession since
53In particular, I calculate the aggregate effect of the recession on some long-run outcome for individuals who were




c −RCFc )(−π̂a), whereNa,c is the number of individuals born in county cwho would
have been age a in 1979, R78−82c is the observed change in log real earnings per capita from 1978-1982, R
CF
c is the
counterfactual change in log real earnings per capita, and π̂a is the difference-in-differences estimate from equation
(1.3), multiplied by −1 because I now use changes, instead of decreases, in log earnings per capita.
54From 1969-1978, real earnings per capita grew by 1.9 percent per year on average.
55There were 69 million individuals with a four-year college degree in 2015 (Ryan and Bauman, 2016). In 2014
dollars, U.S. GDP was $7.2 billion in 1979 and $18.2 billion in 2015, and there were 43 million individuals living in
poverty in 2015 (Proctor, Semega and Kollar, 2016).
56These simple calculations do not capture cohort-wide effects or general equilibrium adjustments, and they rely on
the linear approximation used in my difference-in-differences model. As a result, they could understate or overstate
the true aggregate effects. The resulting bias from not capturing cohort-wide effects is unclear, as these effects could
be positive or negative. For example, negative effects could arise from a nationwide increase in parental stress which
harmed long-run outcomes; in this case, the back of the envelope calculations would be too conservative, though it is
difficult to say by how much. General equilibrium adjustments suggest that back of the envelope calculations might
overstate the aggregate effect of the recession. For example, increasing the college degree attainment of individuals
born in one county might decrease the attainment of individuals born in other counties due to less than perfect elasticity
of supply of college education (Bound and Turner, 2007). Furthermore, these calculations are only for individuals born
from 1951-1979, and the recession could have negative effects on individuals born after 1979, including the children
of those born from 1951-1979.
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1973 has led to a persistent relative decrease in earnings per capita in negatively affected counties.57
The 1980-1982 recession is not unique in its persistent effects on county-level earnings per capita,
which suggests that it might not be unique in its long-run effects on children. Directly examining
the long-run effects of other recessions would be valuable.
These results raise several questions for future research. First, can government policies mitigate
the long-run effects of recessions? While it is important to account for the costs of any mitigating
policy, my results suggest that there could be sizable benefits. Evidence on the mechanisms that
underlie recessions’ long-run effects could point to potentially effective policies. Second, why do
recessions lead to a persistent decline in local economic activity? Evidence on the household- and
firm-level behavior that generate this pattern would shed light on the long-run effects of recessions
and, more generally, how local labor markets respond to economic shocks.
57The figure plots the percent difference in earnings per capita between counties with a more versus less severe
recession, normalized to equal zero at the onset of the recession. The counties with a more versus less severe recession
are defined separately for each recession.
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Table 1.1: Aggregate Employment Changes from 1978-1982, by Industry
Share of Log
total 1978 employment Employment
employment change change
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Overall and one-digit industries
All industries 1.000 0.064 4,545,523
Manufacturing 0.289 -0.045 -880,902
Construction 0.058 -0.043 -170,951
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.004 0.198 59,091
Transportation and public utilities 0.062 0.070 310,444
Mining 0.012 0.358 353,059
Wholesale trade 0.070 0.082 418,200
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.070 0.112 576,696
Retail trade 0.206 0.057 840,051
Services 0.221 0.190 3,214,746
Panel B: Two-digit industries with largest employment decrease
Auto dealers (retail trade) 0.028 -0.120 -212,068
Transportation equipment (manufacturing) 0.025 -0.135 -206,023
Primary metal (manufacturing) 0.017 -0.183 -185,395
Lumber and wood products (manufacturing) 0.011 -0.239 -154,868
General contractors (construction) 0.017 -0.132 -140,851
Textile mill products (manufacturing) 0.013 -0.171 -135,377
Apparel and other textile products (manufacturing) 0.019 -0.098 -120,553
Stone, clay, and glass products (manufacturing) 0.010 -0.157 -92,833
Fabricated metal products (manufacturing) 0.024 -0.059 -91,861
Trucking and warehousing (transportation) 0.019 -0.054 -66,322
Panel C: Two-digit industries with largest employment increase
Nondurables (wholesale trade) 0.028 0.088 174,462
Social services (services) 0.013 0.183 177,258
Durables (wholesale trade) 0.041 0.074 210,445
Depository institutions (finance) 0.021 0.145 212,866
Oil and gas extraction (mining) 0.005 0.602 284,491
Food stores (retail trade) 0.031 0.141 309,392
Miscellaneous services (services) 0.011 0.376 342,560
Eating and drinking places (retail trade) 0.060 0.118 501,927
Business services (services) 0.038 0.236 678,268
Health services (services) 0.070 0.223 1,166,838
Notes: I construct this table by aggregating county-level data for the continental United States. Because em-
ployment is often suppressed at the county-level, I impute employment using the number of establishments
and nationwide information on average employment by establishment size, as described in Appendix A.1.
Source: Census County Business Patterns
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Table 1.2: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Educational Attainment
Dependent variable:
Any Four-year Two-year
Any college college college
HS/GED college degree degree degree Years of
attainment attendance attainment attainment attainment schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 0.0394 -0.0377 -0.184*** -0.303*** 0.119** -0.417
(0.0392) (0.0522) (0.0678) (0.109) (0.0600) (0.373)
11-19 0.0380 -0.0987 -0.122** -0.159** 0.0369 -0.0831
(0.0311) (0.0664) (0.0586) (0.0801) (0.0481) (0.309)
20-28 0.0172 -0.0540 0.0263 0.0306 -0.0043 0.361*
(0.0263) (0.0507) (0.0363) (0.0426) (0.0333) (0.204)
Panel B: Average value of dependent variable in years 2000-2013, by age in 1979
0-10 0.936 0.588 0.414 0.321 0.093 13.57
11-19 0.932 0.537 0.380 0.288 0.093 13.39
20-28 0.933 0.540 0.381 0.292 0.090 13.41
Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita
in individuals’ birth county and indicators for age in 1979. The interaction for individuals age 29 is normalized
to equal zero. Regressions include fixed effects for race, sex, birth county, age in 1979-by-birth state, and survey
year, plus age in 1979 interacted with the 1950-1970 change in log real median family income in individuals’
birth county and a cubic in age at time of survey. Regressions are estimated by 2SLS, using the predicted log
employment change in all industries from 1978-1982 as an instrumental variable. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by birth state. The sample in Panel A contains 23.5 million individuals born in the continental U.S.
from 1950-1979 with a unique birth county and non-imputed variables. Panel B reports average values of the
dependent variable for a comparable sample from publicly available 2000 Census and 2001-2013 ACS data.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data from Ruggles
et al. (2015)
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Table 1.3: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Educational Attainment, Hetero-
geneity by Sex and Race
Dependent variable:
Any Four-year Two-year
Any college college college
HS/GED college degree degree degree Years of
attainment attendance attainment attainment attainment schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Heterogeneity by sex
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979 for men
0-10 -0.0118 -0.148** -0.213** -0.261** 0.0476 -0.290
(0.0495) (0.0733) (0.0830) (0.108) (0.0469) (0.422)
11-19 -0.0175 -0.181** -0.188*** -0.165* -0.0235 -0.280
(0.0473) (0.0878) (0.0709) (0.0876) (0.0443) (0.397)
20-28 -0.0081 -0.0737 -0.0081 0.0050 -0.0131 0.234
(0.0392) (0.0676) (0.0480) (0.0621) (0.0443) (0.303)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979 for women
0-10 0.0864* 0.0793 -0.146** -0.335*** 0.189** -0.495
(0.0469) (0.0619) (0.0723) (0.118) (0.0873) (0.416)
11-19 0.0895** -0.0078 -0.0484 -0.147* 0.0983 0.136
(0.0394) (0.0605) (0.0666) (0.0847) (0.0728) (0.343)
20-28 0.0405 -0.0239 0.0684 0.0609 0.0074 0.512*
(0.0367) (0.0499) (0.0497) (0.0459) (0.0346) (0.287)
p-value, equal effects 0.007 0.001 0.034 0.014 0.170 0.013
Panel B: Heterogeneity by race
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979 for whites
0-10 -0.0045 -0.141** -0.286*** -0.403*** 0.116* -0.989**
(0.0334) (0.0666) (0.0949) (0.146) (0.0632) (0.483)
11-19 0.0031 -0.166** -0.192** -0.229** 0.0372 -0.493
(0.0278) (0.0751) (0.0757) (0.108) (0.0523) (0.371)
20-28 0.0054 -0.0755 0.0081 0.0137 -0.0056 0.271
(0.0234) (0.0511) (0.0409) (0.0515) (0.0369) (0.205)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979 for non-whites
0-10 0.425** 0.468** 0.168 -0.0064 0.174** 2.153*
(0.181) (0.199) (0.144) (0.110) (0.0887) (1.188)
11-19 0.325*** 0.324** 0.175 0.111 0.0633 2.032**
(0.0977) (0.138) (0.116) (0.0926) (0.0780) (0.829)
20-28 0.134* 0.142 0.134 0.0956 0.0388 1.075*
(0.0686) (0.115) (0.102) (0.0912) (0.0797) (0.585)
p-value, equal effects 0.006 0.014 0.046 0.056 0.739 0.013
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. I estimate separate 2SLS regressions for men and women (Panel A) and whites and
non-whites (Panel B). The p-value is for the null hypothesis that the effects of the recession are equal for men and
women or whites and non-whites.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table 1.4: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree Attainment, Heterogeneity by Features of
Birth State and County
Type of heterogeneity: State recession State mean transfers State transfer slope Poverty in county
More Less Less More Less More Less More
severe severe generous generous progressive progressive poverty poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.179** -0.387** -0.378** -0.257* -0.339** -0.235* -0.252 -0.337
(0.0719) (0.192) (0.173) (0.133) (0.149) (0.139) (0.905) (0.521)
11-19 -0.0940 -0.205 -0.161 -0.157 -0.193** -0.0955 -0.119 -0.185
(0.0631) (0.138) (0.131) (0.103) (0.0965) (0.152) (0.272) (0.193)
20-28 0.0190 0.0365 0.0130 0.0417 0.0135 0.0625 0.0449 0.0212
(0.0701) (0.0586) (0.0657) (0.0586) (0.0509) (0.0899) (0.196) (0.125)
p-value, equal effects 0.616 0.498 0.956 0.998
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. I estimate separate 2SLS regressions for each dimension of heterogeneity. The p-value is for the null hypothesis that the effects
of the recession are equal across columns. States with a more severe recession are those with an above-median decrease in log real earnings per capita from
1978-1982. States with less generous mean transfers are those with below-median transfers per capita in 1970, conditional on demographic and economic
covariates. States with a less progressive transfer slope are those with an above-median slope coefficient from a regression of log transfers per capita on log
median family income in 1970, conditional on demographic and economic covariates. Counties with less poverty are those with a below median poverty rate in
1970. See text for details.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file,
Census County Data Book
37
Table 1.5: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Income, Wages, and Poverty
Dependent variable:
Log Log Log Log
personal earned hourly family In
income income wage income poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.217* -0.321** -0.178* -0.366** 0.168***
(0.120) (0.126) (0.0994) (0.166) (0.0493)
11-19 -0.228** -0.272*** -0.318*** -0.351*** 0.0766**
(0.0976) (0.0984) (0.115) (0.122) (0.0349)
20-28 -0.0872 -0.0819 -0.118* -0.135* 0.0182
(0.0817) (0.0902) (0.0699) (0.0760) (0.0254)
Panel B: Average value of dependent variable in years 2000-2013, by age in 1979, in levels
0-10 42,666 40,942 25.52 80,892 0.122
11-19 51,232 48,391 29.81 93,896 0.103
20-28 54,089 48,880 32.04 98,157 0.092
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. The sample in columns 1-4 contains 15.6 million individuals born from 1950-1979
in the continental U.S. with a unique birth county, non-imputed variables, and positive values of family income,
earned income, personal income, and wage. The sample in column 5 contains 18.4 million individuals born from
1950-1979 in the continental U.S. with a unique birth county and non-imputed variables. All monetary variables
are in 2014 dollars.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data from Ruggles
et al. (2015)
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Table 1.6: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Income and Wages, Conditional
on Educational Attainment and Commuting Zone of Residence
Share of effect explained by
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in CZ of
log real earnings per capita and age in 1979 Education Residence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Dependent variable is log earned income
0-10 -0.321** -0.143 -0.114 0.555 0.645
(0.126) (0.108) (0.110)
11-19 -0.272*** -0.143 -0.121 0.474 0.555
(0.0984) (0.0878) (0.0798)
20-28 -0.0819 -0.0601 -0.0165 0.266 0.799
(0.0902) (0.0883) (0.0963)
Panel B: Dependent variable is log hourly wage
0-10 -0.178* -0.0171 0.0025 0.904 1.014
(0.0994) (0.0854) (0.0769)
11-19 -0.318*** -0.202** -0.185** 0.365 0.418
(0.115) (0.0912) (0.0820)
20-28 -0.118* -0.0971 -0.0620 0.177 0.475
(0.0699) (0.0638) (0.0624)
Panel C: Dependent variable is log family income
0-10 -0.366** -0.214 -0.174 0.415 0.525
(0.166) (0.145) (0.130)
11-19 -0.351*** -0.240** -0.209** 0.316 0.405
(0.122) (0.101) (0.0903)




CZ of residence X
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. Education controls include high school or GED attainment, college attendance,
two-year college degree attainment, and four-year college degree attainment. CZ of residence control is a fixed
effect. Column 4 equals the ratio of column 1 minus column 2 and column 1. Column 5 equals the ratio of
column 1 minus column 3 and column 1. The sample contains 15.6 million individuals born from 1950-1979
with a unique birth county, non-imputed variables, and positive values of family income, earned income, personal
income, and wage.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table 1.7: Back of the Envelope Calculations of the Aggregate Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982
Recession
Counterfactual 1: No real earnings Counterfactual 2: Trend real earnings
per capita growth, 1978-1982 per capita growth, 1978-1982
Number Four-year Earned Adults Four-year Earned Adults
of births, college income, living in college income, living in
mil. graduates bil. $ poverty graduates bil. $ poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age in 1979
0-10 36.0 -643,700 -27.9 356,903 -1,473,351 -63.9 816,908
11-19 34.1 -324,478 -26.9 156,321 -737,019 -61.0 355,067
20-28 34.6 68,998 -9.0 41,038 149,447 -19.6 88,887
0-28 104.8 -899,180 -63.8 554,261 -2,060,924 -144.5 1,260,861
Notes: Table displays back of the envelope calculations of the aggregate long-run effects of the 1980-1982 reces-




c − RCFc )(−π̂a), where
Na,c is the number of individuals born in county c net of infant mortality, R78−82c is the observed change in log
real earnings per capita from 1978-1982 in county c, RCFc is the counterfactual change in log real earnings per
capita from 1978-1982, and π̂a is the difference-in-differences estimate. In counterfactual 1, I set RCFc = 0 and
in counterfactual 2, RCFc = 0.076, which corresponds to the average annual growth in earnings per capita from
1969-1978 of 1.9 percent. Column 1 reports the total number of births for each age group, net of infant mortality
(
∑
cNa,c). Columns 2 and 5 use difference-in-differences estimates from column 4 of Table 1.2. Columns 3 and
6 use estimates from column 2 of Table 1.5. Columns 4 and 7 use estimates from column 5 of Table 1.5.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Birth and infant mortality data from Bailey et al. (2016)
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Figure 1.1: Normalized Mean Real Earnings per Capita, by County-Level Severity of the 1980-
1982 Recession



































Notes: Figure displays population-weighted mean real earnings per capita, among counties with a below and above
median 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita. I calculate the median using 1978 population weights. I
adjust the less severe recession line to equal the more severe recession line in 1978, which amounts to a downward
shift of $2,110. Sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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Figure 1.2: Log Real Earnings per Capita Change, 1978-1982
Notes: Figure displays the county-level change in log real earnings per capita from 1978-1982, which I use to measure the severity of the 1980-1982 recession.
Categories correspond to unweighted deciles, with darker shades of red representing a more severe recession.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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Figure 1.3: Log Real Earnings per Capita Change and Predicted Log Employment Change, 1978-
1982
Regression with state fixed effects
   Slope: 0.345 (0.068), F = 25.9
   Total R2 = 0.401
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Predicted log employment change, 1978-1982
Notes: Predicted log employment change is constructed using a county’s 1976 industrial structure and the industry-
level log employment change from 1978-1982 in other states within the same region, as defined in equation (1.1). The
reported estimates and best fit line come from a regression that includes state fixed effects and clusters standard errors
by state. Sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts and Census County Business Patterns
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1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Model 1: County and state-by-year fixed effects
Model 2:    + year-by-1950-1970 log median income change
Notes: Figure plots the estimated coefficients on interactions between year and the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita, where the coefficient for 1980 is normalized to equal zero. The dependent variable is log real
median family income for 1950-1990 and log real median household income for 2000. Regressions are estimated by
2SLS, using the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 as an instrumental variable. The dashed lines are
pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by state. Sample is limited to the 2,550
counties with less than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Min-
nesota Population Center (2011)
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Figure 1.5: Hypothesized Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on College Degree At-





































0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Age in 1979
Childhood human capital
Opportunity cost of college
Parental resources for college
Costless out-migration
Notes: Figure displays hypothesized effects of the 1980-1982 recession on college degree attainment from different
underlying channels. I model the recession as a persistent, one-time decrease in local labor demand, which is consistent
with the effects of the 1980-1982 recession on counties. The recession could decrease college degree attainment by
reducing parental and community investments in childhood human capital. The recession could increase college degree
attainment by reducing the opportunity cost of forgone earnings. In the presence of credit constraints, the recession
could decrease college degree attainment by reducing parental resources to finance college. There might be no effect if
parents out-migrate from negatively affected areas and there are no disruption costs of moving. See text for additional
discussion.
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Figure 1.6: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree At-
tainment
Comparison Group:
Age 23-28 in 1979
Exposed to Recession:
Age 0-22 in 1979






























0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Age in 1979
Unadjusted for pre-recession migration
Adjusted for pre-recession migration
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita in
individuals’ county of birth and indicators for age in 1979. The interaction for individuals age 29 is normalized to
equal zero. The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. The regression includes
fixed effects for race, sex, birth county, age in 1979-by-birth state, and survey year, plus age in 1979 interacted with the
1950-1970 change in log real median family income in individuals’ birth county and a cubic in age at time of survey.
The regression is estimated by 2SLS, using the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 as an instrumental
variable. The dashed lines are pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by state.
To increase precision, I combine ages 0-1, 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, 11-13, 14-16, 17-19, 20-22, 23-25, and 26-28. The sample
contains 23.5 million individuals born in the continental U.S. from 1950-1979 with a unique birth county and non-
imputed variables. The line that adjusts for pre-recession migration divides the unadjusted estimates by the coefficient
from regressing the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita in county of residence on the 1978-1982
decrease in log real earnings per capita in county of birth, using individuals born from 1990-2013.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS
data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure 1.7: Percent Difference in Mean Real Earnings per Capita between Counties with More
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Notes: Figure displays the difference in population-weighted mean real earnings per capita between counties with
a more versus less severe recession, as a share of the less severe recession mean. Separately for each recession, I
classify counties with a more recession as those with an above median decrease in log real earnings per capita from
1973-1975, 1978-1982, 1989-1991, 2000-2002, and 2007-2010. I calculate the medians using population weights in
the starting years. The starting years are the years in which aggregate real earnings per capita decline. Each line is
normalized to equal zero in the starting year via a parallel shift upwards or downwards. For reference, NBER recession
dates are November 1973 to March 1975; January 1980 to July 1980 and July 1981 to November 1982; July 1990 to
March 1991; March 2001 to November 2001; and December 2007 to June 2009. Sample contains 3,076 counties in
the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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CHAPTER II
Social Interactions and Location Decisions: Evidence from U.S.
Mass Migration
2.1 Introduction
A large and growing literature finds that social interactions influence many economic outcomes,
such as educational attainment, crime, and employment (for recent reviews, see Blume et al., 2010;
Epple and Romano, 2011; Munshi, 2011; Topa, 2011). While economists have long-recognized
the role of location decisions in shaping individual and aggregate economic outcomes, there is lit-
tle evidence on the importance of social interactions in location decisions, and even less evidence
on the types of individuals or economic environments for whom social interactions are most im-
portant. Evidence on the magnitude and nature of social interactions in location decisions informs
theoretical models of migration, the role of migration in equilibrating local labor markets, and the
likely impacts of policies that affect migration incentives.
This paper provides new evidence on the magnitude and nature of social interactions in location
decisions. We focus on the mass migrations of African Americans from the South and whites
from the Great Plains in the mid-twentieth century. The millions of moves made during these
episodes yield particularly valuable settings for studying the long-run effects of social interactions
on location decisions. We use confidential administrative data that measure town of birth and
county of residence at old age for most of the U.S. population born between 1916 and 1936.
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Detailed geographic information allows us to separate birth town-level social interactions from
other determinants of location decisions, such as expected wages or moving costs. For example,
we observe that 51 percent of African-American migrants born from 1916-1936 in Pigeon Creek,
Alabama moved to Niagara County, New York, while less than six percent of black migrants from
nearby towns moved to the same county.
To study this context, we develop a new method of characterizing social interactions in location
decisions. We formulate an intuitive “social interactions (SI) index,” that can be applied to other
discrete choice settings. This index allows us to estimate the strength of social interactions for
each receiving and sending location, which we can then relate to locations’ economic characteris-
tics. Existing methods are not suited to identifying the strength of social interactions for multiple
receiving and sending locations. In particular, extending the widely used approach of Bayer, Ross
and Topa (2008), who focus on a binomial outcome, to our multinomial-outcome setting could
ascribe strong social interactions to popular destinations even if social interactions were relatively
unimportant. Under straightforward and partly testable assumptions, our method identifies the
effect of social interactions, and the SI index maps directly to social interaction models.
We find very strong social interactions among Southern black migrants and smaller interactions
among whites from the Great Plains. Our estimates imply that if we observed one randomly chosen
African American move from a birth town to some destination, then on average 1.9 additional black
migrants from that birth town would make the same move. For white migrants from the Great
Plains, the average is only 0.4, and results for Southern whites are similarly small. Interpreted
through the social interactions model of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), our estimates
imply that 49 percent of African-American migrants chose their long-run destination because of
social interactions, while 16 percent of Great Plains whites were similarly influenced.
To understand the nature of social interactions in location decisions, we examine whether eco-
nomic characteristics of receiving and sending locations are associated with stronger social inter-
actions. Social interactions among African Americans were stronger in destination counties with a
higher share of 1910 employment in manufacturing, a particularly attractive sector for black work-
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ers. This evidence highlights an important role for job referrals in determining location decisions,
and suggests that job referrals were more valuable in locations with better employment opportu-
nities. We also find that social interactions were weaker in more distant destinations, pointing to
the importance of access to information and low mobility costs. Social interactions were stronger
in destinations with fewer African Americans in 1900, suggesting that networks helped migrants
find opportunities in new places. Social interactions also were stronger in poorer sending counties,
consistent with poorer migrants relying more heavily on social networks.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of our empirical strategy. Our research design
asks whether individuals born in the same town were more likely to live in the same destination in
old age than individuals born in nearby towns. This design implies that social interaction estimates
should not change when controlling for observed birth town level covariates, because geographic
proximity controls for the relevant determinants of location decisions. Reassuringly, we find that
our estimates are essentially unchanged when adding meaningful covariates. We also estimate
strong social interactions in a small number of locations, like Rock County, Wisconsin, for which
rich qualitative work supports our findings (Bell, 1933; Rubin, 1960; Wilkerson, 2010).
We believe this paper makes three contributions. First, we develop a new method of charac-
terizing the magnitude and nature of social interactions. Our approach builds on previous work
on social interactions (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008;
Graham, 2008) and can be used to study social interactions in a variety of other settings. Second,
we provide new evidence on the importance of social interactions for location decisions and the
types of individuals and economic environments for which social interactions are most important.
Previous work shows that individuals tend to migrate to the same areas, often broadly defined, as
other individuals from the same town or country, but does not isolate the role of social interac-
tions (Bartel, 1989; Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2005; Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011; Giuletti,
Wahba and Zenou, 2014; Spitzer, 2014).1 Third, our results inform landmark migration episodes
that have drawn interest from economists for almost a century (Scroggs, 1917; Smith and Welch,
1A notable exception is Chen, Jin and Yue (2010), who study the impact of peer migration on temporary location
decisions in China, but lack detailed geographic information on where individuals move.
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1989; Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2009, 2010; Horn-
beck, 2012; Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014; Johnson and Taylor, 2014; Black et al., 2015a; Collins
and Wanamaker, 2015). Our empirical evidence complements the small number of possibly un-
representative historical accounts suggesting that social interactions might have been important in
these migration episodes (Rubin, 1960; Gottlieb, 1987; Gregory, 1989).
Our paper also complements interesting work by Chay and Munshi (2015). They find that,
above a threshold, migrants born in counties with higher plantation crop intensity tend to move to
fewer locations, as measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and this non-linear relationship is
consistent with a network formation model with fixed costs of participation. We differ from Chay
and Munshi (2015) in our empirical methodology, study of white migrants from the Great Plains
and South, and examination of how social interactions vary with destination characteristics.
2.2 Historical Background on Mass Migration Episodes
The Great Migration saw nearly six million African Americans leave the South from 1910 to
1970 (Census, 1979). Although migration was concentrated in certain destinations, like Chicago,
Detroit, and New York, other cities also experienced dramatic changes. For example, Chicago’s
black population share increased from two to 32 percent from 1910-1970, while Racine, Wisconsin
experienced an increase from 0.3 to 10.5 percent (Gibson and Jung, 2005). Migration out of the
South increased from 1910-1930, slowed during the Great Depression, and then resumed forcefully
from 1940 to the 1970’s. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that the vast majority of African American
migrants born from 1916-1936, who comprise our analysis sample described below, moved out of
the South between 1940 and 1960. Most migrants in these cohorts moved North between age 15
and 35 (Panel A of Appendix Figure B.1).
Several factors contributed to the exodus of African Americans from the South. World War
I, which simultaneously led to an increase in labor demand among Northern manufacturers and a
decrease in European immigrant labor supply, helped spark the Great Migration, although many
underlying causes existed long before the war (Scroggs, 1917; Scott, 1920; Gottlieb, 1987; Marks,
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1989; Jackson, 1991; Collins, 1997; Gregory, 2005). The underlying causes included a less devel-
oped Southern economy, the decline in agricultural labor demand due to the boll weevil’s destruc-
tion of crops (Scott, 1920; Marks, 1989, 1991; Lange, Olmstead and Rhode, 2009), widespread
labor market discrimination (Marks, 1991), and racial violence and unequal treatment under Jim
Crow laws (Tolnay and Beck, 1991).
Migrants tended to follow paths established by railroad lines: Mississippi-born migrants pre-
dominantly moved to Illinois and other Midwestern states, and South Carolina-born migrants pre-
dominantly moved to New York and Pennsylvania (Scott, 1920; Carrington, Detragiache and Vish-
wanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2010; Black et al., 2015a). Labor agents, who offered paid
transportation, employment, and housing, directed some of the earliest migrants, but their role di-
minished sharply after the 1920’s (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989). Most individuals paid for the
relatively expensive train fares themselves. In 1918, train fare from New Orleans to Chicago cost
$22 per person, at a time when Southern farmers’ daily wages typically were less than $1, and
wages at Southern factories were less than $2.50 (Henri, 1975). African-American newspapers
from the largest destinations circulated throughout the South, providing information on life in the
North (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989).2 Blacks attempting to leave the South sometimes faced
violence (Scott, 1920; Henri, 1975).
A small number of historical accounts suggest a role for social interactions in location deci-
sions. Social networks, consisting primarily of family, friends, and church members, provided
valuable job references or shelter (Rubin, 1960; Gottlieb, 1987). For example, Rubin (1960) finds
that migrants from Houston, Mississippi had close friends or family at two-thirds of all initial
destinations.3 These accounts motivate our focus on birth town-level social interactions.
The experience of John McCord, born in Pontotoc, Mississippi, captures many important fea-
tures of early black migrants’ location decision.4 In search of higher wages, nineteen-year-old
2The Chicago Defender, perhaps the most prominent African-American newspaper of the time, was read in 1,542
Southern towns and cities in 1919 (Grossman, 1989).
3Rubin (1960) studied individuals from Houston, Mississippi because so many migrants from Houston moved to
Beloit, Wisconsin; this is clearly not a representative sample.
4The following paragraph draws on Bell (1933). See also Knowles (2010).
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McCord traveled in 1912 to Savannah, Illinois, where a fellow Pontotoc-native connected him
with a job. McCord moved to Beloit, Wisconsin in 1914 after hearing of opportunities there and
started within a week as a janitor at the manufacturer Fairbanks Morse and Company. After two
years in Beloit, McCord spoke to his manager about returning home for a vacation. The manager
asked McCord to recruit workers during the trip. McCord returned with 18 unmarried men, all
of whom soon were hired. Thus began a persistent flow of African Americans from Pontotoc to
Beloit: among individuals born from 1916-1936, 14 percent of migrants from Pontotoc lived in
Beloit’s county at old age (see Table 2.2, discussed below).
Migration out of the Great Plains has received less attention from researchers than the Great
Migration, but nonetheless represents a landmark reshuffling of the U.S. population. Considerable
out-migration from the Great Plains started around 1930 (Johnson and Rathge, 2006). Among
whites born in the Great Plains from 1916-1936, the most rapid out-migration occurred from 1940-
1960, as seen in Panel B of Figure 2.1. Most migrants in these cohorts left the Great Plains by age
35 (Panel B of Appendix Figure B.1). Explanations for the out-migration include the decline in
agricultural prices due to the Great Depression, a drop in agricultural productivity due to drought,
and the mechanization of agriculture (Gregory, 1989; Curtis White, 2008; Hurt, 2011; Hornbeck,
2012). Some historical work points to an important role for social interactions in location decisions
(Jamieson, 1942; Gregory, 1989).5
The mass migrations out of the South and Great Plains are similar on several dimensions. Both
episodes featured millions of long-distance moves, as individuals sought better economic and so-
cial opportunities. Furthermore, both episodes saw a similar share of the population undertake
long-distance moves. Figure 2.2 shows that 97 percent of blacks born in the South and 90 percent
of whites born in the Great Plains lived in their birth region in 1910, and out-migration reduced
this share to 75 percent for both groups by 1970. Both African American and white migrants
experienced discrimination in many destinations, although African Americans faced more severe
discrimination and had less wealth (Collins and Margo, 2001; Gregory, 2005). This context in-
5Jamieson (1942) finds that almost half of migrants to Marysville, California had friends or family living there.
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forms the interpretation of our results on the relationship between social interactions and location
decisions.
2.3 Estimating Social Interactions in Location Decisions
We seek to answer two key questions. First, how important were social interactions in the
location decisions of migrants from the South and Great Plains? Second, was the strength of so-
cial interactions for receiving and sending locations systematically related to locations’ economic
characteristics? This section describes a new method of characterizing social interactions that can
answer these questions.
2.3.1 Data on Location Decisions
We use confidential administrative data to measure location decisions made during the mass
migration episodes. In particular, we use the Duke University SSA/Medicare dataset, which covers
over 70 million individuals who received Medicare Part B from 1976-2001. The data contain sex,
race, date of birth, date of death (if deceased), and the ZIP code of residence at old age (death or
2001, whichever is earlier). In addition, the data include a 12-character string with self-reported
birth town information, which is matched to place data, as described in Black et al. (2015a). We use
the data to measure long-run migration from birth town to destination county for individuals born
from 1916-1936; this sample is at the center of both mass migration episodes and likely contains
very few parent-child pairs.6 To improve the reliability of our estimates, we restrict the sample to
birth towns with at least ten migrants and group together all destination counties with less than ten
migrants from a given birth state.
Panels A and B of Figure 2.3 display the states we include in the South and Great Plains. For
migration out of the South, we study individuals born in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.7 We define a migrant as someone who moved
6Our sample begins with the 1916 cohort because coverage rates are low for prior years (Black et al., 2015a) and
ends with 1936 because that is the last cohort available in the data.
7Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Carolinas shared an economic and demographic structure that
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out of the 11 Confederate states.8 For migration out of the Great Plains, we study individuals
born in Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. We define a migrant as
someone who moved out of the Great Plains and a border region, shaded in light grey in Panel
B.9 We make these choices to focus on the long-distance moves that characterize both migration
episodes.
Our data capture long-run location decisions, as we only observe an individual’s location at
birth and old age. We cannot identify return migration: if an individual moved from Mississippi to
Wisconsin, then returned to Mississippi at age 60, we do not count that person as a migrant. We
also do not observe individuals who die before age 65 or do not enroll in Medicare. We discuss the
implications of these measurement issues below.
2.3.2 Econometric Model: The Social Interactions Index
We first introduce some notation and discuss the basic idea underlying our approach to esti-
mating social interactions.10 Let Di,j,k = 1 if migrant i moves from birth town j to destination
county k and Di,j,k = 0 if migrant i moves elsewhere. The probability of a migrant born in town
j choosing destination k is Pj,k ≡ E[Di,j,k]. This probability reflects individuals’ preferences,
resources, and the expected return to migration, but does not depend on other individuals’ real-
ized location decisions. The number of people who move from birth town j to destination k is
Nj,k ≡
∑
i∈j Di,j,k, and the number of migrants from birth town j is Nj ≡
∑
kNj,k.
A key result in the literature is that positive social interactions yield more variance in decisions
than would occur in the absence of social interactions (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman,
1996; Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008; Graham, 2008). To see this, imagine that we observed multiple
realizations of Nj,k from a fixed data generating process. The variance of location decisions for a
differed from the rest of the South. We include Florida for completeness, though it differed from the other Southern
states (Gregory, 2005).
8These include the seven states already listed, plus Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
9This border region includes Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, and
Wyoming.
10Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Blume et al. (2010) provide comprehensive discussions of various approaches to
estimating social interaction.
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= NjPj,k(1− Pj,k) +Nj(Nj − 1)Cj,k, (2.1)
whereCj,k ≡
∑
i 6=i′∈j C[Di,j,k, Di′,j,k]/(Nj(Nj−1)) is the average covariance of location decisions
for two migrants from the same town. Positive social interaction (Cj,k > 0) clearly increases the
variance of location decisions. In a counterfactual world where we observe multiple observations
of Nj,k, we could directly estimate Pj,k,V[Nj,k], and Cj,k. Because we observe a single set of
location decisions for each (j, k) pair, we use an econometric model to estimate social interaction.
For our econometric model, a natural starting point is the widely used approach of Bayer, Ross
and Topa (2008), who propose an empirical strategy that uses excess variance to identify social
interactions and exploits detailed geographic data, which we have. Extending their model to our
setting yields




′) = j] + εi,i′,k, (2.2)
where j(i) is the birth town of migrant i, and both i and i′ live in birth town group g. As described
below, we define birth town groups in two ways: counties and square grids independent of county
borders. The fixed effect αg,k equals the average propensity of migrants from birth town group g
to co-locate in destination k, while βj,k equals the additional propensity of individuals from the
same birth town j to co-locate in k.11 Equation (2.2) allows location decision determinants to vary
arbitrarily at the birth town group-destination level through αg,k (e.g., because of differences in
migration costs due to railroad lines or highways).
11Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) study the propensity of workers from the same census block to work together, beyond
the propensity of workers from the same block group (a larger geographic area) to work together. Their outcome is
binary: whether two individuals work in the same census block. In their initial specification, αg,k does not vary by
k, and βj,k does not vary by j or k. In other specifications, they allow the slope coefficient to depend on observed
characteristics of the pair (i, i′).
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To better understand the reduced-form model in equation (2.2), we show how to map the pa-
rameters of the extended Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) model, (αg,k, βj,k), into classic parameters
governing social interaction, (Pj,k, Cj,k). Doing so requires two assumptions. The most important
assumption is that Pj,k is constant across nearby birth towns in the same group:
Assumption 1. Pj,k = Pj′,k for different birth towns in the same birth town group, j 6= j′ ∈ g.
Assumption 1 formalizes the idea that there are no ex-ante differences across nearby birth
towns in the value of moving to destination k. For example, this assumes away the possibility that
migrants from Pigeon Creek, Alabama had preferences or human capital particularly suited for
Niagara Falls, New York relative to migrants from a nearby town, such as Oaky Streak, which was
6 miles away. This assumption attributes large differences in realized moving propensities across
nearby towns to social interactions. Assumption 1 covers the probability of choosing a destination,
conditional on migrating; we make no assumptions regarding out-migration probabilities.
Assumption 1 is plausible in our setting. Preferences for destination features (e.g., wages or
climate) likely did not vary sharply across nearby birth towns. Potential migrants had little informa-
tion about most destinations outside of what was provided through social networks. Furthermore,
African Americans tended to work in different industries in the North and South, suggesting a neg-
ligible role for human capital specific to a birth town, destination county pair. The fixed effect αg,k
soaks up broader variation in human capital, such as the fact that some Great Plains migrants chose
specific locations in California to pick cotton (Gregory, 1989). Conditional on out-migration, the
cost of moving to a specific destination likely did not vary sharply across nearby towns.12
Importantly, Assumption 1 yields a testable prediction. This assumption relies on geographic
proximity to control for the relevant determinants of location decisions. As a result, using observed
birth town-level covariates to explain moving probabilities should not affect estimates of Pj,k or our
social interaction estimates. As discussed in detail below, we test this prediction and find evidence
consistent with Assumption 1.
The second assumption is that social interaction occurs only among individuals from the same
12Assumption 1 is not violated if the cost of moving to all destinations varied sharply across birth towns (e.g.,
because of proximity to a railroad), as we focus on where people move, conditional on migrating.
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birth town:
Assumption 2. C[Di,j,k, Di′,j′,k] = 0 for individuals from different birth towns, j 6= j′.
Assumption 2 allows us to map the parameters of the extended Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008)
model, (αg,k, βj,k), into the key parameters governing social interaction, (Pj,k, Cj,k). Positive social
interactions across nearby towns, which violates Assumption 2, would lead us to underestimate the
strength of town-level social interactions, βj,k.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the slope coefficient in equation (2.2) equals the covariance of
location decisions from birth town j to destination k: βj,k = Cj,k.13 In addition, the fixed effect in
equation (2.2) equals the squared moving probability: αg,k = (Pg,k)
2, where Pg,k is the probability
of moving from birth town group g to destination k. This analysis demonstrates that the Bayer,
Ross and Topa (2008) model uses the covariance of decisions to measure social interactions.
Simply extending the Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) model, which they use to study a binomial
outcome, to a multinomial-outcome setting could lead to incorrect inferences about the strength of
social interactions. To see this, let µj,k ≡ E[Di,j,k|Di′,j,k = 1] be the probability that a migrant
moves from birth town j to destination k, given a randomly chosen migrant from birth town j
makes the same move. Slight manipulation of the definition of the covariance of location decisions,
Cj,k, yields
Cj,k = Pg,k (µj,k − Pg,k) . (2.3)
Equation (2.3) shows that variation in Cj,k arises from two sources: the probability of moving to
a destination (Pg,k) and the “marginal social interaction effect” (µj,k − Pg,k). For example, Cj,k
could be large for a popular destination like Chicago because Pg,k is large, even if (µj,k − Pg,k)
13Proof:
βj,k = E[Di,j(i),kDi′,j(i′),k|j(i) = j(i′) = j]− E[Di,j(i),kDi′,j(i′),k|j(i) 6= j(i′)]
= E[Di,j(i),kDi′,j(i′),k|j(i) = j(i′) = j]− (E[Di,j,k])
2
= C[Di,j,k, Di′,j,k] = Cj,k
The first line follows directly from equation (2.2). The second line follows from Assumptions 1 and 2. The third line
follows from the definition of covariance.
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is small. For less popular destinations, (µj,k − Pg,k) could be very large, but Cj,k will be small if
Pg,k is sufficiently small. As a result, the covariance of location decisions, Cj,k, is not an attractive
measure of social interactions in a multinomial setting.
To characterize the strength of social interactions for receiving and sending locations, we pro-
pose an intuitive social interactions (SI) index: the expected increase in the number of people from
birth town j that move to destination county k when an arbitrarily chosen person i is observed to
make the same move,
∆j,k ≡ E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]− E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 0], (2.4)
where N−i,j,k is the number of people who move from j to k, excluding person i. A positive value
of ∆j,k indicates positive social interactions in moving from j to k, while ∆j,k = 0 indicates the
absence of social interactions.
The SI index (∆j,k) features several attractive properties as a method of measuring social inter-
actions. The SI index permits comparisons of social interactions across heterogeneous receiving
and sending locations. In addition, the SI index is consistent with multiple behavioral models,
which is valuable given uncertainty about the true behavioral model. For example, suppose that
all migrants in town j form coalitions of size s, all members of a coalition move to the same des-
tination, and all coalitions move independently of each other. In this case, the SI index for each
destination k depends only on the behavioral parameter s (∆j,k = s − 1), while the covariance of
location decisions depends on additional parameters (Cj,k = (s−1)Pg,k(1−Pg,k)/(Nj−1)). Sec-
tion 2.4.5 shows how to connect our SI index to the model of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman
(1996). Another attractive property of the SI index that we demonstrate below is that it can be
estimated non-parametrically with increasingly available data. The SI index could be used to study
social interactions for many outcomes besides location choices.
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In Appendix B.1, we show that the SI index, ∆j,k, can be expressed as
∆j,k =




Pg,k − P 2g,k
. (2.5)
Several features of equation (C.16) are noteworthy. First, the SI index depends on the classic
parameters governing social interaction, (Pg,k, Cj,k). Second, the SI index increases in the marginal
social interaction effect, (µj,k−Pg,k). If migrants move independently, then µj,k−Pg,k = ∆j,k = 0.
Third, the SI index does not necessarily increase in the number of migrants from birth town j, Nj ,
as the marginal social interaction effect might decrease in Nj .14
2.3.3 Estimating the Social Interactions Index
As suggested by equation (C.16), estimation of the SI index is straightforward. We first define
birth town groups, and then non-parametrically estimate the underlying parameters Pg,k, P 2g,k, and
Cj,k.
We consider two ways of defining birth town groups. Our preferred approach balances the
inclusion of very close towns, for which Assumption 1 likely holds, with the inclusion of towns
that are further away and lead to a more precise estimate of Pg,k. We divide each birth state into a
grid of squares with sides x∗ miles long and choose x∗ for each state using cross validation.15 Given
x∗, the location of the grid is determined by a single latitude-longitude reference point.16 Results
14In addition, −1 ≤ ∆j,k ≤ Nj − 1. At the upper bound, all migrants from j move to the same location, while at
the lower bound, migrants displace each other one-for-one.
15That is,














j′ 6=j∈g(x)Nj′ is the average moving propensity from the birth town group
of size x, excluding moves from town j. If there is only one town within a group g, then we define P̂g(x),−j,k to be the
statewide moving propensity. We search over even integers for convenience.
16In a related but substantively different setting, Billings and Johnson (2012) use cross validation in estimating
the degree of industrial specialization. Duranton and Overman (2005) and Billings and Johnson (2012) estimate
specialization parameters that do not require the aggregation of decisions at a spatial level. In contrast, we aggregate
decisions at the receiving and sending county level. Doing so allows us to examine whether observed economic
characteristics are related with patterns of social interactions.
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are very similar across four different reference points, so we average estimates across them.
An alternative definition of a birth town group is a county. If the value of choosing a given
destination varies sharply with county borders in the sending region, then this definition is appro-
priate. Differences across counties, such as local government policies, do not necessarily imply
that counties are better birth town groups than those constructed with cross validation; what matters
is whether these differences affect the probability of choosing a destination, conditional on migrat-
ing. An important advantage of using cross-validation is that it facilitates comparisons across birth
states, which differ widely in average county size. We emphasize results based on cross validation
in the main text and include results based on counties as birth town groups in the appendix.17
We estimate the probability of moving from birth town group g to destination county k as the





















− P̂ 2g,k. (2.8)
The final component of the SI index is the number of migrants from birth town j, Nj .
Given (P̂g,k, P̂ 2g,k, Ĉj,k, Nj), we can estimate the SI index, ∆j,k, using equation (C.16). How-
17Appendix Figures B.2 and B.3 describe the number of birth towns per group when groups are defined using cross
validation for Southern black and Great Plains white migrants. All groups used in estimation have at least two towns
in them, and the median number of towns per group is 15 for African Americans and 39 for whites from the Great
Plains. Appendix Figures B.4 and B.5 describe the number of towns per county.
18Equation (2.7) yields an unbiased estimate of P 2j,k under Assumptions 1 and 2. In contrast, simply squaring P̂g,k
would result in a biased estimate.
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ever, each estimate ∆̂j,k depends primarily on a single birth town observation. To conduct infer-
ence, increase the reliability of our estimates, and decrease the number of parameters reported, we




 P̂g(j),k − P̂ 2g(j),k∑
j′ P̂g(j′),k − P̂ 2g(j′),k
 ∆̂j,k, (2.9)
where g(j) is the group of town j. The destination level SI index estimate, ∆̂k, is robust to small
estimates of Pg,k, which can blow up estimates of ∆j,k. The weighting scheme used in equation
(2.9) arises naturally from assuming that ∆j,k does not vary across birth towns within a state.19
The destination level SI index estimate, ∆̂k, allows us to identify the destinations for which social
interactions were particularly important and the economic characteristics associated with stronger
social interactions.
We also construct birth county level SI index estimates by aggregating across destinations and






 P̂g(j),k − P̂ 2g(j),k∑
k′
∑
j′∈c P̂g(j′),k′ − P̂ 2g(j′),k′
 ∆̂j,k. (2.10)
Birth county level SI index estimates have similar conceptual and statistical properties as destina-
tion county level SI index estimates.
To facilitate exposition, we have described estimation of the SI index in terms of four dis-
tinct components, (P̂g,k, P̂ 2g,k, Ĉj,k, Nj). In fact, the SI index estimates depend only on observed
population flows, and equation (2.9) forms the basis of an exactly identified generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator. To estimate the variance of ∆̂k, we treat the birth town group as
the unit of observation and use a standard GMM variance estimator. This is akin to calculating
standard errors clustered at the birth town group level.20 Appendix B.2 contains details.
19When assuming ∆j,k = ∆k∀j, the derivation in Appendix B.1 yields ∆k =(∑






, which leads directly to the estimator in equation (2.9).
20Treating birth town groups as the units of observation has no impact on the point estimate, ∆̂k. We cluster because
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2.3.4 An Extension to Assess the Validity of Our Empirical Strategy
The key threat to our empirical strategy is that the ex-ante value of moving to some destination
differs across nearby birth towns in the same birth town group. If, contrary to this threat, Assump-
tion 1 were true, then geographic proximity adequately controls for the relevant determinants of
location decisions, and using observed birth town-level covariates to explain moving probabilities
will not affect SI index estimates.
To assess this threat, we allow moving probabilities to depend on town level covariates,
Pj,k = ρg,k +Xjπk, (2.11)
where ρg,k is a birth town group by destination fixed effect, and Xj is a vector of town level
covariates whose effect on the moving probability can differ across destinations. We include in
Xj an indicator for being along a railroad, an indicator for having above-median black population
share, and four indicators corresponding to population quintiles.21 These covariates, available from
the Duke SSA/Medicare data and the railroad information used in Black et al. (2015a), capture
potentially relevant determinants of location decisions. For example, migrants born in larger towns
might have had more human capital or information and used these advantages to locate in certain
destinations, and so our SI index estimates might reflect the role of birth town population size
instead of social interactions; if this were the case, then our SI index estimates would be attenuated
when controlling for population size. Equation (2.11) implies an alternative moving probability
estimate, P̃j,k, as fitted values from the OLS regression
Nj,k
Nj
= ρg,k +Xjπk + ej,k. (2.12)
We use fitted values from a separate OLS regression, also implied by equation (2.11), to form
the estimates P̂g,k and P̂ 2g,k are common to all birth towns within g.
21Percentiles are constructed separately for each birth state.
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an alternative squared moving probability estimate, P̃ 2j,k.
22 We estimate all equations separately
by birth state. Our extended model uses these alternative estimates of Pj,k and P 2j,k to construct
alternative SI index estimates.23 To the extent that the original and alternative SI index estimates
are similar, this procedure provides support for our empirical strategy.24
2.4 Results: Social Interactions in Location Decisions
2.4.1 Social Interactions Index Estimates
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the long-run population flows that we use to estimate social
interactions. Our data contain 1.3 million African Americans born in the South from 1916-1936,
1.9 million whites born in the Great Plains, and 2.6 million whites born in the South. In old
age, 42 percent of Southern-born blacks and 35 percent of Great Plains-born whites lived outside
their birth region, while only 9 percent of Southern-born whites lived outside the South.25 As
previously mentioned, we focus on Southern-born blacks and Great Plains-born whites in the main
text, and leave results for Southern-born whites for the appendix. Appendix Table B.1 shows that,
on average, there were 142 migrants per birth town for African Americans from the South, and
181 migrants per birth town for whites from the Great Plains.
We begin with some examples to illustrate how we identify social interactions in location de-
cisions. Table 2.2 shows the birth town to destination county migration flows that would be most
unlikely in the absence of social interactions. Panel A shows that, among these examples, 10-50





= ρg(j),kρg(j′),k +Xjπkρg(j′),k +Xj′πkρg(j),k + (Xjπk)(Xj′πk) + e
′
j,j′,k
for different birth towns, j 6= j′.
23When including covariates, we ignore the variance from estimates of equation (2.11). Including this variance
would make our estimates with and without covariates appear even more similar when performing statistical tests.
24An alternative approach to assessing the validity of Assumption 1 is testing whether the parameter vector πk = 0
in equation (2.12). We prefer to test the difference in SI index estimates because this approach allows us to assess the
statistical and substantive significance of any differences.
25Census data show that return migration was quite low among Southern-born blacks and much higher among
Southern-born whites (Gregory, 2005).
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percent of African-American migrants from each birth town lived in the same destination county
in old age, while typically less than one percent of migrants from each birth state lived in the same
county. The observed moving propensities are 50-65 standard deviations larger than what would
be expected if individuals moved independently of each other according to the statewide moving
propensities. The estimated moving probabilities, P̂j,k, exceed the statewide moving propensities,
suggesting a meaningful role for local conditions in determining location decisions. Most impor-
tantly, the observed moving propensities are much larger than the estimated moving probabilities,
consistent with a positive estimated covariance of location decisions, and ultimately, positive SI
index estimates. The results in Panel B for Great Plains whites are similar.
To summarize the importance of social interactions for all location decisions in our data, Table
2.3 reports averages of destination level SI index estimates. Our data contain 516,712 black mi-
grants from the South and 644,523 white migrants from the Great Plains.26 For African Americans,
unweighted averages of the destination level SI index, ∆̂k, across all destination counties vary from
0.46 (Louisiana) to 0.90 (Mississippi), as seen in column 2. Weighted averages in column 3 vary
from 0.81 (Florida) to 2.61 (South Carolina) and are larger because we generally estimate stronger
social interactions in destinations that received more migrants. We prefer the weighted average
as a summary measure because it better reflects the experience of a randomly chosen migrant and
depends less on our decision to combine destination counties with fewer than 10 migrants. Across
all states, the migrant-weighted average of destination level SI index estimates in column 3 is 1.94;
this means that when we observe one randomly chosen African American move from a birth town
to some destination, then on average 1.94 additional black migrants from that birth town would
make the same move. Panel B presents results for white moves out of the Great Plains. The
weighted average of destination level SI index estimates for whites is 0.38, only one-fifth the size
of the average for African Americans.27 These results indicate that African American migrants
26The number of migrants in Table 2.3 differs slightly from the implied number of migrants in Table 2.1 because
we exclude individuals from birth towns with fewer than 10 migrants when we estimate the SI index.
27Appendix Table B.2 shows that results are similar when we define birth town groups using counties. For Southern
blacks, the linear (rank) correlation between the destination level SI index estimates using cross validation and counties
is 0.858 (0.904). For whites from the Great Plains, the linear (rank) correlation is 0.965 (0.891). Appendix Table B.3
shows that average SI index estimates for whites from the South are small.
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relied more heavily on social networks in making their long-run location decisions. Given the his-
torical context, one explanation for this finding is that African Americans used social networks to
overcome their lack of resources or the discrimination they faced in many destinations.
We provide a more complete picture of social interactions in Figure 2.4, which plots the dis-
tributions of destination level SI index estimates.28 The figure shows that social interactions were
particularly strong for some destinations and relatively weak for most destinations. As described
below, our empirical approach allows us to examine whether this considerable heterogeneity can
be explained by destinations’ economic characteristics.29 Across the board, SI index estimates for
African Americans are larger than those for whites.
To examine social interactions more closely, Figure 2.5 plots the spatial distribution of des-
tination level SI index estimates for Mississippi-born blacks. There is evidence of strong social
interactions in many Northern destinations: 23 counties have an estimated SI index greater than 3
and 58 counties have an estimated SI index between 1 and 3. These counties lie in the Midwest
and, to a lesser degree, the Northeast. The figure also shows that African Americans moved to a
relatively small number of destination counties, consistent with limited opportunities, information,
or interest in moving to many places in the U.S.30 We estimate particularly strong social inter-
actions (∆̂k > 3) in Rock County, Wisconsin, which contains Beloit, consistent with historical
accounts suggesting strong social interactions for Mississippi-born African Americans in Beloit
(Bell, 1933; Rubin, 1960; Wilkerson, 2010). Figure 2.6 maps the destination level SI index esti-
mates for whites from North Dakota. We find little evidence of strong social interactions, although
one exception is San Joaquin county (∆̂k > 3), an area described memorably in the novel The
Grapes of Wrath (Steinbeck, 1939).31 In contrast to black migrants, whites moved to a large num-
ber of destinations throughout the U.S. The difference between the number of destinations chosen
28A single destination county can appear multiple times in these figures because we estimate destination level SI
indices separately for each birth state.
29Appendix Figure B.6 displays the associated t-statistic distributions, and Appendix Figures B.7 and B.8 display
analogous results for whites from the South.
30In Figure 2.5, the counties in white received less than 10 migrants.
31In The Grapes of Wrath, the Joad family travels from Oklahoma to the San Joaquin Valley. Gregory (1989) notes
that the (fictional) Joads were poorer than many migrants from the Great Plains.
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by Mississippi blacks and North Dakota whites is striking, especially because there were more
migrants from Mississippi (120,454 versus 92,205). Appendix Figures B.9 and B.10, for Southern
Carolina-born blacks and Kansas-born whites, show similar patterns.
To assess the validity of our empirical strategy, we examine whether SI index estimates change
when we use birth town level covariates to explain moving probabilities. Under our key identifying
Assumption 1, geographic proximity adequately controls for the relevant determinants of location
decisions, and so additional covariates should have no impact. Table 2.4 reports weighted averages
of destination level SI index estimates with and without covariates. When we examine birth states
individually, there are no substantively or statistically significant differences between the two sets
of estimates. When pooling all Southern states together, the estimates are very similar in magnitude
(1.94 and 1.92) and statistically indistinguishable (p = 0.76). When pooling all Great Plains states
together, the estimates again are very similar in magnitude (0.38 and 0.36), but are statistically
distinguishable (p = 0.02). In addition, the destination level SI index estimates with and without
covariates are highly correlated: the linear (rank) correlation is 0.914 (0.992) for blacks from the
South and 0.939 (0.988) for whites from the Great Plains. On net, this evidence suggests that
geographic proximity adequately controls for the relevant determinants of location decisions and
supports the validity of our empirical strategy.
To examine the robustness of our results and a potentially important dimension of heterogene-
ity, we examine average SI index estimates that exclude migration from large birth towns and
migration to large destination counties. Birth town size could be correlated with unobserved deter-
minants of social interactions and location decisions, such as the level of social and human capital
or information about destinations. Based on previous qualitative work and simple economic mod-
els, we expect substantial social interactions in small birth towns, but small towns need not feature
stronger social interactions than large towns. Similarly, we expect substantial, but not necessarily
larger, social interactions in smaller destination counties.
For reference, column 1 of Table 2.5 reports weighted averages of destination level SI index es-
timates when including all birth towns and destinations. In column 2, we exclude birth towns with
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at least 20,000 residents in 1920 when estimating each destination level SI index.32 Column 3 ex-
cludes destination counties that intersect with the ten largest non-South consolidated metropolitan
statistical areas (CMSAs) as of 1950, in addition to counties that received less than 10 migrants.33
We exclude both large birth towns and large destinations in column 4. The average SI index esti-
mates are similar across all four specifications for both Southern blacks and Great Plains whites.34
In sum, this table shows that our results are not driven by migration from the largest birth towns or
migration to the largest destinations and, relatedly, that there is limited heterogeneity in SI index
estimates on these dimensions.
One of the most widely noted features of the Great Migration is the tendency of migrants to
move along vertical pathways established by South-to-North railroad lines. In effect, railroads
reduced the cost of moving to a Northern destination on the same line and increased the flow
of information. Social interactions might not have followed this pattern if they drew migrants
to destinations that they would not consider otherwise. However, social interactions could have
been fostered by the reduced migration costs and increased information that generated vertical
migration patterns. To examine this, Table 2.6 displays weighted averages of destination level
SI index estimates for different regions.35 Social interactions among African Americans clearly
follow vertical migration patterns: the largest SI index estimates in the Northeast come from the
Carolinas, while the largest estimates in the Midwest are among migrants from Mississippi and
Alabama, and the largest estimates in the West come from Louisiana.36 Panel B displays weighted
32These birth towns are Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery, Alabama; Jacksonville, Miami, Pensacola, and
Tampa, Florida; Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, Macon, and Savannah, Georgia; Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and
Shreveport, Louisiana; Jackson and Meridian, Mississippi; Asheville, Charlotte, Durham, Raleigh, Wilmington, and
Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Charleston, Greenville, and Spartanburg, South Carolina; Hutchinson, Kansas City,
Topeka, and Wichita, Kansas; Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska; Fargo, North Dakota; Muskogee, Oklahoma City, and
Tulsa, Oklahoma; Sioux Falls, South Dakota
33The ten CMSAs are New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Washington, D.C., San
Francisco, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. The first nine of these are also the largest non-Great Plains (and border region)
CMSAs; our sample of Great Plains migrants does not include individuals who moved to St. Louis because Missouri
is in the border region.
34Appendix Table B.4 reports similar results for Southern-born whites.
35Appendix Table B.5 reports regional results for Southern-born whites.
36The Northeast region includes Connecticut, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. The Midwest region
includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The West region includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
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averages by region for Great Plains whites. Social interactions among Great Plains whites were
much stronger in the Midwest and West, where moving costs were lower, than the Northeast or
South. These patterns suggest that lower migration costs and greater information facilitated social
interactions.
To further understand the nature of social interactions, we examine whether the location deci-
sions of African American migrants influenced the location decisions of white migrants from the
same Southern birth town, and vice versa. While, in principle, whites and blacks could have shared
information about opportunities in the North, the level of segregation in the Jim Crow South makes
cross-race social interactions unlikely. Appendix B.3 provides details on how we estimate cross-
race social interactions, and Appendix Table B.6 provides little evidence of cross-race interactions.
These results demonstrate that social interactions operated within racial groups. In addition, there
is little correlation between destination level SI index estimates for blacks and whites from the
South: the linear (rank) correlation is 0.076 (0.149). This implies that our SI index estimates do
not simply reflect unobserved characteristics of certain Southern towns.
2.4.2 Addressing Measurement Error due to Incomplete Migration Data
SI index estimates depend on measured population flows, which are incomplete because some
individuals die before enrolling in Medicare and some individuals’ birth town information is un-
available. We first address the implications of measurement error due to incomplete migration data
under a missing at random assumption. If we observe a random sample of migration flows for each
birth town-destination combination, then measurement error does not bias estimates of the covari-
ance of location decisions, Cj,k, or moving probabilities, Pj,k. As a result, equation (C.16) shows
that our SI index estimates will be attenuated because we undercount the number of migrants, Nj .
More specifically, suppose that we are interested in the effect of social interactions on loca-
tion decisions at age 40. Denote the number of migrants that survive to age 40 by N40j , and
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. The South region includes Al-
abama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. These regions vary from Census-defined regions because we define the South to be the Confederacy.
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assume for simplicity that this equals the observed number of migrants divided by a scaling factor,
N40j = Nj/α. To approximate the coverage rate α, we divide the number of individuals in the
Duke/SSA Medicare data by the number of individuals in decennial census data.37 Across birth
states, the average coverage rate is 52.5% for African Americans from the South and 69.7% for
whites from the Great Plains (see Appendix Table B.7), which implies that N40j ≈ 1.90Nj for
Southern blacks and N40j ≈ 1.43Nj for Great Plains whites. As an approximate measurement
error correction, SI index estimates should be multiplied by a factor of 1.90 for Southern blacks
and 1.43 for Great Plains whites. Appendix Table B.8 presents results that reflect state-specific
coverage rate adjustments. The weighted average of destination level SI index estimates is 3.69 for
Southern blacks and 0.56 for Great Plains whites. Adjusting for incomplete data under a missing at
random assumption increases the magnitude of SI index estimates and increases the gap between
black and white social interaction estimates.
Appendix B.4 describes the implications of measurement error when we relax the missing at
random assumption. We derive a lower bound on the social interactions (SI) index and show that
estimates of this lower bound still reveal sizable social interactions.
2.4.3 The Role of Family Migration
If migrants relied on family members from the same birth town when making their location
decisions, then our SI index would reflect this behavior, as it should. While family migration
does not represent a threat to our results, it would be interesting to know the extent to which
social interactions occur within the family. Unfortunately, we do not have information on family
membership and are limited in our ability to address this issue directly. We can examine whether
our results stem entirely from the migration of heterosexual couples. If this were true, there would
be no social interactions among men only or women only. We find that SI index estimates are
similar in magnitude among men and women (see Appendix Table B.8), and we conclude that our
37We use the 1960 Census to construct coverage rates for individuals born from 1916-1925 and the 1970 Census for
individuals born from 1926-1935.
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results do not simply reflect the migration of couples.38 Our sample likely contains very few sets
of parents and children, since we only include individuals born from 1916-1936.
A related question is the extent to which differences in family structure explain differences
in social interactions between black and white migrants. As a first step to providing evidence on
this question, we use the 1940 Census to measure the average within-household family size for
individuals born from 1916-1936. African Americans from the South had families that were 17
percent larger than those of whites from the Great Plains (6.16 versus 5.25). This gap clearly does
not explain our finding that average SI index estimates are 410 percent larger among blacks than
whites.39 To construct an upper bound on extended family size, we use the 100 percent sample
of the 1940 Census to count the average number of individuals in a county born from 1916-1936
with the same last name (Minnesota Population Center and Ancestry.com, 2013). Southern black
family networks likely were no more than 270 percent larger than those for Great Plains whites
(54.5 versus 14.7). This upper bound is sizable, but still less than the 410 percent difference in
social interaction strength. Differences in family structure might explain some, but not all, of the
differences in social interactions between black and white migrants.
2.4.4 Social Interactions and Economic Characteristics of Receiving and Sending Locations
The results above show that social interactions were extremely important for the location de-
cisions of African Americans and less important for whites. They also show that the strength
of social interactions varied considerably across space. To better understand why social interac-
tions affected location decisions, we relate estimates of the SI index to economic characteristics
of receiving and sending locations. We focus on African American migrants in the text because
social interactions were more important for this group and present results for white migrants in the
appendix.
38The similarity between men and women is not surprising given the relative sex balance among migrants in this
period (Gregory, 2005).
39The weighted average of SI index estimates in Table 2.3 is 1.938 for blacks and 0.380 for whites, and (1.938-
0.380)/0.380 = 4.1. When adjusting for incomplete migration data under the missing at random assumption, social
interactions among African Americans are 559 percent larger than among Great Plains whites.
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We begin by considering the economic characteristics of receiving locations. Employment op-
portunities were among the most important features of a destination, and employment in the man-
ufacturing sector was particularly attractive to African Americans because of its relatively high
wages and demand for workers. In the presence of imperfect information, networks might have
directed their members to destinations with more manufacturing employment. This is the story
of John McCord. Because migrants almost certainly had more information about employment
opportunities in the largest destinations, the imperfect information channel suggests a stronger
relationship between social interactions and manufacturing employment intensity in small desti-
nations. However, if information about employment opportunities was widely known, then social
interactions might not be stronger in destinations with more manufacturing. Pecuniary moving
costs, which were largely determined by railroads and physical distance, represented another key
economic characteristic of destinations. Lower moving costs could have fostered social interac-
tions by facilitating the transmission of information. On the other hand, migrants might have been
willing to travel to high moving cost destinations only if they received information or benefits from
a network there.
To explore these hypotheses, we regress destination level SI index estimates on county level
covariates. Column 1 of Table 2.7 shows that social interactions were significantly larger in desti-
nations with a higher 1910 manufacturing employment share: a one standard deviation increase in
the 1910 manufacturing employment share is associated with a 12 percent increase in the SI index
at the mean.40 Column 2 shows that the positive relationship between manufacturing employment
and social interactions was over twice as large in smaller destinations.41 We also find that social
interactions were significantly stronger in destinations that were closer to the birth state. How-
ever, there is no relationship between the strength of social interactions and whether a destination
could be reached directly or with one-stop by rail from the birth state. One possible concern is
40We report summary statistics in Appendix Table B.9. Appendix Figure B.11, which plots the bivariate relationship
between social interaction estimates and 1910 manufacturing employment share, shows the considerable variation in
the manufacturing employment share across destinations.
41Small destination counties are those that do not intersect with the ten largest non-South CMSAs in 1950 (New
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and St.
Louis).
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that these results do not reflect characteristics of destination counties, but instead characteristics
of birth states. As seen in column 3, the data do not support this concern: adding birth state fixed
effects has very little impact.42
In sum, the results in Table 2.7 suggest that migrants relied on social networks to overcome
imperfect information about employment opportunities, and that migrants had less non-network
information about smaller destinations. The results also suggest that low moving costs facilitated
social interactions.
We next consider the relationship between social interactions and the economic characteristics
of sending counties. Social networks could have been particularly important in locating jobs or
housing for migrants from poorer communities who had fewer resources to engage in costly search.
Another salient characteristic of sending locations was the share of the population in rural areas.
Rural areas might have had less non-network information about destinations, making networks
more valuable. Alternatively, social ties in rural areas might have been weaker due to the lower
population density there (Chay and Munshi, 2015). We also characterize counties’ exposure to
Rosenwald schools, which improved educational attainment among Southern blacks in this period
(Aaronson and Mazumder, 2011). The relationship between human capital attainment and social
interaction is unclear, as human capital could promote social ties in the South while also increasing
the relative return to choosing a non-network destination. In addition, we examine whether social
interactions were stronger in counties with greater access to railroads, which could have facilitated
the transmission of information through both network and non-network channels.
Table 2.8 displays results from regressing birth county level SI index estimates on birth county
characteristics. Social interactions were stronger in poorer counties, measured as the share of
residents with income less than $2,000 in 1950. The point estimate on the rural population share is
negative, but only significant when including birth state fixed effects in column 2. A one standard
deviation increase in the share of poor residents is associated with a 41 percent increase in the
SI index at the mean, while a one standard deviation increase in the percent rural is associated
42Results are qualitatively similar using counties to define birth town groups (Appendix Table B.10). Results for
Great Plains whites and Southern whites are in Appendix Tables B.11 and B.12.
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with a 46 percent decrease in social interactions. We find little evidence that social interactions
varied with Rosenwald school or railroad exposure, though the standard errors are fairly large.
In both specifications in Table 2.8, we control for the log number of migrants from a sending
county to ensure that our results do not spuriously reflect out-migration patterns. In sum, we find
that migrants from poorer communities relied more heavily on social networks in their location
decisions. This is consistent with networks providing several possible benefits, such as reducing
the time required to find a job or affordable housing.
2.4.5 Connecting the Social Interactions Index to a Behavioral Model
The results above rely on estimates of the SI index developed in this paper. Next, we connect
the SI index to the behavioral model of social interactions from Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman
(1996). The assumptions in their model allow us to estimate the share of migrants that chose their
long-run location because of social interactions, a parameter that complements our SI index in
intuitively describing the size of social interactions. This connection also demonstrates that our SI
index can be used to integrate the behavioral model of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996)
and the general identification strategy of Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008).
Migrants, indexed on a line by i ∈ {1, . . . , Nj}, are either a “fixed agent” or a “complier.” A
fixed agent chooses her location independently of other migrants. If i is a complier, then he chooses
the same destination as his neighbor, i−1. The probability that an individual is a complier equals χ,
assumed for simplicity to be constant across birth towns and destinations for a given birth state. The
covariance of location decisions for individuals i and i+n is C[Di,j,k, Di+n,j,k] = Pg,k(1−Pg,k)χn.











s=1 (Nj − s)χs
Nj(Nj − 1)
. (2.14)
In the absence of social interactions, there are no compliers, and the covariance of location deci-
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sions equals zero.43
Substituting the expression for Cj,k(χ;Pg,k, Nj) in equation (2.14) into the expression for the





With a sufficiently large number of migrants, we obtain ∆j,k = 2χ/(1−χ). Because the destination
level SI index, ∆k, is just a weighted average of the SI index, ∆j,k, and the average destination
level SI index, denoted ∆, is just a weighted average of ∆k, we can estimate the probability that





As seen in Table 2.9, we estimate that between 29 (Florida) and 57 percent (South Carolina) of
black migrants chose their long-run location because of social interactions. There is considerable
variation across destination regions.44 For example, of Mississippi-born migrants, 32 percent of
Northeast-bound, 57 percent of Midwest-bound, and 34 percent of West-bound migrants chose
their location because of social interactions. Among whites from the Great Plains, between 11
(Kansas) and 19 percent (North Dakota) of migrants chose their destination because of social
interactions. Although these estimates depend on stronger assumptions than are necessary to es-
timate our SI index, they help illustrate the considerable impact of social interactions on location
decisions for Southern blacks and the smaller impact among whites.
43Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) measure social interactions using the normalized variance of out-














44Assuming that χ is constant across destinations implies that it should not vary across different regions. Nonethe-
less, we find the rescaled regional estimates to be informative. Appendix B.5 contains a richer model that allows the
probability of complying to vary with birth town and destination.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the magnitude and nature of social interactions in loca-
tion decisions. We use confidential administrative data to study over one million long-run location
decisions made by African Americans born in the U.S. South and whites born in the Great Plains
during two landmark migration episodes. We formulate a novel social interactions (SI) index that
characterizes the strength of social interactions for each receiving and sending location, which al-
lows us to estimate not only the overall magnitude of social interactions, but also the degree to
which social interactions were associated with economic characteristics of receiving and sending
locations. The SI index can be used for other outcomes and settings to provide a deeper under-
standing of social interactions in economic outcomes.
We find very strong social interactions among Southern black migrants and smaller interac-
tions among whites. Estimates of our social interactions (SI) index imply that if we observed one
randomly chosen African American move from a birth town to some destination, then on average
1.9 additional black migrants from that birth town would make the same move. For white migrants
from the Great Plains, the average is only 0.4, and results for Southern whites are similarly small.
Interpreted through the social interactions model of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996),
our estimates imply that 49 percent of African-American migrants chose their long-run destination
because of social interactions, while 16 percent of Great Plains whites were similarly influenced.
One interpretation of our results is that African Americans relied on social networks more heavily
to overcome the more intense discrimination they faced in labor and housing markets. In addition,
our results suggest that social interactions were particularly important in providing African Amer-
ican migrants with information about attractive employment opportunities in smaller destinations,
and that social interactions played a larger role in less costly moves. Our results also suggest that
migrants from poorer sending communities relied more heavily on social interactions.
Our results shed new light on how individuals decide where to move. Social interactions are of
first-order importance in our setting, especially for migrants with the fewest resources and opportu-
nities. Our results suggest that social interactions help migrants address the substantial information
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frictions that characterize long-distance location decisions. Social interactions likely play an im-
portant role in the rural-to-urban migration taking place across the developing world, and policies
that seek to direct migration to certain areas should account for the role of social interactions.
Our results also have implications for economic outcomes in the U.S. during the twentieth
century. Birth town social networks continued to operate after location decisions had been made,
and the Great Migration generated considerable variation in the strength of social networks across
destinations. In ongoing work, we use this variation to study the relationship between crime and
social capital in Northern cities (Stuart and Taylor, 2014). Examining the impacts of social capital
on other economic outcomes in destination cities is a promising direction for future work.
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Table 2.1: Location at Old Age, 1916-1936 Cohorts
Percent Living in Location
Outside Birth In Birth Region
People Region Birth State Other State
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Southern Blacks
Alabama 209,128 47.2% 39.5% 13.3%
Florida 79,237 26.1% 67.1% 6.8%
Georgia 218,357 36.3% 44.2% 19.5%
Louisiana 179,445 32.4% 52.7% 14.9%
Mississippi 218,759 56.1% 28.9% 15.0%
North Carolina 200,999 40.2% 49.7% 10.1%
South Carolina 163,650 43.4% 41.9% 14.7%
Total 1,269,575 41.8% 44.0% 14.1%
Panel B: Southern Whites
Alabama 469,698 9.8% 62.1% 28.1%
Florida 231,071 12.7% 68.5% 18.8%
Georgia 454,286 7.4% 65.5% 27.1%
Louisiana 384,601 8.7% 71.1% 20.2%
Mississippi 275,147 11.0% 57.0% 32.0%
North Carolina 588,674 8.5% 71.6% 19.8%
South Carolina 238,697 6.6% 70.6% 22.8%
Total 2,642,174 9.0% 66.9% 24.0%
Panel C: Great Plains Whites
Kansas 462,490 30.4% 43.3% 26.3%
Nebraska 374,265 36.0% 42.0% 22.0%
North Dakota 210,199 44.1% 31.8% 24.1%
Oklahoma 635,621 31.8% 41.6% 26.6%
South Dakota 196,266 40.4% 35.4% 24.2%
Total 1,878,841 34.6% 40.3% 25.1%
Notes: Column 1 contains the number of people from the 1916-1936 birth cohorts
observed in the Duke SSA/Medicare data. Columns 2-4 display the share of individuals
living in each location at old age (2001 or date of death, if earlier). Figure 2.3 displays
birth regions. Southerners’ birth region is the Confederacy. The Great Plains birth
region includes the Plains and border states.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.2: Extreme Examples of Correlated Location Decisions, Southern Blacks and Great Plains Whites
Destination Destination SD under Estimated Social
Total Town- Share of Share of Independent Moving Interaction
Largest City in Birth Town Destination Birth Town Birth State Binomial Probability Estimate
Birth Town Destination County Migrants Flow Migrants Migrants Moves P̂j,k ∆̂k
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Southern Blacks
Pigeon Creek, AL Niagara Falls, NY 85 43 50.6% 0.5% 64.5 4.5% 8.5
Marion, AL Fort Wayne, IN 1311 200 15.3% 0.7% 63.7 3.8% 8.8
Greeleyville, SC Troy, NY 215 34 15.8% 0.1% 62.2 1.7% 15.2
Athens, AL Rockford, IL 649 64 9.9% 0.2% 61.0 2.0% 5.6
Pontotoc, MS Janesville, WI 456 62 13.6% 0.2% 59.4 3.3% 6.5
New Albany, MS Racine, WI 599 97 16.2% 0.4% 58.7 4.9% 11.4
West, MS Freeport, IL 336 35 10.4% 0.1% 56.9 0.8% 6.2
Gatesville, NC New Haven, CT 176 88 50.0% 1.6% 51.8 8.1% 7.1
Statham, GA Hamilton, OH 75 22 29.3% 0.3% 50.0 3.0% 4.4
Cochran, GA Paterson, NJ 259 62 23.9% 0.6% 49.4 4.1% 6.3
Panel B: Great Plains Whites
Krebs, OK Akron, OH 210 32 15.2% 0.1% 82.6 0.3% 7.4
Haven, KS Elkhart, IN 144 22 15.3% 0.1% 51.1 0.4% 6.9
McIntosh, SD Rupert, ID 299 20 6.7% 0.1% 50.9 0.6% 4.8
Hull, ND Bellingham, WA 55 24 43.6% 0.5% 44.6 1.5% 4.3
Lindsay, NE Moline, IL 226 29 12.8% 0.2% 41.5 0.4% 5.2
Corsica, SD Holland, MI 253 26 10.3% 0.2% 39.6 0.4% 6.3
Corsica, SD Grand Rapids, MI 253 34 13.4% 0.3% 37.2 0.7% 6.0
Montezuma, KS Merced, CA 144 21 14.6% 0.3% 32.7 0.9% 2.7
Hillsboro, KS Fresno, CA 407 65 16.0% 0.9% 32.0 1.2% 2.2
Henderson, NE Fresno, CA 146 32 21.9% 0.7% 31.1 0.8% 2.2
Notes: Each panel contains the most extreme examples of correlated location decisions as determined by column 7. Column 7 equals the
difference, in standard deviations, of the actual moving propensity (column 5) relative to the prediction with independent moves following a
binomial distribution governed by the statewide moving propensity (column 6). Column 8 equals the estimated probability of moving from
town j to county k using observed location decisions from nearby towns, where the birth town group is defined by cross validation. Column
9 equals the destination level social interaction estimate for the relevant birth state. When choosing these examples, we restrict attention to
town-destination pairs with at least 20 migrants.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.3: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, by Birth State
Number of Type of Average
Migrants Unweighted Weighted
Birth State (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 96,269 0.770 1.888
(0.049) (0.195)
Florida 19,158 0.536 0.813
(0.052) (0.117)
Georgia 77,038 0.735 1.657
(0.048) (0.177)
Louisiana 55,974 0.462 1.723
(0.039) (0.478)
Mississippi 120,454 0.901 2.303
(0.050) (0.313)
North Carolina 78,420 0.566 1.539
(0.039) (0.130)
South Carolina 69,399 0.874 2.618
(0.054) (0.301)
All States 516,712 0.736 1.938
(0.020) (0.110)
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 139,374 0.128 0.255
(0.007) (0.024)
Nebraska 134,011 0.141 0.361
(0.008) (0.082)
North Dakota 92,205 0.174 0.464
(0.012) (0.036)
Oklahoma 200,392 0.112 0.453
(0.008) (0.036)
South Dakota 78,541 0.163 0.350
(0.009) (0.026)
All States 644,523 0.137 0.380
(0.004) (0.022)
Notes: Column 2 is an unweighted average of destination level so-
cial interaction estimates, ∆̂k. Column 3 is a weighted average,
where the weights are the number of people who move from each
state to destination k. Birth town groups are defined by cross vali-
dation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.4: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, With and Without Controlling for Ob-
served Differences across Birth Towns
Control for Covariates p-value of
No Yes difference
Birth State (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 1.888 1.852 0.763
(0.195) (0.189)
Florida 0.813 0.742 0.401
(0.117) (0.119)
Georgia 1.657 1.689 0.658
(0.177) (0.175)
Louisiana 1.723 1.651 0.862
(0.478) (0.474)
Mississippi 2.303 2.295 0.967
(0.313) (0.306)
North Carolina 1.539 1.482 0.149
(0.130) (0.127)
South Carolina 2.618 2.636 0.827
(0.301) (0.304)
All States 1.938 1.917 0.764
(0.110) (0.108)
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.255 0.233 0.112
(0.024) (0.024)
Nebraska 0.361 0.349 0.504
(0.082) (0.082)
North Dakota 0.464 0.445 0.456
(0.036) (0.035)
Oklahoma 0.453 0.439 0.241
(0.036) (0.036)
South Dakota 0.350 0.331 0.145
(0.026) (0.026)
All States 0.380 0.363 0.021
(0.022) (0.022)
Notes: All columns contain weighted averages of social interac-
tion estimates, ∆̂k, where the weights are the number of people
who move from each state to destination k. Column 1 is identical
to column 3 of Table 2.3. Column 2 controls for observed birth
town covariates as described in the text. Column 3 reports the
p-value from testing the null hypothesis that the two columns are
equal. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.5: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, by Size of Birth Town and Destination
Exclude Largest Birth Towns No Yes No Yes
Exclude Largest Destinations No No Yes Yes
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 1.888 1.784 2.056 2.189
(0.195) (0.149) (0.285) (0.268)
Florida 0.813 0.607 1.323 1.231
(0.117) (0.061) (0.229) (0.215)
Georgia 1.657 1.458 1.696 1.772
(0.177) (0.092) (0.170) (0.133)
Louisiana 1.723 1.106 0.971 0.960
(0.478) (0.095) (0.182) (0.176)
Mississippi 2.303 2.299 2.085 2.032
(0.313) (0.304) (0.210) (0.205)
North Carolina 1.539 1.451 0.743 0.687
(0.130) (0.126) (0.064) (0.059)
South Carolina 2.618 2.556 1.784 1.742
(0.301) (0.283) (0.241) (0.234)
All States 1.938 1.791 1.755 1.783
(0.110) (0.089) (0.108) (0.102)
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.255 0.220 0.243 0.228
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
Nebraska 0.361 0.253 0.265 0.253
(0.082) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
North Dakota 0.464 0.464 0.527 0.531
(0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046)
Oklahoma 0.453 0.395 0.450 0.427
(0.036) (0.029) (0.040) (0.038)
South Dakota 0.350 0.339 0.387 0.381
(0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033)
All States 0.380 0.331 0.374 0.361
(0.022) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Notes: All columns contain weighted averages of social interaction estimates,
∆̂k, where the weights are the number of people who move from each state to
destination k. Column 1 includes all birth towns and destinations. Column 2
excludes birth towns with 1920 population greater than 20,000 when estimating
each ∆̂k. Column 3 excludes all destination counties which intersect in 2000 with
the ten largest non-South CMSAs as of 1950: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and
St. Louis, in addition to counties which received fewer than 10 migrants. Column
4 excludes large birth towns and large destinations. Birth town groups are defined
by cross validation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.6: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, by Region
Destination Region
Northeast Midwest West South
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 1.237 2.356 0.813 -
(0.161) (0.295) (0.272) -
Florida 0.978 0.793 0.264 -
(0.172) (0.169) (0.107) -
Georgia 1.546 2.067 0.410 -
(0.243) (0.310) (0.205) -
Louisiana 0.282 1.138 2.169 -
(0.101) (0.206) (0.734) -
Mississippi 0.924 2.662 1.036 -
(0.105) (0.396) (0.130) -
North Carolina 1.678 0.908 0.185 -
(0.149) (0.176) (0.040) -
South Carolina 2.907 1.223 0.211 -
(0.351) (0.167) (0.055) -
All States 1.860 2.259 1.402 -
(0.120) (0.195) (0.345) -
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.079 0.452 0.281 0.051
(0.019) (0.095) (0.031) (0.006)
Nebraska 0.080 0.439 0.420 0.063
(0.014) (0.096) (0.109) (0.009)
North Dakota 0.107 0.405 0.524 0.047
(0.027) (0.057) (0.046) (0.009)
Oklahoma 0.051 0.390 0.542 0.074
(0.007) (0.091) (0.047) (0.007)
South Dakota 0.061 0.485 0.381 0.058
(0.013) (0.069) (0.034) (0.011)
All States 0.073 0.434 0.442 0.062
(0.007) (0.039) (0.029) (0.004)
Notes: All columns contain weighted averages of destination level so-
cial interactions index estimates, ∆̂k, where the weights are the number
of people who move from each state to destination k. See footnote 36
for region definitions. We do not estimate social interactions for blacks
who move to the South. Birth town groups are defined by cross valida-
tion. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table 2.7: Social Interactions Index Estimates and Destination County Characteristics, Black
Moves out of South
Dependent Variable: Destination Level Social Interaction Estimate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 1.651*** 1.139*** 1.076***
(0.396) (0.353) (0.360)
Manufacturing employment share by 1.122** 1.145**
small destination indicator (0.564) (0.546)
Small destination indicator 0.129 0.108
(0.132) (0.127)
Direct railroad connection from birth state 0.033 -0.005 -0.058
(0.119) (0.117) (0.133)
One-stop railroad connection from birth state 0.065 0.044 -0.007
(0.084) (0.079) (0.083)
Log distance from birth state -0.405*** -0.339*** -0.395***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.066)
Log number of migrants from birth state 0.316*** 0.351*** 0.353***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Log population, 1900 -0.131*** -0.110*** -0.110***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Percent African-American, 1900 -2.142*** -1.655*** -1.703***
(0.336) (0.327) (0.328)
Birth state fixed effects x
Observations 1,469 1,469 1,469
Clusters 371 371 371
R-squared 0.178 0.199 0.209
Notes: The dependent variable is the social interaction estimate for each destination county by
birth state pair. The sample contains only counties which received at least 10 migrants. Birth town
groups are defined by cross validation. Standard errors, clustered by destination county, are in
parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data, Haines and ICPSR (2010) data, and
Black et al. (2015a) data
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Table 2.8: Social Interactions Index Estimates and Birth County Characteristics, Black Moves out
of South
Dependent Variable: Birth County Level Social Interaction Estimate
(1) (2)
Share with income less than $2,000 (1950) 3.302** 4.853***
(1.482) (1.815)
Percent rural, 1950 -2.812 -3.441*
(1.795) (1.925)
Rosenwald exposure -0.768 -0.867
(0.683) (0.762)
Railroad exposure -0.083 -0.048
(0.471) (0.474)
Percent African-American 0.600 0.284
(0.836) (1.115)
Log number of migrants 0.508*** 0.527**
(0.165) (0.239)
Birth state fixed effects x
Observations 551 551
R-squared 0.084 0.095
Notes: The dependent variable is the birth county level social interaction esti-
mate. Railroad exposure is the share of migrants in a county which lived along a
railroad. Rosenwald exposure is the average Rosenwald coverage experienced
over ages 7-13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data, Haines and
ICPSR (2010) data, Aaronson and Mazumder (2011) data, and Black et al.
(2015a) data
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Table 2.9: Estimated Share of Migrants That Chose Their Destination Because of Social Interac-
tions
Destination Region
All Northeast Midwest West South
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 0.486 0.382 0.541 0.289 -
(0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.069) -
Florida 0.289 0.328 0.284 0.117 -
(0.030) (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) -
Georgia 0.453 0.436 0.508 0.170 -
(0.026) (0.039) (0.038) (0.070) -
Louisiana 0.463 0.123 0.363 0.520 -
(0.069) (0.039) (0.042) (0.084) -
Mississippi 0.535 0.316 0.571 0.341 -
(0.034) (0.025) (0.036) (0.028) -
North Carolina 0.435 0.456 0.312 0.085 -
(0.021) (0.022) (0.042) (0.017) -
South Carolina 0.567 0.592 0.379 0.095 -
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.023) -
All States 0.492 0.482 0.530 0.412 -
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.060) -
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.113 0.038 0.184 0.123 0.025
(0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.012) (0.003)
Nebraska 0.153 0.039 0.180 0.174 0.031
(0.029) (0.007) (0.032) (0.037) (0.004)
North Dakota 0.188 0.051 0.168 0.208 0.023
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.004)
Oklahoma 0.185 0.025 0.163 0.213 0.036
(0.012) (0.003) (0.032) (0.015) (0.003)
South Dakota 0.149 0.030 0.195 0.160 0.028
(0.010) (0.006) (0.022) (0.012) (0.005)
All States 0.160 0.035 0.178 0.181 0.030
(0.008) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.002)
Notes: Table contains estimates and standard errors of χ = ∆/(2 + ∆), the share
of migrants which chose their destination because of social interactions, based on
weighted average estimates from column 3 of table 2.3 and columns 1-4 of table
2.6. Standard errors, estimated using the Delta method, are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Notes: See notes to figure 2.3 for home region definitions.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Ruggles et al. (2010) data
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Southern African-Americans Great Plains Whites
Notes: The solid line shows the proportion of blacks from the seven Southern birth states we analyze (dark grey states
in Figure 2.3a) living in the South (light and dark grey states) at the time of Census enumeration. The dashed line
shows the proportion of whites from the Great Plains states living in the Great Plains or Border States.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Ruggles et al. (2010) data
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Figure 2.3: Geographic Coverage
(a) South
(b) Great Plains
Notes: For the South, our sample includes migrants born in the seven states in dark grey (Alabama, Georgia, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina). A migrant is someone who at old age lives outside of the
Confederacy, which includes the dark and light grey states. For the Great Plains, our sample includes migrants born in
the five states in dark grey (Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota). A migrant is someone who
at old age lives outside of the Great Plains states and the surrounding border area.
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(b) White Moves out of Great Plains
Notes: Bin width is 1/2. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation. Panel (a) omits the estimate ∆̂k = 11.4
from Mississippi to Racine County, WI, ∆̂k = 15.2 from South Carolina to Rensselaer County, NY, and ∆̂k = 18.1
from Florida to St. Joseph County, IN.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Figure 2.5: Spatial Distribution of Destination Level Social Interaction Estimates, Mississippi-born Blacks
Notes: Figure displays destination level social interaction estimates, ∆̂k, across U.S. counties for Mississippi-born black migrants. The South is shaded in grey,
with Mississippi outlined in red. Destinations to which less than 10 migrants moved are in white. Among all African-American estimates, ∆̂k = 3 corresponds to
the 95th percentile, while ∆̂k = 1 corresponds to the 81st percentile.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Figure 2.6: Spatial Distribution of Destination Level Social Interaction Estimates, North Dakota-born Whites
Notes: See note to Figure 2.5. Among all Great Plains white estimates, ∆̂k = 3 is greater than the 99th percentile, while ∆̂k = 1 corresponds to the 98th percentile.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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CHAPTER III
The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime: Evidence from
the Great Migration
3.1 Introduction
For almost 200 years, the enormous variance of crime rates across space has intrigued social
scientists and policy makers (Guerry, 1833; Quetelet, 1835; Weisburd, Bruinsma and Bernasco,
2009). Standard covariates explain a modest amount of cross-city variation in crime, which sug-
gests a potential role for social influences. One possible explanation is peer effects, whereby an
individual is more likely to commit crime if his peers commit crime (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991;
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Damm and Dustmann, 2014). A non-rival explanation
is that cities differ in the degree of social connectedness, or the strength of relationships between
individuals. Despite vast academic and public interest in the related concept of social capital, con-
cerns about reverse causality and omitted variables seriously limit existing evidence on the effect
of social connectedness on crime.
This paper uses a new source of variation in social connectedness to estimate its effect on
crime. Social interactions in the migration of millions of African Americans out of the U.S. South
from 1915-1970 generated plausibly exogenous variation across destinations in the concentration
of migrants that came from the same birth town. For example, consider Beloit, Wisconsin and Mid-
dletown, Ohio, two cities similar along many dimensions, including the total number of Southern
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black migrants that moved there. Around 18 percent of Beloit’s black migrants came from Pon-
totoc, Mississippi, while less than five percent of Middletown’s migrants came from any single
town. Historical accounts trace the sizable migration from Pontotoc to Beloit to a single influ-
ential migrant getting a job in 1914 at a manufacturer in search of workers. Furthermore, quali-
tative evidence suggests that Southern birth town networks translated into strong community ties
in the North. Guided by a simple economic model, we proxy for social connectedness using a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of birth town to destination city population flows for individuals born
from 1916-1936 who we observe in the Duke SSA/Medicare dataset.
Economic theory does not make an unambiguous prediction about whether social connected-
ness will increase or decrease crime. Social connectedness could increase crime by reinforcing
unproductive norms or providing trust that facilitates criminal activity, as with the Ku Klux Klan,
Mafia, or gangs (Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000). Alternatively, social connectedness could de-
crease crime by increasing the probability that criminals are identified and punished (Becker, 1968)
or by facilitating the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills during childhood (Heck-
man, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006).
We estimate regressions that relate cross-city differences in crime from 1960-2009 to cross-city
differences in social connectedness. We control for the number of Southern black migrants that
live in each city to adjust for differences in the overall attractiveness of cities to black migrants, and
we control for a rich set of demographic and economic variables, plus state-by-year fixed effects,
that might influence crime. We measure city-level crime data using FBI Uniform Crime Reports,
which are widely available starting in 1960.
We find that social connectedness leads to sizable reductions in crime rates. At the mean, a
one standard deviation increase in social connectedness leads to a precisely estimated 14.1 per-
cent decrease in murder, the best measured crime in FBI data. Our estimates imply that replacing
Middletown’s social connectedness with that of Beloit would decrease murders by 25.4 percent,
robberies by 35.2 percent, and motor vehicle thefts by 22.9 percent. By comparison, the estimates
in Chalfin and McCrary (2015) imply that a similar decrease in murders would require a 38 percent
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increase in the number of police officers. The elasticity of crime with respect to social connected-
ness ranges from -0.05 to -0.25 across the seven commonly studied index crimes of murder, rape,
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and is statistically distinguishable from
zero for every crime besides larceny. As predicted by our economic model, the effect of social
connectedness on city-level crime rates is stronger in cities with a higher African American popu-
lation share. Social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses,
which suggests that an increased probability of detection is not the only operative mechanism.
The substantial reductions in crime due to social connectedness are not permanent. We estimate
significant negative effects of social connectedness in each decade from 1960-1999, and much
smaller and insignificant effects from 2000-2009. The attenuated effects from 2000-2009 appear
to reflect a decline in the effective strength of social connectedness, as Southern black migrants
aged and eventually died. From 1980-1989, social connectedness reduces murders attributed to
African American adults and especially African American youth, who belong to the generation of
the migrants’ children and grandchildren. Social connectedness also reduces murders attributed to
non-blacks, consistent with an important role of peer effects.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of our empirical strategy. Historical accounts
point to the importance of migrants who were well connected in their birth town and who worked
for an employer in search of labor in establishing concentrated migration flows from Southern
birth towns to Northern cities (Scott, 1920; Bell, 1933; Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989). Many
of the initial location decisions were made in the 1910’s, over 40 years before we estimate effects
on crime. Consistent with the dominant role of idiosyncratic factors, social connectedness is not
correlated with crime rates from 1911-1916 or in a consistent manner with economic or demo-
graphic covariates from 1960-2000.1 One potential threat to our empirical strategy is that migrants
from the same birth town tended to move to cities with low unobserved determinants of crime and
these unobserved determinants of crime persisted over time. We provide evidence that this threat
1The one exception is that social connectedness is positively correlated with the share of a destination’s work force
employed in manufacturing, a relatively attractive sector for African American migrants (Stuart and Taylor, 2017). We
control for a city’s manufacturing employment share in our regressions.
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is unimportant by showing that the estimated effect of social connectedness on crime after 1965
is very similar when we control for the 1960-1964 crime rate. We also show that our results are
robust to controlling for the share of migrants in each destination that moved there because of so-
cial interactions, a variable we obtain by estimating a novel structural model of social interactions
in location decisions. Consequently, our estimates likely reflect the effect of social connectedness
per se, as opposed to unobserved characteristics of certain migrants.
This paper contributes most directly to the literature studying how characteristics of social
networks affect crime. Arguably the best available evidence comes from Sampson, Raudenbush
and Earls (1997), who examine the neighborhood-level relationship in Chicago between crime and
proxies for collective efficacy, defined as “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their
willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (p. 918). Despite extremely rich data, their
proxies could be correlated with unobserved determinants of crime.2 We contribute by providing
a new source of plausibly exogenous variation in social connectedness and new evidence. We also
use a simple economic model to highlight the important interaction between social connectedness
and peer effects.
We also contribute to the literature in economics studying the impact of social capital and
trust on various outcomes, including growth and development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Miguel,
Gertler and Levine, 2005), government efficiency and public good provision (La Porta et al., 1997;
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999, 2000), financial development (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
2004), and the repayment of microfinance loans (Karlan, 2005, 2007; Cassar, Crowley and Wydick,
2007; Feigenberg, Field and Pande, 2013). We differ from most of this work by focusing on
social connectedness, as opposed to social capital or trust, and by using plausibly exogenous cross-
city variation in social connectedness.3 Several papers also examine the determinants of social
capital and trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2000; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote,
2Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) acknowledge that “causal effects were not proven” (p. 923) in their study.
3Social connectedness is a broader concept than social capital, trust, or collective efficacy. For example, social
connectedness might reduce crime by increasing the probability that criminals are identified, and this behavior typically
is not included in definitions of social capital, trust, or collective efficacy. At the same time, our measure might capture
social capital that was transported from South to North.
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2002; Karlan et al., 2009; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and Zingales, 2013). Our results point to the
importance of social interactions in location decisions in generating social connectedness.
More broadly, there is enormous interest in the causes and consequences of criminal activity
and incarceration in U.S. cities, especially for African Americans (Freeman, 1999; Neal and Rick,
2014; Evans, Garthwaite and Moore, 2016), and this paper demonstrates the importance of social
connectedness among African Americans in reducing crime. We also add to the literature on
the consequences of the Great Migration for migrants and cities (e.g., Scroggs, 1917; Smith and
Welch, 1989; Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2009, 2010;
Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014; Black et al., 2015b). This paper draws on Stuart and Taylor (2017),
which examines the importance of social interactions in location decisions for African American
migrants in more detail.
3.2 Historical Background on the Great Migration
The Great Migration saw nearly six million African Americans leave the South from 1910 to
1970 (Census, 1979).4 Although migration was concentrated in certain destinations, like Chicago,
Detroit, and New York, other cities also experienced dramatic changes. For example, Chicago’s
black population share increased from two to 32 percent from 1910-1970, while Racine, Wisconsin
experienced an increase from 0.3 to 10.5 percent (Gibson and Jung, 2005). Migration out of the
South increased from 1910-1930, slowed during the Great Depression, and then resumed forcefully
from 1940 to the 1970’s.
Several factors contributed to the exodus of African Americans from the South. World War
I, which simultaneously increased labor demand among Northern manufacturers and decreased
labor supply from European immigrants, helped spark the Great Migration, although many un-
derlying causes existed long before the war (Scroggs, 1917; Scott, 1920; Gottlieb, 1987; Marks,
1989; Jackson, 1991; Collins, 1997; Gregory, 2005). Underlying causes included a less developed
Southern economy, the decline in agricultural labor demand due to the boll weevil’s destruction
4Parts of this section come from Stuart and Taylor (2017).
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of crops (Scott, 1920; Marks, 1989, 1991; Lange, Olmstead and Rhode, 2009), widespread labor
market discrimination (Marks, 1991), and racial violence and unequal treatment under Jim Crow
laws (Tolnay and Beck, 1991).
Migrants tended to follow paths established by railroad lines: Mississippi-born migrants pre-
dominantly moved to Illinois and other Midwestern states, and South Carolina-born migrants pre-
dominantly moved to New York and Pennsylvania (Scott, 1920; Carrington, Detragiache and Vish-
wanath, 1996; Collins, 1997; Boustan, 2010; Black et al., 2015b). Labor agents, offering paid
transportation, employment, and housing, directed some of the earliest migrants, but their role di-
minished sharply after the 1920’s, and most individuals paid for the relatively expensive train fares
themselves (Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989).5 African-American newspapers from the largest
destinations circulated throughout the South, providing information on life in the North (Gottlieb,
1987; Grossman, 1989).6 Blacks attempting to leave the South sometimes faced violence (Scott,
1920; Henri, 1975).
Historical accounts and recent quantitative work indicate that social interactions strongly af-
fected location decisions during the Great Migration. Initial migrants, most of whom moved in
the 1910’s, chose their destination primarily in response to economic opportunity. Migrants who
worked for an employer in search of labor and were well connected in their birth town linked
friends, family, and acquaintances to jobs and shelter in the North, sometimes leading to persistent
migration flows from birth town to destination city (Rubin, 1960; Gottlieb, 1987; Stuart and Taylor,
2017). Stuart and Taylor (2017) show that birth town-level social interactions strongly influenced
the location decisions of African American migrants from the South. These social interactions
mirror vertical migration patterns established by railroad lines and were stronger in destinations
with more manufacturing employment, a particularly attractive sector for black workers during this
time.
The experience of John McCord captures many important features of early black migrants’
5In 1918, train fare from New Orleans to Chicago cost $22 per person, when Southern farmers’ daily wages
typically were less than $1 and wages at Southern factories were less than $2.50 (Henri, 1975).
6The Chicago Defender, perhaps the most prominent African-American newspaper of the time, was read in 1,542
Southern towns and cities in 1919 (Grossman, 1989).
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location decision.7 Born in Pontotoc, Mississippi, nineteen-year-old McCord traveled in search of
higher wages in 1912 to Savannah, Illinois, where a fellow Pontotoc-native connected him with a
job. McCord moved to Beloit, Wisconsin in 1914 after hearing of employment opportunities and
quickly began working as a janitor at the manufacturer Fairbanks Morse and Company. After two
years in Beloit, McCord spoke to his manager about returning home for a vacation. The manager
asked McCord to recruit workers during the trip. McCord returned with 18 unmarried men, all
of whom were soon hired. Thus began a persistent flow of African Americans from Pontotoc to
Beloit: among individuals born from 1916-1936, 14 percent of migrants from Pontotoc lived in
Beloit’s county at old age (Stuart and Taylor, 2017).8
Qualitative evidence documents the importance of social ties among African Americans from
the same birth town for life in the North. For example, roughly 1,000 of Erie, Pennsylvania’s
11,600 African American residents once lived in Laurel, Alabama, and almost half had family
connections to Laurel, leading an Erie resident to say, “I’m surrounded by so many Laurelites here,
it’s like a second home” (Associated Press, 1983). Nearly forty percent of the migrants in Decatur,
Illinois came from Brownsville, Tennessee, and Brownsville high school reunions took place in
Decatur from the 1980’s to 2000’s (Laury, 1986; Smith, 2006).9 As described by a Brownsville
native, “Decatur’s a little Brownsville, really” (Laury, 1986).
3.3 A Simple Model of Crime and Social Connectedness
This section describes a simple model of crime and social connectedness. Social connected-
ness, or the strength of relationships between individuals, could reduce crime through multiple
channels, including by increasing the probability that criminals are identified and punished or by
facilitating the development of human capital during childhood. We use the model to derive an
empirical measure of social connectedness, and we show how the effect of social connectedness
on crime depends on peer effects.
7The following paragraph draws on Bell (1933). See also Knowles (2010).
8This is 68 times larger than the percent of migrants from Mississippi that lived in Beloit’s county at old age.
9The 40 percent figure comes from the Duke SSA/Medicare dataset, described below.
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3.3.1 Individual Crime Rates
We focus on a single city and characterize individuals by their age and social ties. For sim-
plicity, we consider a static model in which each younger individual makes a single decision about
whether to commit crime, while older individuals do not commit crime. Each individual belongs
to one of three groups: blacks with ties to the South (τi = s), blacks without ties to the South
(τi = n), and all others (τi = w). Older individuals have a tie to the South if they were born
there. Younger individuals have a tie to the South if at least one of their parents, who are older
individuals, was born in the South. We index younger individuals by i and older individuals by o.
For a younger individual who is black with ties to the South, we model the probability of
committing crime as




where Ci = 1 if person i commits crime and Ci = 0 otherwise, and ji denotes the birth town
of i’s parents. Equation (3.1) is a linear approximation to the optimal crime rule from a utility-
maximizing model in which the relative payoff of committing crime depends on three factors.
First, αs, which is common to all individuals of type s, captures all non-social determinants of
crime (e.g., due to police or employment opportunities). Second, an individual’s decision to com-





i,o,j , where γ
s
i,o,j is the influence of older individual o on younger individual
i. This reduced-form representation captures several possible channels through which social con-
nectedness might affect crime. For example, older individuals might reduce crime among younger
individuals by increasing the probability a criminal is identified and punished (Becker, 1968) or
by increasing younger individuals’ stock of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, which boost earn-
ings in the non-crime labor market (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006). Alternatively, social
connectedness could increase crime by reinforcing unproductive norms or providing trust that fa-
cilitates criminal activity, as with the Ku Klux Klan, Mafia, or gangs (Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam,
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2000). Ethnographic work describing African American families and kinship networks suggests
crime-reducing effects of social connectedness (Stack, 1970).
Motivated by the qualitative evidence described in Section 3.2, we model social connectedness
as a function of whether the parents of individual i share a birth town with individual o. In particu-
lar, γsi,o,j = γ
s





We assume that younger blacks with ties to the South are only influenced by older blacks with
ties to the South, so that γsi,o,j = 0 if τi 6= τo. Given these assumptions, the effect of social con-





















the total number of older individuals in the city. Because social interactions depend on birth town
connections, the older generation’s migration decisions lead to differences in expected crime rates
for younger individuals with ties to different birth towns.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index emerges as a natural way to measure social connectedness in
this model. In particular, the probability that a randomly chosen African American with ties to the
South commits crime is








2 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of birth town to destination
city population flows for African Americans with ties to the South.10 The direct effect of social
connectedness on the type s crime rate is γsH − γsL. One reasonable case is γsH < γsL < 0, so that
older individuals discourage younger individuals from committing crime, and the effect is stronger
10In deriving equation (3.3), we assume that each Southern birth town accounts for the same share of individuals in






1∀j, where Nsj,1 is the number of younger individuals




j,1 is the total number of younger individuals.
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among individuals who share a birth town connection. Expressions analogous to equation (3.3)
exist for African American youth without ties to the South (τi = n) and non-black youth (τi = w).
3.3.2 City-Level Crime Rates
We next consider the equilibrium of this model, in which peer effects can accentuate or attenu-
ate the effect of social connectedness on crime. We use HHI to measure social connectedness and
allow peer effects to differ by the type of peer, leading to the following equilibrium,
C̄s = F s(αs,HHIs, C̄s, C̄n, C̄w) (3.4)
C̄n = F n(αn,HHIn, C̄s, C̄n, C̄w) (3.5)
C̄w = Fw(αw,HHIw, C̄s, C̄n, C̄w), (3.6)
where C̄τ is the crime rate among younger individuals of type τ , and F τ characterizes the equi-
librium crime rate responses. The equilibrium crime rate vector (C̄s, C̄n, C̄w) is a fixed point of
equations (3.4)-(3.6).
We are interested in the effect of social connectedness among African Americans with ties to








































where I is the 3 × 3 identity matrix and J , a sub-matrix of the Jacobian of equations (3.4)-(3.6),
captures the role of peer effects.11 Equations (3.7)-(3.9) depend on the direct effect of HHIs on
11In particular,
J ≡
∂F s/∂C̄s ∂F s/∂C̄n ∂F s/∂C̄w∂Fn/∂C̄s ∂Fn/∂C̄n ∂Fn/∂C̄w
∂Fw/∂C̄s ∂Fw/∂C̄n ∂Fw/∂C̄w
 ,
and Jab is the (a, b) element of J . ms is the (1, 1) element of (I − J)−1, mn is the (2, 1) element, and mw is the
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crime among blacks with ties to the South, ∂F s/∂HHIs, times a peer effect multiplier, given by
ms,mn, and mw. We assume the equilibrium is stable, which essentially means that peer effects
are not too large.12 For example, if J11 ≡ ∂F s/∂C̄s ≥ 1, and there are no cross-group peer effects,
then a small increase in the crime rate among individuals of type s leads to an equilibrium where
all individuals of type s commit crime. In contrast, a small change in any group’s crime rate does
not lead to a corner solution in a stable equilibrium.
Our first result is that if social connectedness reduces the crime rate of African Americans with
ties to the South, then social connectedness reduces the crime rate of all groups, as long as the
equilibrium is stable and peer effects (i.e., elements of J) are non-negative.
Proposition 1. dC̄s/dHHIs ≤ 0, dC̄n/dHHIs ≤ 0, and dC̄w/dHHIs ≤ 0 if ∂F s/∂HHIs < 0, the
equilibrium is stable, and peer effects are non-negative.
In a stable equilibrium with non-negative peer effects, the crime-reducing effect of social con-
nectedness among Southern blacks is not counteracted by higher crime rates among other groups.
Hence, equilibrium crime rates of all groups weakly decrease in Southern African American HHI.
With negative cross-group peer effects, the reduction in crime rates among Southern blacks could
lead to higher crime by other groups. Proposition 1 is not surprising, and we provide a proof in
Appendix C.1.
Because of data limitations, most of our empirical analysis examines the city-level crime rate,
C̄, which is a weighted average of the three group-specific crime rates,
C̄ = P b[P s|bC̄s + (1− P s|b)C̄n] + (1− P b)C̄w, (3.10)
where P b is the black population share and P s|b is the share of the black population with ties to
the South. Proposition 1 provides sufficient, but not necessary, conditions to ensure that Southern
black HHI decreases the city-level crime rate, C̄, when the direct effect is negative. There exist
(3, 1) element.
12The technical assumption underlying stability is that the spectral radius of J is less than one. This condition is
analogous to the requirement in linear-in-means models that the slope coefficient on the endogenous peer effect is less
than one in absolute value (e.g., Manski, 1993).
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situations in which cross-group peer effects are negative, but an increase in HHIs still decreases in
the city-level crime rate.
Our second result is that the effect of Southern black social connectedness on the city-level
crime rate decreases (or, increases in magnitude) with the black population share for certain peer
effect parametrizations.
Proposition 2. dC̄/dHHIs decreases with P b if ∂F s/∂HHIs < 0, the equilibrium is stable, and
cross-group peer effects are non-negative and sufficiently small.














Two jointly sufficient conditions for Proposition 2 are (a): dC̄s/dHHIs < dC̄w/dHHIs and (b):
dC̄n/dHHIs ≤ dC̄w/dHHIs. If Southern black social connectedness leads to greater crime reduc-
tions among both groups of African Americans, relative to non-blacks, then the total effect will
be larger in magnitude in cities with a higher black population share. In this case, Proposition
2 occurs mechanically. The nature of peer effects determines whether conditions (a) and (b) are
satisfied, and we provide precise conditions in Appendix C.1.
As a simple example, suppose there are no cross-group peer effects between blacks and non-
blacks (J13 = J23 = J31 = J32 = 0). In this case, an increase in HHIs does not affect the crime
rate among non-blacks, so condition (a) holds. Condition (b) requires that an increase in HHIs
must not increase crime among blacks without ties to the South, which will be true if peer effects
between the two groups of African Americans are non-negative. As shown in Appendix C.1, the
formal conditions in this example are a stable equilibrium and J21 ≥ 0.
13It is not clear whether we would expect, say, dC̄s/dHHIs to be more or less negative in cities with higher P b. The
effect could decrease in magnitude if the higher black population share diluted existing community ties, or the effect
could increase in magnitude if the higher black population share reinforced community ties. The former case makes
Proposition 2 less likely to hold, while the latter case makes it more likely.
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In sum, we expect that higher social connectedness among African Americans with ties to the
South will reduce the city-level crime rate (Proposition 1). We also expect that the effect will be
stronger in cities with a higher black population share (Proposition 2). Furthermore, the effect of
social connectedness among African Americans with ties to the South on the city-level crime rate
depends critically on the nature of a peer effects, an issue we examine more fully in Section 3.6
after presenting our baseline results.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data on Crime, Social Connectedness, and Control Variables
To estimate the effect of social connectedness on crime, we use three different data sets. We
measure annual city-level crime counts using FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data for 1960-
2009, available from ICPSR. UCR data contain voluntary monthly reports on the number offenses
reported to police, which we aggregate to the city-year level.14 We focus on the seven commonly
studied index crimes: murder and non-negligent manslaughter (“murder”), forcible rape (“rape”),
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Murder is the best measured crime,
and robbery and motor vehicle theft are also relatively well-measured (Blumstein, 2000; Tibbetts,
2012). Because missing observations are indistinguishable from true zeros, we drop any city-year
in which any of the three property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) equal zero.
We also use annual population estimates from the Census Bureau in the UCR data.
The Duke SSA/Medicare dataset provides the birth town-to-destination city population flows
that underlie our measure of social connectedness. The data contain sex, race, date of birth, date of
death (if deceased), and the ZIP code of residence at old age (death or 2001, whichever is earlier)
for over 70 million individuals who received Medicare Part B from 1976-2001. In addition, the
data include a 12-character string with self-reported birth town information, which is matched to
14We use Federal Information Processing System (FIPS) place definitions of cities. We follow Chalfin and McCrary
(2015) in decreasing the number of murders for year 2001 in New York City by 2,753, the number of victims of the
September 11 terrorist attack.
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places, as described in Black et al. (2015b). We focus on individuals born from 1916-1936 in the
former Confederate states, which we refer to as the South.15 We restrict our main analysis sample
to cities that received at least 25 Southern-born African American migrants in the Duke dataset to
improve the reliability of our estimates.
Census city data books provide numerous city-level covariates for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and
2000. These data are only available for cities with at least 25,000 residents in 1960, 1980, and
1990, and we apply the same restriction for 1970 and 2000. We limit our sample to cities in the
Northeast, Midwest, and West Census regions to focus on the cross-region moves that characterize
the Great Migration. Our main analysis sample excludes the 14 cities with 1980 population greater
than 500,000, as we found considerable measurement error in murder counts for these cities.16
Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2 provide summary statistics.
3.4.2 Estimating the Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime
Our main estimating equation is
Yk,t = exp[ln(HHIk)δ + ln(Nk)θ +X ′k,tβ] + εk,t, (3.12)
where Yk,t is the number of crimes in city k in year t. The key variable of interest is our proxy for




where Nj,k is the number of migrants from birth town j that live in destination city k, and Nk ≡∑
j Nj,k is the total number of migrants. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a natural way to mea-
sure social connectedness, as shown in Section 3.3, and approximately equals the probability that
two randomly chosen migrants living in city k share a birth town.17 Xk,t is a vector of covari-
15Coverage rates decline considerably for earlier and later cohorts (Black et al., 2015b; Stuart and Taylor, 2017).
16In particular, we constructed annual murder counts using the FBI UCR data, which are not broken down by age,
race, or sex, and the FBI Age-Sex-Race (ASR) data, which are. Both data sets should yield the same number of
murders in a city, but substantial discrepancies exist in the largest cities (see Appendix Figure C.1). We do not know
why the murder counts differ between these data sets.
17The probability that two randomly chosen migrants living in city k share a birth town is
P[ji = ji′ ] =
∑
j









ates, including log population and other variables described below, and εk,t captures unobserved
determinants of crime.18 We use an exponential function in equation (3.12) because there are no
murders for many city-year observations (Appendix Table C.1). We cluster standard errors at the
city level to allow for arbitrary autocorrelation in the unobserved determinants of crime.19
The key parameter of interest is δ, which we interpret as the elasticity of the crime rate with
respect to HHIk, our proxy of social connectedness, because we control for log population. If
social connectedness reduces the city-level crime rate, as predicted by Proposition 1, then δ < 0.
We estimate δ using cross-city variation in social connectedness, conditional on the total num-
ber of migrants and other covariates. To identify δ, we make the following conditional indepen-
dence assumption,
εk,t ⊥ HHIk|(Nk, Xk,t). (3.13)
Condition (3.13) states that, conditional on the number of migrants living in city k and the vector
of control variables, social connectedness is independent of unobserved determinants of crime
from 1960-2009. This condition allows the total number of migrants, Nk, to depend arbitrarily on
unobserved determinants of crime, εk,t.20
We include several control variables in Xk,t that bolster the credibility of condition (3.13).
State-by-year fixed effects flexibly account for determinants of crime that vary over time at the
state-level, due to changes in economic conditions, police enforcement, government spending,
and other factors. Demographic covariates include log population, percent black, percent female,
percent age 5-17, percent age 18-64, percent age 65 and older, percent at least 25 years old with a
high school degree, percent at least 25 years old with a college degree, and log city area. Economic
18Because equation (3.12) includes ln(HHIk), ln(Nk), and log population, our estimate of δ would be identical if
we used city population as the denominator of HHIk.
19Equation (3.12) emerges from a Poisson model, but consistent estimation of (δ, θ, β) does not require any restric-
tion on the conditional variance of the error term (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002).
20Condition (3.13) does not guarantee identification of the other parameters in equation (3.12) besides δ. For
example, identification of θ requires exogenous variation in the total number of migrants in each city. Boustan (2010)
provides one possible strategy for such an approach, but we do not pursue that here.
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covariates include log median family income, unemployment rate, labor force participation rate,
and manufacturing employment share.21 We observe log population in every year and, with a few
exceptions, we observe the remaining demographic and economic covariates every ten years from
1960-2000.22 In explaining crime in year t, we only use covariates corresponding to the decade in
which t lies. We allow coefficients for all covariates besides log population to vary across decades
to account for possible changes in the importance of economic and demographic covariates.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of condition (3.13). First, variation in social
connectedness stems from location decisions made 50 years before we estimate effects on crime.
As described in Section 3.2, initial migrants in the 1910’s chose their destination in response to
economic opportunity, and idiosyncratic factors, like a migrant’s ability to persuade friends and
family to join them, strongly influenced whether other migrants followed.23
Table 3.1 shows that social connectedness is not correlated with homicide rates from 1911-
1914. In particular, we regress ln(HHIk) on ln(Nk) and log homicide rates from 1911-1914, which
we observe from historical mortality statistics published for cities with at least 100,000 residents
in 1920 (Census, 1922). We find no significant relationship between social connectedness and
early century crime rates. This conclusion holds when we use inverse probability weights to make
this sample of cities more comparable to our main analysis sample on observed characteristics.24
These results partially dismiss the possibility that social connectedness is correlated with extremely
persistent unobserved determinants of crime, which would threaten our empirical strategy.
21Stuart and Taylor (2017) find that the manufacturing employment share predicts the strength of social interactions
in location decisions among Southern black migrants, which leads to higher social connectedness.
22The exceptions are percent female (not observed in 1960), percent at least 25 years old with a high school degree
and a college degree (not observed in 2000), log median family income (not observed in 2000), and manufacturing
share (not observed in 2000). For decades in which a covariate is not available, we use the adjacent decade.
23For example, Scott (1920) writes, “The tendency was to continue along the first definite path. Each member of
the vanguard controlled a small group of friends at home, if only the members of his immediate family. Letters sent
back, representing that section of the North and giving directions concerning the route best known, easily influenced
the next groups to join their friends rather than explore new fields. In fact, it is evident throughout the movement that
the most congested points in the North when the migration reached its height, were those favorite cities to which the
first group had gone” (p. 69).
24We do not adjust the standard errors in columns 3-4 for the use of inverse probability weights. As a result, the
p-values for these columns are likely too small, which further reinforces our finding of no significant relationship.
Appendix Table C.3 compares the observed characteristics of cities for which we do and do not observe 1911-1914
mortality rates.
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If anything, limitations in the data used to construct HHIk could lead us to understate any
negative effect of social connectedness on crime. We construct HHIk using migrants’ location at
old age, measured at some point from 1976-2001. As a result, migration after 1960, when we first
measure crime, could influence HHIk and the estimated effect on crime, δ. If migrants with a higher
concentration of friends and family nearby were less likely to out-migrate in response to higher
crime shocks, εk,t, then HHIk would be larger in cities with greater unobserved determinants of
crime. This would bias our estimate of δ upwards, making it more difficult to conclude that social
connectedness reduces crime. Reassuringly, Table 3.2 reveals very low migration rates during this
period among African Americans who were born from 1916-1936 in the South and living in the
North. Around 90 percent of individuals stayed in the same county for the five-year periods from
1955-1960, 1965-1970, 1975-1980, 1985-1990, and 1995-2000.25 This table suggests that our
inability to construct HHIk using migrants’ location before 1960 is relatively unimportant.
Table 3.3 provides additional indirect evidence in support of condition (3.13) by showing that
social connectedness is not systematically correlated with most demographic or economic covari-
ates. The lack of systematic correlations with observed variables suggests that social connectedness
is not correlated with unobserved determinants of crime, εk,t. We regress log HHI on various co-
variates for the 228 cities observed in every decade from 1960 to 2000. To facilitate comparisons,
we normalize all variables, separately for each decade, to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. Only the log number of migrants and the manufacturing employment share are consistently
correlated with log HHI. The negative correlation between log HHI and the log number of migrants
arises because a large number of migrants necessarily came from many sending towns, due to the
small size of Southern towns relative to Northern cities. The positive correlation between log HHI
and the manufacturing employment share arises because social interactions in location decisions
guided migrants to destinations with ample manufacturing employment, which was especially at-
tractive to African American workers (Stuart and Taylor, 2017). The bottom panel reports p-values
from tests that demographic or economic covariates (besides the manufacturing employment share)
25Available data do not allow us to examine whether out-migration rates vary with the concentration of friends and
family living nearby, which is the type of behavior that would affect HHIk.
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are unrelated to log HHI. We fail to reject this null hypothesis at standard significance levels from
1960-1980, providing support for condition (3.13). There is a significant relationship between so-
cial connectedness and covariates in 1990 and 2000, but this does not necessarily provide evidence
against condition (3.13) because social connectedness might have affected these later outcomes.26
Appendix Table C.4 shows results when adding a number of covariates measured among African-
Americans.
Figure 3.1 further describes the cross-city variation in social connectedness by plotting log
HHI and the log number of Southern black migrants. Our regressions identify the effect of social
connectedness on crime with variation in HHI conditional on the number of migrants in a city (and
other covariates), which is variation in the vertical dimension of Figure 3.1. Except for cities with
at least 500,000 residents in 1980, there is considerable variation in log HHI conditional on the log
number of migrants. Figure 3.2 shows that social connectedness stems largely from the location
decisions of a single sending town. Sixty-seven percent of the variation in log HHI is explained by
the leading term of log HHI, which equals the log squared share of migrants from the top sending
town. This finding reinforces the importance of idiosyncratic features of migrants and birth towns
in generating variation in social connectedness.27
26The significant relationship between social connectedness and demographic covariates in 1990 and 2000 is driven
by a negative relationship between social connectedness and the percent of the population age 0-4. Social connect-
edness could lower birth rates by increasing the opportunity cost of having children (by increasing human capital).
The significant relationship between social connectedness and economic covariates in 1990 is driven by a negative
relationship between social connectedness and log median income. Social connectedness and log median income are
not significantly correlated in other decades.
27Appendix Table C.5 displays the relationship between log HHI and estimates of social capital, based mainly on
1990 county-level data, from Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater (2006). Raw correlations between log HHI and
various measures of social capital are positive, but small and indistinguishable from zero. After controlling for the
log number of migrants and state fixed effects, these correlations shrink even further. The social capital estimates
of Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater (2006) depend on the density of membership organizations, voter turnout for
presidential elections, response rates for the decennial Census, and the number of non-profit organizations. The weak
correlation between log HHI and the county-level social capital estimates is not particularly surprising, given the
different time periods involved and, more importantly, the fact that these social capital estimates do not isolate social
ties among African Americans.
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3.5 The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime
3.5.1 Effects on City-Level Crime Rates
Motivated by the model in Section 3.3, we estimate the effect of social connectedness on city-
level crime rates (Proposition 1) and whether this effect is stronger in cities with a higher African
American population share (Proposition 2).
Table 3.4 shows that social connectedness leads to sizable and statistically significant reduc-
tions in murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. The table reports esti-
mates of equation (3.12) for an unbalanced panel of 471 cities.28 As seen in column 1, our esti-
mated elasticity of the murder rate with respect to HHI is -0.181 (0.034). The estimates for robbery
and motor vehicle theft, two other well-measured crimes in the FBI data, are -0.251 (0.035) and
-0.163 (0.041). These results are consistent with Proposition 1.
Because social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses, an
increased probability of detection likely is not the only operative mechanism. Burglary and motor
vehicle theft are less likely to have witnesses than rape, robbery, or assault, yet our estimates are
roughly comparable for all of these crimes.29 As a result, the effect of social connectedness on
crime probably stems in part from other mechanisms, such as an improvement in cognitive or
non-cognitive skills.
Simple examples help illustrate the sizable effects of social connectedness on crime. First,
consider Middletown, Ohio and Beloit, Wisconsin. These cities are similar in their total number of
Southern black migrants, 1980 population, and 1980 black population share, but Beloit’s HHI is
over four times as large as in Middletown (0.057 versus 0.014).30 The estimates in Table 3.4 imply
that replacing Middletown’s HHI with that of Beloit would decrease murders by 25.4 percent,
robberies by 35.2 percent, and motor vehicle thefts by 22.9 percent. By comparison, the estimates
28Appendix Table C.6 displays results for all covariates in the regressions.
29Unlike larceny or motor vehicle theft, a robbery features the use of force or threat of force. Consequently, rob-
beries are witnessed by at least one individual (the victim).
30For Middletown and Beloit, the number of Southern black migrants is 376 and 407; the 1980 population is 35,207
and 43,719; and the 1980 percent black is 11.3 and 12.0.
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in Chalfin and McCrary (2015) imply that a similar decrease in murders would require a 38 percent
increase in the number of police officers.31 The effect of social connectedness is even larger in other
examples. HHI in Decatur, Illinois is almost twenty times larger than that of Albany, NY (0.118
versus 0.006).32 Replacing Albany’s HHI with that of Decatur would decrease murders by 53.9
percent, robberies by 74.8 percent, and motor vehicle thefts by 48.6 percent. While these effects
are sizable, they are reasonable in light of the tremendous variation in crime rates across cities
(Appendix Table C.2).
Table 3.5 demonstrates that our results are robust to various sets of control variables. We fo-
cus on the effect of social connectedness on murder, given its importance for welfare and high
measurement quality, and we restrict the sample to the 228 cities observed in every decade. Our
baseline specification in column 1 yields an estimate of δ of -0.244 (0.041). Estimates are very
similar when excluding demographic or economic covariates (columns 2-3) and somewhat atten-
uated when excluding both sets of covariates or replacing state-year fixed effects with region-year
fixed effects (columns 4-5). The estimate is even larger in magnitude when not controlling for the
log number of migrants and is very similar when using ten indicator variables to control flexibly
for the number of migrants (columns 6-7).33 Controlling for log HHI and the log number of South-
ern white migrants and foreign immigrants has little impact on the estimate (column 8).34 Results
are similar when we control for the share of migrants that chose their destination because of social
interactions (column 9); this variable controls for unobserved characteristics of migrants that could
confound our results, as detailed below.
Table 3.6 provides some evidence that the effect of social connectedness on crime is stronger
in cities with a higher African American population share. We estimate equation (3.12) separately
for each tercile of cities’ 1960 African American population share. Across increasing levels of the
31Chalfin and McCrary (2015) estimate an elasticity of murder with respect to police of -0.67, almost four times the
size of our estimated elasticity of murder with respect to social connectedness.
32For Decatur and Albany, the number of Southern black migrants is 760 and 874; the 1980 population is 94,081
and 101,727; and the 1980 percent black is 14.6 and 15.9.
33For identification purposes, we strongly prefer to control for the log number of migrants. We estimate the regres-
sion in column 6 to demonstrate that the strong relationship between log HHI and the log number of migrants does not
account for the negative coefficient on log HHI.
34We use country of birth to construct HHI for immigrants.
112
black population share, the estimated effect of HHI on murder is -0.017 (0.124), -0.085 (0.052), and
-0.213 (0.051). A similar pattern exists for other crimes, including robbery and motor vehicle theft.
Point estimates for the highest percent black tercile are negative and statistically significant across
all crimes, while point estimates for the lowest percent black tercile are indistinguishable from zero
for six out of seven crimes.35 Moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of HHI (0.008 to 0.028) has
essentially no effect on the murder rate in cities in the bottom tercile of black population share.
For the middle tercile, increasing HHI across the interquartile range leads to 0.6 fewer murders per
100,000 residents, relative to a base of 5.4 murders per 100,000; the effect is 3.4 fewer murders
per 100,000 residents at the highest percent black tercile, relative to a base of 12.8 murders per
100,000. The results in Table 3.6 are consistent with Proposition 2 of the model, which predicts
a stronger effect of social connectedness on city-level crime rates in cities with a higher black
population share because a higher share of individuals in these cities have social ties to African
Americans from the South.
3.5.2 Effects over Time
Table 3.7 shows that the effect of social connectedness on crime is generally smaller in mag-
nitude from 2000-2009 relative to 1960-1999. We estimate equation (3.12) separately for each
decade.36 Focusing on the best measured crimes of murder, robbery, and motor vehicle theft, we
see significant negative effects of social connectedness in each decade from 1960-1999, and much
smaller and insignificant effects from 2000-2009.
One possible explanation for the attenuated effects from 2000-2009 is a decline in the effective
strength of social connectedness over time. Reductions in crime in 1960 were likely driven by
individuals who were born around 1940 to mothers born around 1915.37 More generally, the
individuals most affected by social connectedness were likely the children and grandchildren of
35However, standard errors for estimates in the lowest percent black tercile are quite large, and we cannot reject
equality of coefficients in the low and high terciles for murder (t = −1.46) or robbery (t = −1.42), but can for motor
vehicle theft (t = −2.35).
36To ensure that our results are not driven by changes in the sample over time, we limit the sample in Table 3.7 to
cities that appear in at least five years of every decade.
37The highest offending rate for murder is between ages 18-24 (Fox, 2000).
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post-war migrants and the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of the earliest group of migrants.
As a result, the crime-reducing effect of social connectedness might have declined as the original
migrants died. A second possible explanation is that individuals committing crime in the 2000’s,
when crime rates were relatively low (see Figure 3.3), were inframarginal and not affected by
social connectedness.
The attenuated effects from 2000-2009 appear to reflect a decline in the effective strength of
social connectedness, as opposed to an interaction between the level of crime and the effect of
social connectedness. Figure 3.5 shows that fewer black children had ties to the South from 2000-
2009 compared to previous decades. We characterize individuals age 14-17 who are living in the
North, Midwest, or West regions as having a tie to the South if they or an adult in their household
were born in the South. The share of black children with ties to the South declines from 67 percent
in 1980 to 33 percent in 2000 and 20 percent in 2010. We also examine whether the effect of social
connectedness from 2000-2009 differs across cities with higher and lower predicted crime rates.
In particular, we estimate equation (3.12) using data from 1995-1999 and use the coefficients
from this regression to predict cities’ crime rates from 2000-2009 based on their economic and
demographic covariates.38 There is little evidence of a negative effect of social connectedness
from 2000-2009 even for the cities with higher predicted crime rates (Appendix Table C.7).
Figure 3.4 plots the evolution of crime rates from 1960-2009 for two hypothetical cities with
HHI at the 75th and 25th percentiles and average values of other covariates. Crime rates rose
much more slowly from 1960-1990 in cities with higher social connectedness. Crime rates for
cities with high and low social connectedness converged after 1990. Adding up the effect of social
connectedness on crime rates from 1960-2009 implies that the city with HHI at the 75th percentile
had 139 fewer murders and 10,822 fewer motor vehicle thefts per 100,000 residents over this
period.
38We include ln(HHIk) and ln(Nk) in the 1995-1999 regression, but replace these variables with their mean when
constructing predicted crime rates. We also use state-specific linear trends in place of state-by-year fixed effects for
these regressions.
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3.5.3 Effects by Age and Race of Offender over Time
Table 3.8 shows that social connectedness leads to particularly large reductions in murders
committed by black youth. From 1980-1989, the elasticity of murders committed by black youth
with respect to social connectedness is -0.761 (0.175), almost four times the size of the elasticity of
murders committed by non-black youth.39 The effect of social connectedness on murders commit-
ted by black youth declines over time, consistent with the decline in social ties seen in Figure 3.5.
The effect of social connectedness on murders committed by black adults declines more slowly
over time, consistent with social connectedness having persistent effects on cohorts. Peer effects
provide a natural explanation for the reduction in crime among non-blacks, as described in our
model.
3.5.4 Threats to Empirical Strategy and Additional Robustness Checks
A key potential threat to our empirical strategy is that cities with higher social connectedness
had lower unobserved determinants of crime, εk,t. For example, if migrants from the same birth
town moved to cities with low unobserved determinants of crime, and these unobserved charac-
teristics persisted over time, then our estimate of δ could be biased downwards. We have already
presented indirect evidence against this threat by showing that log HHI is not correlated with
homicide rates from 1911-1916 (Table 3.1) or most demographic and economic covariates from
1960-2009 (Table 3.3).
To provide more direct evidence against this threat, we estimate the effect of social connect-
edness on crime for each five-year interval from 1965-2009 while controlling for the log average
crime rate from 1960-1964.40 Figure 3.6 shows that the effect of social connectedness on murder is
nearly identical when controlling for the 1960-1964 crime rate. These results directly rule out the
possibility that our estimates are driven by a persistent correlation between HHI and unobserved
determinants of crime from 1960-forward.41
39FBI data provide the age, race, and sex of offenders for crimes resulting in arrest starting in 1980.
40Controlling for the average log crime rate is unattractive because many cities report zero murders in a given year.
41The similarity of the results in Figure 3.6 is not driven by a weak relationship between the log average crime rate
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Another possible concern is that HHI reflects unobserved characteristics of migrants who chose
the same destination as other individuals from their birth town. Census data show that Southern
black migrants living in a state or metropolitan area with a higher share of migrants from their birth
state have less education and income (Appendix Table C.8). As a result, migrants who followed
their birth town network likely had less education and earnings capacity than other migrants. This
negative selection in terms of education and earnings could generate a positive correlation between
HHIk and εk,t, making it more difficult for us to estimate a negative effect of social connectedness
on crime. At the same time, migrants who followed their birth town network might have displayed
greater cooperation or other “pro-social” behaviors. To address this possibility, we estimate a struc-
tural model of social interactions in location decisions. As described in Appendix C.2, the model
allows us to estimate the share of migrants in each destination that moved there because of social
interactions. When used as a covariate in equation (3.12), this variable proxies for unobserved
characteristics of migrants that chose to follow other migrants from their birth town. Column 9 of
Table 3.5 shows that the estimated effect of social connectedness on murder barely changes when
we control for the share of migrants that chose their destination because of social interactions.42
Consequently, our results appear to reflect the effect of social connectedness per se, as opposed to
unobserved characteristics of certain migrants.
Appendix Table C.9 shows that our results are robust to including the 14 largest cities that
are excluded from the main analysis, estimating negative binomial models, dropping outliers of
the dependent variable, and measuring HHI using birth county to destination county population
flows.43
from 1960-1964 and crime rates from 1965-forward.
42Results are nearly identical when we use quadratic, cubic, or quartics in this variable.
43We prefer equation (3.12) over the negative binomial specification because it requires fewer assumptions to gen-
erate consistent estimates of δ (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002).
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3.6 Understanding the Role of Peer Effects
We now use the model in Section 3.3 to examine the role of peer effects in mediating the
relationship between social connectedness and city-level crime rates. The model connects the total
effect of HHI on city-level crime, δ, to the effect of HHI on crime for blacks with ties to the South
and peer effects. In particular, equations (3.7)-(3.10) imply that the elasticity of the city-level crime
rate with respect to Southern black HHI, δ, can be written
δ = εsrs
[
P b(P s|bms + (1− P s|b)mn) + (1− P b)mw
]
, (3.14)
where δ ≡ (dC̄/dHHIs)(HHIs/C̄) is the parameter of interest in our regressions, εs ≡ (∂F s/∂HHIs)
(HHIs/F s) captures the direct effect of HHI on the crime rate of blacks with ties to the South,
rs ≡ C̄s/C̄ is the ratio of the crime rate among blacks with ties to the South to the overall crime
rate, P b is the black population share, P s|b is the share of blacks with ties to the South, andms,mn,
and mw are peer effect multipliers defined in equations (3.7)-(3.10).
We use equation (3.14) to examine which direct effect (εs) and peer effect (ms,mn,mw)
parametrizations are consistent with our central estimate of δ for murder. We set the black popu-
lation share P b = 0.13 and the share of the black population with ties to the South P s|b = 0.67.44
We do not observe the crime rate among blacks with ties to the South. In the FBI data, half of
the murders resulting in arrest are attributed to African Americans. If crime rates are equal among
blacks with and without ties to the South, then rs = 3.8.45
We make several simplifying assumptions about peer effects. First, we assume that own-group
peer effects are equal across all three groups.46 Second, we assume that cross-group peer effects
between non-blacks and both groups of African Americans are equal. Third, we assume that
44The black population share in our sample is 0.13 in 1980. As seen in Figure 3.5, the share of African American
youth living in the North with ties to the South is 0.67.
45If crime rates are equal among blacks with and without ties to the South, then C̄s = C̄b, where C̄b ≡ Cb/N b is
the crime rate among all blacks. As a result, rs = (Cb/N b)/(C/N) = (Cb/C)/(N b/N) = 0.5/0.13, where C and
N are the total number of crimes and individuals. To the extent that blacks with ties to the South commit less crime
than blacks without ties to the South, we will overstate rs and understate the direct effect, εs.
46We are aware of no evidence suggesting that own-group peer effects differ for black versus non-black youth.
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cross-group peer effects are symmetric in terms of elasticities.47 The first assumption implies that
J11 = J22 = J33, and the second implies that J12 = J21, J13 = J23, and J31 = J32. Letting Eab
denote the elasticity form of Jab, these three assumptions imply that E11 = E22 = E33, E12 = E21,
and E13 = E23 = E31 = E32.
We draw on previous empirical work to guide our parametrization of peer effects. As detailed
in Appendix C.3, the literature suggests on-diagonal values of J (own-group peer effects) be-
tween 0 and 0.5 and off-diagonal values of J (cross-group peer effects) near zero (Case and Katz,
1991; Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Ludwig and Kling, 2007; Damm and Dustmann,
2014).48 We consider on-diagonal values of J of 0, 0.25, and 0.5. We allow for sizable peer effects
between African Americans with and without ties to the South, and we parametrize the cross-race
effects so that elasticities equal 0 or 0.1. Given values of (rs, P b, P s|b,ms,mn,mw) and our esti-
mate of δ, equation (3.14) yields a unique value for εs. Equations (3.7)-(3.9) then allow us to to
solve for the effect of a change in Southern black HHI on crime rates for each group.49
Table 3.9 maps the estimated effect of social connectedness on the city-level murder rate, δ̂,
to the effect on murder rates of various groups under different peer effect parametrizations.50 We
consider a one standard deviation increase in HHI, equal to 0.78, which decreases the total murder
rate by 14.1 percent according to the estimate in Table 3.4. This implies a decrease in the murder
rate of blacks with ties to the South between 42.2 percent, when there are no cross-group peer
effects (column 1), and 21.2 percent, when peer effects operate across all groups (column 7). The
murder rate of blacks without ties to the South decreases by 0-24.2 percent, while the murder rate
of non-blacks decreases by 0-8.0 percent. Depending on the parametrization, up to 82 percent of
the effect on blacks with ties to the South is driven by peer effects. The existing evidence on peer
47Given the differences in crime rates between blacks and non-blacks, we believe that assuming symmetric cross-
group elasticities is more appropriate than assuming symmetric cross-group linear effects (J).
48Estimates from previous work are valuable, but are not necessarily comparable to each other or our setting, as
they rely on different contexts, identification strategies, data sources, and crime definitions.
49In particular: (dC̄s/dHHIs)(HHIs/C̄s) = εsms, (dC̄n/dHHIs)(HHIs/C̄n) = εsmn(C̄s/C̄n), and
(dC̄w/dHHIs)(HHIs/C̄w) = εsmw(C̄s/C̄w). Our assumption that crime rates are equal among blacks with and
without ties to the South implies that C̄s/C̄n = 1. The same assumption, combined with the fact that half of murders
are attributed to blacks in the UCR data, implies that C̄s/C̄w = (1− P b)/P b = 6.69.
50Under all peer effect parametrizations in Table 3.9, the equilibrium is stable, and Propositions 1 and 2 are true.
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effects suggests placing the most emphasis on columns 3 and 4, which imply that a one standard
deviation increase in HHI reduces the murder rate of African Americans with ties to the South by
37.3 and 30.1 percent and reduces the murder rate of African Americans without ties to the South
by 9.9 and 8.7 percent.51 In columns 3 and 4, peer effects account for 30.2 and 32.6 percent of
the effect on blacks with ties to the South. Peer effects clearly could play an important role in
amplifying the effect of social connectedness on crime.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of social connectedness on crime across U.S. cities from 1960-
2009. We use a new source of variation in social connectedness stemming from social interactions
in the migration of millions of African Americans out of the South. A one standard deviation in-
crease in social connectedness leads to a precisely estimated 14 percent decrease in murder. We
find that social connectedness also leads to sizable reductions in rapes, robberies, assaults, burglar-
ies, and motor vehicle thefts. As predicted by our economic model, social connectedness leads to
greater reductions in the city-level crime rate in cities with a higher African American population
share. Social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have witnesses, which
suggests that an increased probability of detection is not the only mechanism through which social
connectedness reduces crime.
Our results highlight the importance of birth town level social ties in reducing violent and prop-
erty crimes in U.S. cities. In principle, similar social ties among immigrants could reduce crime
and generate other desirable outcomes. While the benefits of these social ties must be weighed
against any possible offsetting effects (e.g., on assimilation), the characteristics of social networks
could prove valuable in achieving difficult economic and social milestones.
In future work, we plan to use our new source of variation in social connectedness to study its
effects on a variety of other economic outcomes, such as schooling, employment, marriage, and
51The results in Table 3.8, which show significant effects of social connectedness on non-black crime, suggest
sizable peer effects between non-blacks and blacks.
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fertility. Evidence on these effects is of independent interest and would improve our understanding
of the negative effects on crime documented in this paper.
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Table 3.1: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and 1911-1916 Homicide Rates
Dependent variable:
Log HHI, Southern black migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log mean homicide rate, 1911-1916 0.010 0.073 0.050 -0.012
(0.147) (0.101) (0.216) (0.088)
p-value [0.948] [0.476] [0.817] [0.896]
(0.055) (0.043)
Log number, Southern black migrants x x
Inverse probability weighted x x
R2 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.67
N (cities) 46 46 46 46
Notes: The sample contains cities in the North, Midwest, and West Census regions with at
least 100,000 residents in 1920. We exclude homicide rates based on less than five deaths
in constructing the mean homicide rate from 1911-1916. In columns 3-4, we use inverse
probability weights (IPWs) because the sample of cities for which we observe homicide
rates from 1911-1916 differs on various characteristics from our main analysis sample. We
construct IPWs using fitted values from a logit model, where the dependent variable is an
indicator for a city having homicide rate data for at least one year from 1911-1916, and
the explanatory variables are log population, percent black, percent female, percent with a
high school degree or more, percent with a college degree or more, log land area, log me-
dian family income, unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and manufacturing
employment share, all measured in 1980. Unlike our main analysis sample, we do not re-
strict the sample to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980. Heteroskedastic-robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: Census (1922, p. 64-65) , Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.2: Five-Year Migration Rates, Southern Black Migrants Living Outside of the South
1955-1960 1965-1970 1975-1980 1985-1990 1995-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percent living in same state 93.1 95.5 96.2 96.0 95.9
Same county 86.4 90.4 93.8 77.2 93.8
Same house 33.0 54.0 72.8 77.2 79.1
Different house 53.4 36.4 21.0 - 14.7
Different county - 4.3 2.4 - 2.1
Unknown 6.7 0.8 - 18.8 -
Percent living in different state 6.9 4.5 3.8 4.0 4.1
Not in South 4.0 2.8 1.4 1.2 1.0
In South 2.9 1.6 2.4 2.9 3.1
Notes: Sample restricted to African Americans who were born in the South from 1916-1936 and
were living in the North, Midwest, or West regions five years prior to the census year. For 2000,
column 3 equals the percent living in the same PUMA.
Sources: Census IPUMS, 1960-2000
122
Table 3.3: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and City Covariates, 1960-2000
Dependent variable: Log HHI, Southern black migrants
Year covariates are measured: - 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log number, Southern -0.839*** -0.834*** -0.834*** -0.813*** -0.727*** -0.737***
black migrants (0.040) (0.066) (0.072) (0.078) (0.082) (0.072)
Log population 0.013 -0.009 -0.020 -0.065 0.006
(0.062) (0.067) (0.075) (0.085) (0.083)
Percent black 0.011 -0.013 -0.005 -0.059 -0.063
(0.053) (0.060) (0.075) (0.067) (0.058)
Percent female 0.017 -0.036 -0.004 -0.011 -0.013
(0.047) (0.058) (0.076) (0.077) (0.055)
Percent age 5-17 -0.131 0.089 0.161 0.557** 0.324
(0.151) (0.204) (0.242) (0.248) (0.292)
Percent age 18-64 -0.117 0.044 0.164 0.586** 0.499
(0.122) (0.211) (0.250) (0.260) (0.319)
Percent age 65+ -0.029 0.109 0.236 0.521*** 0.393*
(0.094) (0.146) (0.198) (0.187) (0.200)
Percent with high school degree -0.052 -0.065 -0.178* -0.037 -0.046
(0.115) (0.117) (0.096) (0.076) (0.079)
Percent with college degree 0.149** 0.101 0.076 0.118* 0.047
(0.073) (0.064) (0.051) (0.064) (0.063)
Log area, square miles -0.028 0.021 0.022 0.031 -0.021
(0.049) (0.060) (0.065) (0.073) (0.078)
Log median family income -0.032 -0.028 -0.002 -0.238*** -0.070
(0.085) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.065)
Unemployment rate 0.115* 0.147* 0.027 0.001 0.057
(0.060) (0.079) (0.070) (0.079) (0.060)
Labor force participation rate 0.024 0.085 0.017 0.106 -0.047
(0.025) (0.052) (0.091) (0.100) (0.051)
Manufacturing employment 0.225*** 0.166*** 0.142** 0.162*** 0.190***
share (0.058) (0.061) (0.055) (0.048) (0.045)
State fixed effects x x x x x x
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.769 0.763 0.756 0.762 0.769
N (cities) 228 228 228 228 228 228
p-value: Wald test that parameters equal zero
Demographic covariates 0.239 0.631 0.280 0.022 0.001
Economic covariates 0.121 0.104 0.983 0.012 0.066
Notes: Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980. We normalize all variables, sep-
arately for each regression, to have mean zero and standard deviation one. For the Wald tests, demographic
covariates include log population, percent black, percent female, percent age 5-17, percent age 18-64, percent
age 65+, percent with high school degree, percent with college degree, and log area. Economic covariates
include log median family income, unemployment rate, and labor force participation rate (but not manufactur-
ing employment share). Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log HHI, Southern -0.181*** -0.083** -0.251*** -0.142*** -0.095*** -0.049 -0.163***
black migrants (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.022) (0.030) (0.041)
Log number, Southern x x x x x x x
black migrants
Demographic covariates x x x x x x x
Economic covariates x x x x x x x
State-year fixed effects x x x x x x x
Pseudo R2 0.773 0.838 0.931 0.913 0.938 0.926 0.906
N (city-years) 18,854 17,690 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854
Cities 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in
1980. Demographic covariates include log population, percent black, percent age 5-17, percent age 18-54, per-
cent 65+, percent female, percent with high school degree, percent with college degree, and log area. Economic
covariates include log median family income, unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and manufactur-
ing employment share. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Murder, 1960-2009, Robustness
Dependent variable: Number of murders reported to police
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log HHI, Southern black migrants -0.244*** -0.269*** -0.228*** -0.163** -0.157*** -0.342*** -0.222*** -0.234*** -0.278***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.046) (0.073) (0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.053)
Log number, Southern black migrants x x x x x x x
Demographic covariates x x x x x x x
Economic covariates x x x x x x x
State-year fixed effects x x x x x x x x
Region-year fixed effects x
Indicators for number of x
Southern black migrants
Log HHI, Southern white migrants x
Log number, Southern white migrants x
Log HHI, immigrants x
Log number, immigrants x
Share of Southern black migrants x
influenced by social interactions
Pseudo R2 0.805 0.796 0.801 0.764 0.787 0.803 0.805 0.805 0.805
N (city-years) 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284 11,284
Cities 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980 that also are observed in every decade
from 1960-2000. Demographic covariates include log population, percent black, percent age 5-17, 18-64, and 65+, percent female, percent of population at
least 25 years old with a high school degree, percent of population at least 25 years old with a college degree, and log of area in square miles. Economic
covariates include log median family income, unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and manufacturing employment share. Indicators for the
number of Southern black migrants correspond to deciles. Column 9 includes an estimate of the share of migrants that chose their destination because of
social interactions. We estimate this variable using a structural model of social interactions in location decisions, as described in the text. Standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, by Percent Black Tercile
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coefficient on Log HHI, Southern Black Migrants by Percent Black Tercile
Low -0.017 -0.118 -0.062 -0.184 -0.067 -0.154* 0.072
(0.124) (0.157) (0.136) (0.120) (0.083) (0.092) (0.150)
Medium -0.085 0.053 -0.091 -0.051 -0.043 -0.006 -0.056
(0.052) (0.067) (0.072) (0.067) (0.043) (0.047) (0.071)
High -0.213*** -0.195*** -0.264*** -0.280*** -0.117*** -0.147** -0.304***
(0.051) (0.066) (0.040) (0.073) (0.032) (0.057) (0.056)
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000
residents in 1980. Regressions include the same covariates used in Table 3.4. Percent black is mea-
sured in 1960, and the tercile cutoffs are 0.022 and 0.075. Standard errors, clustered at the city level,
are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, by Decade
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coefficient on Log HHI, Southern Black Migrants by Decade
1960-69 -0.121** -0.313*** -0.368*** -0.265*** -0.145*** -0.087 -0.198**
(0.062) (0.112) (0.082) (0.098) (0.054) (0.064) (0.078)
1970-79 -0.273*** -0.220*** -0.327*** -0.179** -0.133*** -0.033 -0.219***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.057) (0.082) (0.031) (0.045) (0.067)
1980-89 -0.313*** -0.181*** -0.374*** -0.099 -0.174*** -0.089 -0.307***
(0.050) (0.057) (0.059) (0.075) (0.033) (0.059) (0.074)
1990-99 -0.285*** -0.068 -0.300*** -0.150*** -0.116*** -0.064 -0.277***
(0.080) (0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.040) (0.046) (0.076)
2000-09 -0.059 0.127** -0.089 -0.129** -0.039 -0.033 -0.038
(0.062) (0.061) (0.058) (0.059) (0.043) (0.041) (0.067)
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample contains 240 cities that have less than
500,000 residents in 1980 and appear in at least five years of every decade from 1960-2009. Regres-
sions include the same covariates used in Table 3.4. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in
parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Murder, 1980-2009, by Age-Race Group and
Decade
Dependent variable: Number of murders resulting in arrest
for age-race group
Black Black Non-Black Non-Black
All Youth Adults Youth Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient on Log HHI, Southern Black Migrants by Decade
1980-89 -0.210*** -0.761*** -0.355*** -0.200 -0.162
(0.069) (0.175) (0.078) (0.203) (0.089)
1990-99 -0.224*** -0.305*** -0.247** -0.458*** -0.278***
(0.084) (0.118) (0.098) (0.176) (0.101)
2000-09 -0.148 -0.195 -0.086 -0.297 -0.227*
(0.102) (0.200) (0.121) (0.271) (0.120)
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample contains 298 cities that have
less than 500,000 residents in 1980 and appear in at least five years of every decade from
1980-2009. Regressions include the same covariates used in Table 3.4. Standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table 3.9: The Role of Peer Effects in the Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peer effect parametrization
J11 = J22 = J33 (own-group) 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
J12 = J21 (cross-group, black) 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.4 0.4
J13 = J23 (cross-race, non-black on black) 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0.67
J31 = J32 (cross-race, black on non-black) 0 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.015
Implied peer effect elasticities
E11 = E22 = E33 (own-group) 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5
E12 = E21 (cross-group, black) 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.4 0.4
E13 = E23 (cross-race, non-black on black) 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
E31 = E32 (cross-race, black on non-black) 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
Implied peer effect multipliers
ms (blacks with ties to South) 1 1.33 1.44 1.48 2 5.56 8.92
mn (blacks without ties to South) 0 0 0.38 0.43 0 4.44 7.81
mw (non-black) 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.50
Percent change in murder rate due to one standard deviation increase in HHI, Southern Black Migrants
City-level murder rate -14.1 -14.1 -14.1 -14.1 -14.1 -14.1 -14.1
Murder rate among non-blacks 0 0 0 -5.2 0 0 -8.0
Murder rate among blacks -28.3 -28.3 -28.3 -23.1 -28.3 -28.3 -20.3
Among blacks without ties to South 0 0 -9.9 -8.7 0 -24.2 -18.5
Among blacks with ties to South -42.2 -42.2 -37.3 -30.1 -42.2 -30.3 -21.2
Direct effect of HHI -42.2 -31.6 -26.0 -20.3 -21.1 -5.4 -2.4
Peer effect 0 -10.5 -11.3 -9.8 -21.1 -24.8 -18.8
Notes: The top half of Table 3.9 describes the peer effect parametrizations that we consider. The bottom
half decomposes the effect of a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness into changes in
murder rates among different groups. See text for details.
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and the Number of Southern Black
Migrants
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Log number, Southern black migrants
25,000-149,999 150,000-499,999 500,000+
1980 Population
Notes: Figure contains 418 cities. Our main analysis sample excludes the 14 cities with at least 500,000 residents in
1980.
Source: Duke SSA/Medicare data
130
Figure 3.2: The Top Sending Town Accounts for Most of the Variation in Social Connectedness
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Leading Term of Log HHI, Southern black migrants
25,000-149,999 150,000-499,999 500,000+
1980 Population
Notes: The leading term of HHI equals the log squared percent of migrants from the top sending town. Figure contains
418 cities. Our main analysis sample excludes the 14 cities with at least 500,000 residents in 1980.
Source: Duke SSA/Medicare data
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Index Offenses Murder
Notes: Index offenses include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle
theft. Sample restricted to cities in our main analysis sample with less than 500,000 residents in 1980.
Source: FBI UCR
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Figure 3.4: Social Connectedness and the Evolution of Crime Rates Over Time
Cumulative difference from 1960-2009:





















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
HHI at 75th percentile HHI at 25th percentile
(a) Murder
Cumulative difference from 1960-2009:































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
HHI at 75th percentile HHI at 25th percentile
(b) Motor Vehicle Theft
Notes: For each five year period from 1960-2009, we estimate equation (3.12) and take the level of covariates associ-
ated with the average crime rate. We then plot the murder rate associated with the 75th and 25th percentiles of HHI.
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Year
Notes: Figure plots the share of individuals age 14-17 who are living in the North, Midwest, or West regions who were
born in the South or live in the same household as an adult born in the South.
Sources: IPUMS Decennial Census (1900-2000) and American Community Survey (2001-2010)
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Year
Model 1: baseline specification
Model 2: + control for log mean murder rate, 1960-64
Notes: Figure shows point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals from estimating equation (3.12) separately
for year 1960-64, 1965-69, and so on. Model 1 includes the same covariates used in Table 3.4, and model 2 additionally
controls for the log mean murder rate from 1960-64.





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Imputing Employment in County Business Patterns Data
This section describes how I impute employment in Census CBP data.
CBP data always report establishment counts by county, industry, and establishment size, but
frequently suppress employment at the county-by-industry level. From 1974-forward, the estab-
lishment size groups are 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-1499,
1500-2499, 2500-4999, and 5000 or more employees.
I impute employment at the county-by-industry level using establishment counts and nation-
wide information on employment by establishment size. For establishments with fewer than 1000
employees, I impute employment as the number of establishments times average 1977 employ-
ment in the establishment size group, where the average comes from nationwide data across all
industries.
Because nationwide CBP data do not report employment by establishment size group for es-
tablishments with at least 1000 employees, I assume that employment follows a log normal distri-
bution, with mean µ and standard deviation σ, and estimate (µ, σ) using the generalized method




































E[y] = exp(µ+ σ2/2) (A.4)
where p1 is the share of establishments (with at least 1000 employees) with 1000-1499 employees,
p2 is the share with 1500-2499 employees, p3 is the share with 2500-4999 employees, Φ(·) is the
standard normal CDF, and E[y] is average employment among establishments with at least 1000
employees. Equation (A.4) is possible because nationwide CBP data report total employment
among establishments with at least 1000 employees.
I use equations (A.1)-(A.4) to estimate (µ, σ) with GMM, using the identity matrix as the
weighting matrix.1 Using 1977 data across all industries in the U.S., there are 1947 establishments
with 1000-1499 employees, 1202 with 1500-2499 employees, 678 with 2500-4999 employees, and
275 with 5000 or more employees. Total employment among these establishments is 9,442,953.
Consequently, p̂1 = 1947/4102 ≈ 0.475, p̂2 ≈ 0.293, p̂3 ≈ 0.165 and Ê[y] ≈ 2302. The GMM
estimates are µ̂ = 7.506 and σ̂ = 0.686. Standard facts about the log-normal distribution imply
that the imputed means for the four establishment size groups are 1247, 1952, 3414, and 7055.2
1When using equation (A.4) as a moment condition, data limitations prevent estimating standard errors or using






y2i − 2yi exp(µ+ σ2/2) + exp(µ+ σ2/2)
]
,
where N is the total number of establishments and yi is employment at establishment i. Because yi is not observed,
y2i cannot be formed. An alternative would be to use only moment conditions (A.1) - (A.3).
2In particular, if ln(y) ∼ N (µ, σ2), then
E(y|a < y ≤ b) = E(y)Φ(σ − a0)− Φ(σ − b0)
Φ(b0)− Φ(a0)
, a0 ≡ (ln a− µ)/σ, b0 ≡ (ln b− µ)/σ
E(y|y > a) = E(y)Φ(σ − a0)
Φ(−a0)
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A.2 Relationship to Previous Work on the Persistence of the 1980-1982 Re-
cession
Section 1.2 demonstrates that the 1980-1982 recession led to a persistent relative decline in
earnings per capita, the employment-population ratio, and median family income at the county-
level. This section details the relationship between my work and closely related papers by Feyrer,
Sacerdote and Stern (2007) and Greenstone and Looney (2010) that use county-level data and
study the same period. My finding that the 1980-1982 recession had persistent effects on counties
agrees closely with Greenstone and Looney (2010), who document a persistent decline in income
per capita and the employment-population ratio. However, my conclusion differs from that of
Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007, hereafter FSS), who find rapid recovery of unemployment
rates following auto and steel job losses. Two factors help explain this difference. First, the
unemployment rate recovers more quickly than earnings per capita or the employment-population
ratio; this is consistent with individuals adjusting their labor force participation more than their
location. Second, FSS focus on auto and steel job losses, while I use all industries; the different
sources of variation could lead to different effects, but the estimates are not precise enough to
support sharp conclusions.
A.2.1 Relationship to Greenstone and Looney (2010)
Greenstone and Looney (2010) show that real income per capita and the employment-population
ratio declined persistently for counties in the bottom 20 percent of the 1979-1982 income per capita
change distribution, relative to the other 80 percent of counties. My Figure 1.1 very closely resem-
bles their Figure 2, although I use earnings instead of income per capita, use the 50th instead of
20th percentile to define a severe recession county, use 1978 instead of 1979 as the pre-recession
year, and normalize the two series to be equal in 1978.3
Relative to Greenstone and Looney (2010), I provide new evidence by examining the evolution
of median family income from 1950-2000 and results at the commuting zone level. I characterize
3My Appendix Figure A.2 also resembles their Figure 3, subject to the same differences in construction.
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the persistence of the recession more formally and show that the high degree of persistence holds
within states. I also show the relationship between pre-existing industrial structure and the severity
of the recession.
A.2.2 Relationship to Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007)
FSS study the effects of job losses in the auto and steel industries from 1977-1982 and find that
county-level unemployment rates recovered within 5 years. FSS use OLS to estimate the regression
∆Yc = α + βshock sizec + γd(c) + δMSA statusc + εc, (A.5)
where ∆Yc is the change in some outcome over some horizon for county c. The shock size is the
1977-1982 employment change in the auto and steel industries divided by 1977 total employment.
In some specifications, FSS use a binary measure which defines a shock county as one losing at
least 2 percent of initial jobs. Equation (A.5) includes indicator variables for Census division, γd(c),
and a county’s Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) status.4 FSS limit their sample to counties with
at least 10,000 residents in 1977.
In assessing the persistence of the auto and steel shock, FSS emphasize results where the de-
pendent variable is the change in one minus the unemployment rate, or the employment-labor force
ratio. I follow FSS in referring to this as the employment rate. This variable comes from Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics data, which are constructed using
the Current Population Survey, the Current Employment Statistics survey, and state unemployment
insurance data. Besides the unemployment rate, BLS data also report estimates of the number of
people who are employed, unemployed, and in the labor force. Data are available annually from
1976-forward and are adjusted to reflect county of residence. The BLS states that, “[a]lthough
substate data for 1976-89 exist in archived files, they are not consistent with data for the 1990s,
nor are they consistent within the pre-1990 period. Moreover, substate estimates for years prior
to 1990 are no longer official BLS data” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1998).5 From 1976-1984,
4I use the 1999 MSA definitions, which appear to be consistent with the MSAs that FSS list in their Table 1.
5Official data, for 1990-forward, are available on the BLS website. I received the 1976-1989 data from the BLS
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BLS constructed county-level variables by disaggregating labor market area statistics, assuming a
uniform employment-population ratio throughout a labor market area (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1998).6
In principle, several reasons could explain why FSS arrive at a different conclusion than I
do. First, they emphasize results based on the unemployment rate, while I emphasize results for
earnings per capita and the employment-population ratio.7 The unemployment rate might recover
more quickly than other outcomes if individuals respond to the shock by exiting the labor force.8
Second, FSS focus on job losses in the steel and auto industries, while I focus on job losses in all
industries. Third, the comparison group in FSS includes counties with a high share of employment
in mining, which experienced a countercyclical boom-bust cycle during the 1970’s and 1980’s. My
2SLS estimates reveal less persistence when including these counties (see Appendix Table A.4).
Finally, FSS exclude counties with less than 10,000 residents in 1977 and include division and
MSA fixed effects, while I include all counties and include state fixed effects.
I am able to closely replicate the shock size variable used by FSS. While FSS do not fully
describe some data processing details, I believe that I have inferred these details by successfully
replicating their Table 1, which helpfully lists the shock counties and associated job losses.9 I
believe FSS use County Business Patterns (CBP) employment counts to measure the employment
change in the auto and steel industries (i.e., the numerator of the shock size). This approach could
be problematic, as CBP data frequently suppress employment counts to protect respondent confi-
dentiality, and FSS appear to treat suppressed employment as zero employment.10 A potentially
via e-mail.
6Previous studies question how much valuable information county-level unemployment rate data contain, espe-
cially conditional on county and year fixed effects (Bartik, 1996; Hoynes, 2000).
7FSS find a persistent relative decrease in income per capita in shock counties (see their Table 11), as do Greenstone
and Looney (2010) and I. Consequently, their findings might not be best summarized by the claim in the introduction
that “Rust Belt counties and MSAs recovered quickly on certain dimensions like unemployment and income per
capita” (Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern, 2007, p. 42).
8Using county-level BLS data from 2000-2010, Foote, Grosz and Stevens (2015) find that mass layoffs lead to
greater reductions in labor force than population. In principle, non-classical measurement error in the BLS unemploy-
ment rate data could also contribute to differences in the results.
9The only difference between Table 1 of FSS and my replication is that I have Neosho, KS, Laclede, MO, and St.
Louis, MO as shock counties, but FSS do not.
10In 1977, 1,144 counties had at least one establishment in the steel industry (SIC 3300), and 861 of these counties
(75 percent) had suppressed employment. In the auto industry (SIC 3700), 1,515 counties had at least one establish-
141
more accurate approach is to use establishment counts, which are never suppressed, and impute
employment as described in Appendix A.1 and Holmes and Stevens (2002). I believe that FSS
measure 1977 total employment from BLS data.
I have not been able to replicate the non-shock counties used by FSS. In Table 2, FSS list 66
shock counties (62 of which have non-missing 1977 population) and 1,373 non-shock counties
(1,253 of which have non-missing 1977 population). My sample contains 69 shock counties and
2,257 non-shock counties (all of which have non-missing 1977 population).
Appendix Figure A.4 displays the differences that arise when using CBP employment versus
establishment counts to measure the shock size. Panel A shows the bivariate relationship for the
2,326 counties with at least 10,000 residents in 1977 (the same sample restriction used by FSS).
Employment suppression is visible in the cases where the shock size based on employment counts
equals 0, while the shock size based on establishment counts (horizontal axis) does not. The linear
correlation between the two measures is 0.2. Panel B displays an analogous figure for all counties.
The basic pattern is similar, but the linear correlation falls to 0.01. Classical measurement error
does a poor job of describing the relationship between these two variables, as the employment
count shock size varies less than the potentially better-measured establishment count shock size.11
Appendix Table A.1 shows that I can closely approximate the results of FSS on how the auto
and steel shock affected the employment rate. The table reports estimates of equation (A.5) where
the dependent variable is the change over different horizons in the employment rate (i.e., one minus
the unemployment rate). Panels A and C repeat Tables 3 and 4 of FSS, and Panels B and D report
my estimates. The point estimates and standard errors are extremely similar, although the number
of observations and R2 differ.12
Appendix Table A.2 examines different dependent variables using the FSS specification and
assesses the impact of using CBP establishment counts to construct the shock size. Panel A,
ment, and 1,167 counties (77 percent) had suppressed employment.
11When limiting to counties with at least 10,000 residents in 1977, the variance of the establishment count shock
size is over five times that of the employment count shock size. When not making this population restriction, the
multiple is over two.
12Standard errors in Appendix Table A.1 are robust to heteroskedasticity, but are not clustered. I do not know how
FSS estimate their standard errors.
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which uses CBP employment counts to construct the shock size, demonstrates that a negative
shock reduced the employment rate, employment-population ratio, and earnings per capita from
1977-1982. For example, the point estimate in column 1 indicates that a decrease in auto and
steel employment equal to 1 percent of a county’s initial employment decreased the employment
rate by 0.2 percent from 1977-1982.13 The employment rate elasticity is less than half that of other
outcomes. Panel B presents results using CBP establishment counts to measure the shock size. The
results in Panels A and B differ somewhat, especially for dependent variables measured using BEA
data. Panels C and D examine the change in outcome variables from 1977-1987. Panel C, which
uses CBP employment counts as in FSS, cannot reject complete convergence of the employment
rate, but finds persistent effects on the employment-population ratio and earnings per capita. Most
of the point estimates are attenuated and indistinguishable from zero in Panel D, which uses CBP
establishment counts, but the upper range of the confidence intervals admit moderate effects.14
Appendix Table A.3 shows that (1) the employment rate appears to recover more quickly than
the employment-population ratio or earnings per capita and (2) the effects of the FSS shock are
typically attenuated and estimated with less precision than the effects of the 1980-1982 recession
shock that I use. Panel A displays results from a specification similar to equation (A.5), but I do
not control for MSA status.15 Panel B measures the shock size using CBP establishment counts,
and Panel C includes counties with fewer than 10,000 residents in 1977. Estimates are attenuated
when using CBP establishment counts, but are very similar when including all counties. Panel
D replaces the FSS shock size with the 1978-1982 change in log real earnings per capita. The
coefficient on the employment rate is a precisely estimated 0, but there are lasting effects on the
employment-population ratio and earnings per capita. Panel E uses the predicted log employment
change from 1978-1982 as an instrumental variable. Panels F-H repeat Panels C-E, but exclude the
13This estimate is similar to the analogous estimate in FSS (see column 1 of their Table 6, Panel A).
14There are some differences between the point estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Appendix Table A.2. The dependent
variable in both columns is the ratio of employment to population age 15 and older, with employment in column 2
coming from BLS data and in column 3 from BEA data. BLS data refer to place of residence and count the number of
people employed, while BEA employment data refer to place of work and count the number of jobs. Both series are
derived from the same underlying data, but the BEA adjusts for sectors not covered by unemployment insurance, uses
additional data to measure employment in certain industries, and adjusts for misreporting.
15I cluster standard errors by state in Appendix Table A.3 as in my preferred specification.
143
526 counties with at least 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector, which experienced a
countercyclical boom-bust cycle. Estimates using the FSS shock variable in Panel F are somewhat
imprecise and indistinguishable from zero, while the OLS and 2SLS estimates in Panels G and
H show significant effects of the change in log earnings per capita on all variables, with much
smaller effects on the employment rate. To compare the FSS shock size and the predicted log
employment change in all industries, Panel I reports results of instrumenting for the 1978-1982
change in log earnings per capita with the shock size based on CBP establishment counts.16 The
rescaled estimates are typically within one standard error of the point estimates in Panel H, but the
2SLS estimates using the shock size are very imprecise.
Appendix Figure A.5 provides additional evidence on differences between the predicted log
employment change in all industries and the shock size variable used by FSS. When using CBP
employment counts (Panel A) or establishment counts (Panel B), there are many counties which
experience no job loss in the steel or auto industries, but are predicted to experience considerable
job loss in other industries. These variables do not appear to capture the same underlying phe-
nomenon. While the auto and steel industries are important and interesting, the recession affected
many other industries as well (see Table 1.1).
A.3 Additional Results on the 1980-1982 Recession
A.3.1 The Persistence of the Recession
Figure 1.1 shows that the 1980-1982 recession led to a persistent decrease in earnings per
capita for negatively affected counties. This section provides a more formal characterization of the
persistence of the recession.
A simple way of measuring the persistence of the recession is by relating the 1978-1992 and
1978-1982 changes in log real earnings per capita,
ln(Ec,1992)− ln(Ec,1978) = α + β (ln(Ec,1982)− ln(Ec,1978)) + vc, (A.6)
16The first stage slope coefficient is 0.270 (0.107), with an F-statistic of 6.41, so there is some concern about a weak
instrument.
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where Ec,t is real earnings per capita for county c in year t. In equation (A.6), the average degree
of persistence is captured by β, with full persistence represented by β = 1 and no persistence
represented by β = 0. However, equation (A.6) has the unattractive property that, even if earnings
per capita displays no serial correlation, the model implies a non-zero degree of persistence, β =
0.5. This arises because ln(Ec,1978) appears on both the left and right hand sides of equation (A.6)
and occurs even in the absence of measurement error.
To quantify the average degree of persistence, I estimate the regression
ln(Ec,1992) = α + β ln(Ec,1982) + γ ln(Ec,1978) +Xcδ + vc. (A.7)
Xc includes state fixed effects and the 1950-1970 change in log real median family income in
county c, which I include in my preferred specification for estimating long-run effects on chil-
dren.17
Table A.4 shows that the 1980-1982 recession led to a statistically and economically signifi-
cant persistent decrease in earnings per capita. The OLS estimate of β̂ in column 1 indicates that,
conditional on earnings per capita in 1978 and Xc, a ten percent decrease in earnings per capita
from 1978-1982 leads to 6.4 percent lower earnings per capita in 1992.18 Column 2 reports 2SLS
estimates using the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 in all industries as an in-
strument. I exclude the 526 counties with at least 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining
sector to limit the countercyclical boom-bust cycle in this sector. A 10 percent decrease in earn-
ings per capita from 1978-1982 leads to 13.2 percent lower earnings per capita in 1992. Column
3, which uses the same instrument but includes counties with a large mining employment share,
shows less persistence, as expected. Column 4, which uses the predicted log employment change
in manufacturing alone, also reveals full persistence. Results are similar when examining the log
17Equations (A.6) and (A.7) are equivalent when β+γ = 1 andXc is included in equation (A.6). However, equation
(A.7) eliminates the bias that arises from estimating equation (A.6).
18This interpretation is clear when rewriting equation (A.7) as
ln(Ec,1992) = α+ β(ln(Ec,1982)− ln(Ec,1978)) + (γ + β) ln(Ec,1978) +Xcδ + vc.
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employment-population ratio (Appendix Table A.5). The degree of persistence is similar for years
1987, 1992, and 1997, but economic activity declined further in 2002, 2007, and 2012 in counties
which experienced a more severe 1980-1982 recession (Appendix Table A.6). Possible explana-
tions for the decay in the 2000’s include the long-run decline in human capital associated with the
1980-1982 recession or the long-run adjustment of employers (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2016).19
A.3.2 The Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Housing Prices
This section shows that the median price of housing fell from 1980-1990 in counties with a
more severe recession, but by less than the decrease in median income.
The price of housing and other local goods could decrease after the recession, mitigating the
earnings decrease. To see this, suppose that household utility, u(x, y), depends on consumption
of a numeraire traded good x and a non-traded good y with local price p. The household budget
constraint is
(1− τ)w = x+ py, (A.8)
where τ is the marginal tax rate and w is family earnings. For simplicity, I assume that labor
supply is fixed. The expenditure function is e(p, u) = (1 − τ)w, where u is the level of utility.
Using Shepherd’s Lemma and rearranging, it is straightforward to show that a household will be
indifferent to a change in earnings and local prices as long as
(1− τ)ŵ = syp̂, (A.9)
19In principle, the decline in the 2000’s could also be due to additional negative shocks, but Figures 1.1 and A.1
provide little support for this interpretation.
The shock to local labor markets from increased Chinese import competition studied by Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2013) is only weakly correlated with the severity of the 1980-1982 recession. A one standard deviation increase in
the average of 1990-2000 and 2000-2007 increase in import competition is associated with a 0.5 percent decrease in
earnings per capita from 1978-1982 and a 0.8 percent decrease in predicted employment. A one standard deviation
increase in average predicted import competition is associated with a 0.8 percent decrease in earnings per capita and
a 1.0 percent decrease in predicted employment. The average change in log earnings per capita is -0.071, and the
standard deviation is 0.114. The average predicted log employment change is 0.037, and the standard deviation is
0.083. These calculations come from matching my county-level data to the CZ-level data from Autor, Dorn and
Hanson (2013), estimating regressions with state fixed effects, and calculating unweighted summary statistics.
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where the proportional change in earnings is ŵ ≡ dw/w = d ln(w), the proportional change in
the price of the non-traded good is p̂, and sy ≡ py/w is the share of earnings spent on the non-
traded good. After accounting for taxes and deductions, a reasonable approximation is τ = 0.32
and sy = 0.33 (Albouy, 2012). Consequently, the cost of the non-traded good would need to
fall in proportional terms by around twice as much as the fall in earnings for households to be
indifferent.20
Appendix Table A.7 shows that the median price of housing fell from 1980-1990 in counties
with a more severe recession, but by less than the decrease in median income. The table reports
2SLS regressions of the 1980-1990 change in log median family income, log median rent, and log
median house value on the 1978-1982 change in log earnings per capita. As elsewhere, the regres-
sions control for state fixed effects and the 1950-1970 change in log median family income. Panel
A excludes counties with a high mining employment share and uses the predicted log employment
change in all industries as the instrumental variable. A 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita
from 1978-1982 leads to a 10.0 percent decrease in median family income from 1980-1990, but
only a 7.2 and 7.8 percent decrease in median rent and median house value. As expected, these
patterns are attenuated when including counties with a high mining employment share in Panel B.
This evidence, especially in Panel A, is broadly consistent with the results of Bound and Holzer
(2000), who find that wages fell by more than house prices using cross-metro regressions from
1980-1990.21
20This simple analysis could be extended so that households also value local quality of life amenities (Albouy and
Stuart, 2016). If a decrease in labor demand does not affect quality of life, then equation (A.9) remains the relevant
condition. If a decrease in labor demand also decreases quality of life, then households would require an even greater
decrease in house prices to remain indifferent.
The analysis also could be extended to the model described in Section 1.3, where parents purchase traded and non-
traded goods for their children and allocate their time between market work, investment in child human capital, and
leisure. In this case, the relevant indifference condition is
twork(1− τ)ŵ = syp̂,
where twork ∈ [0, 1] is the share of time allocated to market work and ŵ is the proportional change in the wage. For a
given decrease in wages, parents require a smaller non-traded price decrease to remain indifferent because the price of
time with children and leisure falls.
21Bound and Holzer (2000) use price indices for 26 large metropolitan statistical areas and find that a 10 percent
decrease in labor demand is associated with a 2.6 percent decrease in local price levels (see their footnote 28). The
same decrease in labor demand leads to a 4.2 percent decrease in wages of college graduates and a 6.9 percent decrease
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A.3.3 The Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Commuting Zones
It is of some interest to examine patterns for commuting zones (CZs), which have been used
in previous work to approximate local labor markets. Appendix Figures A.8 and A.9 display the
evolution of mean real earnings per capita and employment-population ratios for CZs with an
above and below median decrease in log real earnings per capita from 1978-1982.22 Appendix
Figure A.8 shows that mean real earnings per capita in CZs with a more and less severe recession
evolved similarly before 1979, but diverged persistently after 1982; this pattern is very similar to
the county-level results in Figure 1.1. Appendix Figure A.9 shows that employment-population
ratios converged within a decade, in contrast to the lack of convergence seen at the county-level
(Appendix Figure A.2).23 Appendix Figures A.8 and A.9 suggest that there was greater scope
for the recovery of jobs across CZs than counties, but that the incremental jobs offered lower
earnings. Understanding the household- and firm-level behavior that generate these patterns, and
the distinction between counties and CZs, is an interesting direction for future work.
A.4 Effects on Local Government Expenditures and Revenues
This section examines the effects of the 1980-1982 recession on local government expenditures
and revenues, which could affect human capital development in childhood. I find that expenditures
per capita fell starting in 1992 in counties that experienced a more severe recession, but there is
little evidence of a decrease before then, likely due to higher federal transfers. The decline in
expenditures is driven by spending on welfare and health, and not education.
To examine the effect of the recession on local government expenditures and revenues, I es-
timate event study regressions similar to equation (1.2), where the dependent variable is log real
in wages of non-college graduates (Table 3). Other authors find different results. Using a different source of variation,
Bartik (1991) finds that decreases in labor demand have similar effects on local prices and wages. Blanchard and Katz
(1992) find that median house prices initially decline more than wages, but that both approximately converge within
12 years (Figures 12 and 15). Notowidigdo (2013) finds that a decrease in labor demand reduces income per adult
slightly more than the price of housing, but reduces wages by less than the price of housing (Tables 2 and 4).
22I aggregate county-level data to 1990 CZ definitions using the crosswalk provided by Autor and Dorn (2013).
23Using state-level data, Yagan (2016) finds employment-population ratio convergence from the 1980-1982 reces-
sion in 8 years (see his Figure A.1.D).
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expenditures or revenues.24 I use data from the Census of Governments, which contains infor-
mation on expenditures and revenues for all government units in years that end in a “2” or “7.”25
I collapse all government units to the county level for years 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and
1997. I normalize the interaction between year 1977 and the severity of the recession to equal zero.
I estimate the model by 2SLS, using the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 in all
industries as the IV. To remove the countercyclical boom-bust cycle experienced by the mining
sector, I limit the sample to the 2,550 counties with no more than 5 percent of 1976 employment
in the mining sector. I control for log population and the share of the population age 0-4, 5-19, and
20-64, which could affect the amount and composition of expenditures and revenues.
Appendix Table A.8 shows that the recession had little effect on expenditures in the short-run,
but is associated with reductions from 1992-forward. I focus on general direct expenditures, which
represent all expenditures besides those for liquor stores, utilities, insurance trusts, or intergovern-
mental transfers, and amount to 89 percent of total expenditures in 1977.26 The results in column 1
provide little evidence that the recession reduced expenditures per capita in 1982 or 1987, but there
is a significant decrease in expenditures in 1992 and 1997. A 10 percent decrease in earnings per
capita from 1978-1982 is associated with an 11.2 percent reduction in expenditures in 1992 and an
8.8 percent reduction in 1997. Columns 2-6 demonstrate that the long-run reduction is not driven
by education or public safety spending, which account for 59 percent of spending in 1977, but
instead by welfare and health, infrastructure, and other purposes.27 Columns 7-8 show that both
24In a very small number of instances, a county reports 0 expenditures or revenues for the outcomes I examine. To
maintain a constant sample, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine, ln(y+
√
1 + y2), instead of ln(y) throughout (Burbridge,
Magee and Robb, 1988). The log and inverse hyperbolic sine yield very similar coefficients in linear regression models
when y is sufficiently large.
25I downloaded these data from the NBER website, with thanks to Michael Greenstone for making them available.
I exclude the five New York City counties from the analysis because they are combined into a single geographic unit.
26I exclude liquor stores, utilities (water supply, electric power, gas supply, and mass transit), and insurance trusts to
focus on government activities most likely to affect children, but results are similar when including these categories. I
exclude intergovernmental expenditures to avoid double counting, which could arise when a county government gives
money to a school district, which then spends the money on teachers’ salaries. The grouping of expenditures and
revenues in Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9 is similar to that used by Bartik et al. (2016).
27Education expenditure purposes include elementary and secondary education, higher education, and libraries.
Public safety expenditure purposes include police, correctional facilities, fire, judicial and legal, and protective inspec-
tion and regulation. Welfare and health expenditure purposes include welfare, health and hospital, transit subsidies,
and housing and community development. Infrastructure expenditure purposes include airport, total highway, parking,
sewerage, solid wage management, and water transport and terminals. Examples of other expenditure purposes are
149
current and capital expenditures decreased in the 1990’s; the point estimates indicate an earlier and
larger decrease in capital spending.
Appendix Table A.9 provides suggestive evidence that intergovernmental transfers initially
offset the decrease in tax revenues after the recession. As seen in column 1, there is a significant
decrease in general direct revenues from 1992-forward.28 Underlying this is an immediate decrease
in tax revenue (column 2), possibly offset by an increase in intergovernmental transfers in 1982
and 1987 (column 4). Column 5 shows that property taxes, which account for 33 percent of general
direct revenue and 89 percent of tax revenue, drive the decrease in total tax revenues. Columns
6-8 suggest that offsetting intergovernmental transfers came from federal and local, as opposed to
state, governments.
Unfortunately, the results in Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9 are estimated with sufficient im-
precision that uncertainty remains about the evolution of government finances over time and the
relative importance of different types of expenditures and revenues. These results do not exploit
heterogeneity across states in the severity of the recession, initial asset holdings, or restrictions on
local government finances. It would be interesting to explore these dimensions further.
A.5 Matching NUMIDENT Data to Counties
This section describes the procedure used to match the Social Security Administration NUMI-
DENT file to FIPS county codes. The procedure described here was developed alongside Martha
Bailey, Evan Taylor, and Reed Walker. Researchers with access to confidential Census data can
read a technical memo with more information on this procedure and will be able to access the code
and output from this procedure (Taylor, Stuart and Bailey, 2016).
We seek to match information on individuals’ place of birth to county FIPS codes. The NU-
MIDENT file, which draws on Social Security card applications, contains a 12-character string
identifying the place of birth (city and/or county) and a 2-character string identifying the state of
financial administration, central staffing, and parks and recreation.
28As expected given balanced budget requirements, the change in expenditures in Appendix Table A.8 approxi-
mately mirror the change in revenues in Appendix Table A.9.
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birth postal code.29 We identify a set of target locations using U.S. Geological Survey data on
current and historical locations from the Geographic Names Information System (GNIS).30 GNIS
data contain place names and county FIPS codes.
Several challenges prevent exact, unique matching of the NUMIDENT 12-character strings to
GNIS counties. First, some place names in a state are indistinguishable with only 12 characters.31
Second, place names are frequently misspelled. Third, the place of birth string sometimes contains
acronyms and abbreviations, such as “Mnpls” for Minneapolis. Fourth, some NUMIDENT records
contain the wrong postal code for their state of birth (e.g., “Anchorage, AL” where “AL” is the
wrong abbreviation for Alaska).
Our algorithm yields four broad categories of matches. Each step proceeds sequentially and
only applies to NUMIDENT strings not previously matched. In a preliminary processing step, we
correct for common acronyms and abbreviations by hand for any string that occurs more than 50
times in the NUMIDENT data for birth cohorts 1950-1985. First, we obtain exact matches for
correctly spelled place names that can be uniquely identified in a birth state with 12 characters.
Second, we obtain “duplicate” matches for correctly spelled place names that can, in principle,
be identified uniquely in 12 characters. We assign individuals to a single birth county if at least
75 percent of the exact matches are to a single county, and we assign multiple birth counties
otherwise.32 Third, we use hand matches from Isen, Rossin-Slater and Walker (Forthcoming),
described in their Appendix C. Fourth, we use probabilistic matching algorithms.33 Finally, we
29We use the 2012 version of the NUMIDENT file, accessed through the Michigan Census Research Data Center.
For individuals born outside the United States, the 2-character string identifies the country of birth.
30We restrict attention to geographic features that are plausibly populated (those with a Populated Place, Census, or
Civil feature class) or have a federal location code.
31For example, there are three different Populated Places in North Carolina beginning with “Bells Crossroads”
located in different counties. Repeated place names pose less of a problem if the place name has less than 12 characters.
For example, there are two places named Arcadia in North Carolina: one in Davidson County and the other in Forsyth
County. These can be distinguished if “Arcadia Davi” or “Arcadia Fors” appear in the NUMIDENT.
32For example, a person born in North Carolina who writes “Arcadia Fors” or “Arcadia Davi” is matched to the
correct Arcadia (in Forsyth or Davidson county) in the exact matching step. However, if an individual writes “Arcadia,”
we do not know in which Arcadia they were born. If at least 75 percent of the exact Arcadia matches are attributed to
one county, then we match “Arcadia” to that county.
33In the probabilistic matching step, we only match NUMIDENT strings to GNIS places that have census codes
to control the number of false positive matches. We first use the Stata command reclink2 (Wasi and Flaaen, 2015),
with the tolerance set to 0.1, to obtain a set of potential matches for each NUMIDENT string. We then use the Stata
command jarowinkler (Feigenbaum, 2015) to select the best match as the one with the highest Jaro-Winkler score
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hand check all strings that are matched in the probabilistic step, disagree with the match found
in Isen, Rossin-Slater and Walker (Forthcoming) algorithm (but were not hand checked by them),
and have at least 50 occurrences in the NUMIDENT file.
Appendix Table A.10 summarizes match rates for individuals observed in the 2000 Census and
2001-2013 ACS. I limit the sample to individuals who were born from 1950-1980 and were age
25-64 at the time of the survey. I also limit the sample to individuals with non-imputed values of
sex, age, race, and state of birth, and who report being born in the U.S on the census survey.34 95.9
percent of the sample has a non-missing protected identification key (PIK), which is the anonymous
identifier used to link Census and SSA data. Of these individuals, 99.6 percent have a PIK which
is not duplicated within a survey year. We identify a unique birth county for 93.6 percent of
the individuals with non-duplicated PIKs. Ultimately, these restrictions leave 89.4 percent of the
initial sample. The majority of matches, 80.4 percent, are exact matches, while 11.0 percent are
duplicates, 5.1 percent are matched probabilistically, and 3.5 percent are hand matches.
A.6 Pre-Recession Migration is Not Correlated with the Severity of the Re-
cession
This appendix shows that there is little evidence that pre-recession out-migration propensities
are correlated with the severity of the recession. This finding is not necessary for the measurement
error approach described in Section 1.4.3, but provides additional information about pre-recession
migration patterns.
Based on publicly available 1980 Census data (Ruggles et al., 2015), 2SLS regressions do not
reveal a significant relationship between children’s 1975-1980 migration and the recession severity
in their 1975 commuting zone (CZ): a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita from 1978-1982
is associated with a 3.8 (standard error: 3.4) percentage point increase in the probability of moving
across CZs.35 There is also no evidence of a significant relationship between the probability that
among the potential matches. If no potential match has a Jaro-Winkler score of at least 0.8, then the string remains
unmatched. If multiple places have the same Jaro-Winkler score, then this step matches to each place.
34I use similar restrictions in my analysis.
35The regression includes birth state-by-age fixed effects, plus indicator variables for race and sex. I estimate the
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a child lives outside his or her birth state and the severity of the recession in their 1975 CZ: a 10
percent decrease in earnings per capita is associated with a 7.1 (11.9) percentage point increase in
the probability of living outside one’s birth state.36
A.7 Additional Support for the Empirical Strategy from Birth Certificate
Data
To further examine the validity of my empirical strategy, I examine whether the pre-recession
evolution of infant mortality, parental characteristics, and infant health are correlated with the
severity of the 1980-1982 recession. I do not detect a meaningful relationship, which provides
evidence that my estimates of the long-run effects of the recession on children are not driven by
differential pre-recession trends in infant health or parental characteristics.
I examine the evolution of the infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 births) by estimating
regressions similar to equation (1.2). The regression includes fixed effects for county of residence
and state-by-birth year, plus controls for birth year interacted with the 1950-1970 change in log
median family income.37 My sample contains individuals born from 1950-1979. I normalize the
interaction between the severity of the recession and birth year to equal 0 for individuals born
in 1950, and I aggregate the remaining interactions into three-year bins. I use the predicted log
employment change as the instrumental variable, and exclude the 526 counties with at least 5
percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector.
Appendix Figure A.15 shows that there is no evidence of a relationship between the evolution of
infant mortality from 1950-1979 and the severity of the 1980-1982 recession. The point estimates
are centered around zero, generally small in magnitude, and indistinguishable from zero (p =
0.89). When including counties with a high mining employment share, there is also no evidence
regression on individuals under age 18 and cluster standard errors by birth state. I use maternal migration for children
born after 1975. On average, 13.7 percent of children move across CZs from 1975-1980. OLS estimates imply that a
10 percent decrease in earnings per capita is associated with a 0.8 (1.3) percentage point increase in the probability of
moving across CZs.
36I use the same covariates and sample to estimate this regression. On average, 18 percent of my sample lives
outside their birth state. OLS estimates imply that a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita is associated with a 0.9
(3.8) percentage point increase in the probability of living outside one’s birth state.
37Results are not sensitive to controlling for the 1950-1970 change in income.
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of a significant relationship (p = 0.67).
Information on parental characteristics and infant birth weight are not available for the full
1950-1979 period, but are available from 1970-1979. To examine these outcomes, I estimate
similar regressions, normalizing the interaction between the severity of the recession and birth
year to equal 0 for individuals born in 1970. The control variables and sample are the same.
Appendix Table A.13 provides no evidence of a relationship between the evolution of maternal
education or infant birth weight and the severity of the 1980-1982 recession. I examine five de-
pendent variables: average mothers’ years of schooling, the share of births classified as low birth
weight (no more than 2,500 grams), very low birth weight (1,500 grams), and extremely low birth
weight (1,000 grams), and median birth weight.38 For each dependent variable, the coefficients are
small and individually and jointly indistinguishable from zero.
A.8 Separating the Long-Run Effects of Temporary and Persistent Earn-
ings Decreases on Education
My baseline specification measures recession severity using the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita, and uses the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 as an instru-
mental variable. Counties with a larger predicted employment decrease experienced a persistent
decrease in local economic activity, as described in Section 1.2, and my baseline specification
implicitly reflects this persistence.
Evidence on whether the long-run effects of the recession stem from temporary or persistent
declines in local economic activity could shed light on the underlying mechanisms and the type
of economic shock that might lead to long-run effects. For young children, a temporary decrease
in economic activity could have negative long-run effects if the human capital production func-
tion features sufficiently strong dynamic complementarity or early childhood is a sensitive period
of development.39 Even in the absence of these features of childhood development, a persistent
38There are fewer observations for average mother’s years of schooling because 13 states did not report education
during part of the 1970-1977 period. All states reported education in 1978 and 1979. The state-year fixed effects in
the regression control for changes in a state’s reporting status over time.
39Dynamic complementarity implies that less investment in one period reduces the return to investment in later
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decrease in economic activity could have negative long-run effects by reducing the sequence of
investments in childhood human capital or parental resources to pay for college. For adolescents,
a temporary or persistent decrease could reduce parental resources to pay for college.
To examine this, I estimate regressions that include the decrease in log real earnings per capita
from 1978-1982 and from 1978-1992.40 As instrumental variables, I use the predicted log employ-
ment change from 1978-1982 and 1978-1992, based on a county’s 1976 industrial structure. The
identification comes from the interaction of a county’s pre-recession industrial specialization with
aggregate employment changes from 1978-1982 and 1978-1992.41 While this approach separates
the temporary and persistent declines in earnings per capita that emerged at the onset of the 1980-
1982 recession, a limitation that should be considered in interpreting these results is that not all of
the industry-level employment changes from 1978-1992 are due to the 1980-1982 recession.
The point estimates in Appendix Table A.17 suggest that the negative long-run effects on four-
year degree attainment arise from the persistent decline in log earnings per capita, but there is
little evidence of this for any college degree attainment, and the standard errors prevent sharper
conclusions.42
A.9 Long-Run Effects of the Recession on Education: Robustness Checks
This section summarizes results that demonstrate the robustness of my estimates to different
specifications. Given its importance, I focus on the effect of the recession on four-year college
degree attainment.
periods (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010; Aizer and Cunha, 2012; Caucutt and
Lochner, 2012).
40As discussed in Appendix A.3, the recession displays a similar degree of persistence for years 1987-2002, so the
choice of 1992 is probably not important.
41The 1978-1982 and 1978-1992 predicted log employment changes are highly, but not perfectly, correlated (see
Appendix Figure A.20). Among all counties, state fixed effects and the 1978-1982 predicted log employment change
explain 45 percent of the variation in the 1978-1992 predicted change. Appendix Table A.16 describes industry-
level employment changes from 1978-1992. Comparing this with Table 1.1 reveals the patterns that distinguish the
temporary and persistent effects. For example, oil and gas extraction did relatively well from 1978-1982, but poorly
from 1978-1992. Auto dealers experienced large employment losses from 1978-1982, but gains from 1978-1992.
Primary metal manufacturing experienced employment losses over both horizons.
42In the future, I will report p-values from the test of whether the effects of temporary and persistent earnings
decreases are equal. This requires submitting an additional disclosure request to the Census Bureau.
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Appendix Table A.18 shows that results are similar when replacing fixed effects for age in
1979 by birth state with age by birth division or region.43 Appendix Table A.19 shows that results
are robust to not controlling for interactions between age in 1979 and the 1950-1970 change in log
median family income in individuals’ birth county, to controlling instead for the 1950-1980 change
in log median family income, and to controlling for both the 1950-1970 and 1970-1980 change.
Appendix Table A.20 shows that results are similar when replacing the 1978-1982 decrease in
log earnings per capita with other measures of recession severity: the decrease in log earnings, the
decrease in log income per capita, the decrease in log employment, and the decrease in earnings
per capita.44 Appendix Table A.21 shows that results are similar when using all other states in
the continental U.S., instead of other states in the same region, to construct the predicted log
employment change instrumental variable; estimates are similar but less precise when using the
predicted log employment change in manufacturing, which was the largest industry in 1978 and
experienced a severe decline in the 1980-1982 recession.
Appendix Table A.22 presents results that measure the change in log earnings per capita and the
predicted log employment change at different units of geography. My main specification measures
recession severity at the county-level. I also estimate regressions that measure recession severity
at the commuting zone (CZ)-level. In interpreting these two sets of results, an important issue
is whether the nature of the recession differs at the county or CZ-level. To examine this, I re-
estimate equation (1.2), where the dependent variable is the log real median family income in a
county, using the change in log earnings per capita from 1978-1982 in each county’s CZ as the key
explanatory variable. I also construct the predicted log employment change at the CZ-level. The
results, in Appendix Figure A.7, differ somewhat from the results in Figure 1.4, where the change
in log earnings per capita and predicted log employment change are measured at the county-level.
When measuring recession severity at the CZ-level, there is a slight decline in log median family
43There are nine divisions and four regions, as defined by the Census Bureau.
44Mean real earnings per capita in 1978 is $21,964, so a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita at the mean
amounts to $2,196. The estimates using the decrease in earnings per capita in Appendix Table A.20 imply that a
$2,196 decrease in earnings per capita leads to a 3.5 percentage point (= 0.159× 0.2196) decrease in four-year degree
attainment for 0-10 year olds and a 1.9 percentage point decrease for 11-19 year olds. These estimates are similar to
those which use the change in log real earnings per capita, which imply a 3.0 and 1.6 percentage point decrease.
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income from 1970-1980 in counties whose CZ experienced a more severe recession (in contrast,
Figure 1.4 shows no change in log median family income from 1970-1980 in counties where the
recession was more severe). In addition, the decline in log median family income in 1990 is
smaller in magnitude than the decline in 2000 (in contrast, Figure 1.4 shows a similar decline in
log median family income for 1990 and 2000, and this decline is similar to the 2000 decline in
Appendix Figure A.7). In sum, the nature of the recession differs somewhat at the county and
CZ-level. These results suggest that controlling for the 1970-1980 change in log median family
income and separating the temporary and persistent effects of the recession could be important
when comparing specifications that measure recession severity at the county versus CZ-level.
Column 1 of Appendix Table A.22 presents the baseline effects on four-year college degree
attainment, where recession severity is measured at the county-level. In column 2, I separate the
effects of the temporary and persistent declines in earnings per capita, as described in Appendix
A.8. Columns 3 and 4 present results when measuring the severity of the recession at the CZ-level,
without making any other changes to the specification. In both columns, the effects are small and
indistinguishable from zero. Columns 5-8 add interactions between individuals’ age in 1979 and
the 1970-1980 change in log median family income in their county of birth. Columns 5-6, which
measure recession severity at the county-level, are similar to columns 1-2, as expected given the
lack of a 1970-1980 pre-trend in log median family income seen in Figure 1.4. Columns 7-8 mea-
sure recession severity at the CZ-level. Column 7, which does not separate the temporary and
persistent declines in earnings per capita, again reveals small and indistinguishable effects. How-
ever, when separating the temporary and persistent declines in column 8, the results are broadly
consistent with those in column 6, which measure recession severity at the county-level. In partic-
ular, the decrease in log real earnings per capita from 1978-1992 (i.e., the persistent component)
has a negative, statistically significant, and similarly-sized effect on four-year college degree attain-
ment. In sum, these results indicate that after modifying the specification to account for differences
in the nature of the recession at the county and CZ-level, the effects of the recession on four-year
college degree attainment are broadly consistent when measuring recession severity at the county
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and CZ-level.
Columns 9-10 present an alternative approach to assess the robustness of my results to the
unit of geography. I replace the decrease in log earnings per capita in individuals’ birth county
with a population and distance weighted average for counties within 100 miles, and I use a similar
weighted average for the predicted log employment change.45 This approach has the benefit of
distinguishing between counties within CZs, while allowing the severity of the recession in nearby
counties to influence long-run outcomes. Columns 9-10 are extremely similar to columns 1-2,
which provides further support for the robustness of my results.












The weight increases in Nj , the 1970 population of county j, and decreases in Dc,j , the distance in miles between
counties c and j. These are desirable features because larger counties are likely more popular destinations for migrants
or commuters and the cost of migrating or commuting increases in distance. I normalize Dc,c = 1.
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Table A.1: Approximate Replication of Tables 3 and 4 of Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007)
Dependent variable: Change in employment rate
1977-1982 1982-1987 1977-1987 1987-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Table 3 of FSS
Shock dummy -0.013*** 0.011*** -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439
R2 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.31
Panel B: Attempted replication of Table 3 of FSS
Shock dummy -0.013*** 0.012*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326
R2 0.28 0.32 0.38 0.24
Panel C: Table 4 of FSS
Shock size 0.163*** -0.144*** 0.019 0.020
(0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.039)
Observations 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439
R2 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.31
Panel D: Attempted replication of Table 4 of FSS
Shock size 0.173*** -0.153*** 0.020 0.019
(0.058) (0.058) (0.048) (0.036)
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326
R2 0.28 0.31 0.38 0.24
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 minus the unemployment rate, which FSS and
I refer to as the employment rate. Shock size is the 1977-1982 employment change
in the auto and steel industries divided by 1977 total employment. Shock dummy
equals one if shock size is less than or equal to -0.02 (i.e., at least two percent
of employment lost). All regressions include Census division indicators and an
indicator for whether a county is in an MSA in 2000. Sample limited to counties
with at least 10,000 residents in 1977. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Sources: Panels A and C are from Tables 3 and 4 of Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern
(2007). Panels B and D are from BLS Local Area Statistics, Census County Busi-
ness Patterns, and Census Annual Population Estimates
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Table A.2: Comparison to Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007): Results from Different Dependent
Variables with FSS Specification
Dependent variable: Log change in
Employment Employment- Employment- Employment- Earnings
rate pop. 15+ ratio pop. 15+ ratio pop. ratio per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Dependent variable is log change from 1977-1982
Shock size 0.201*** 0.485*** 0.622*** 0.647*** 0.659***
(0.0674) (0.150) (0.118) (0.121) (0.124)
R2 0.267 0.061 0.111 0.107 0.248
Panel B: Dependent variable is log change from 1977-1982
Shock size 0.194** 0.542*** 0.417*** 0.408*** 0.414***
using estabs. (0.0969) (0.150) (0.126) (0.125) (0.131)
R2 0.280 0.075 0.122 0.117 0.255
Panel C: Dependent variable is log change from 1977-1987
Shock size 0.0185 0.378 0.572*** 0.575*** 0.787***
(0.0530) (0.235) (0.176) (0.178) (0.170)
R2 0.368 0.071 0.105 0.134 0.268
Panel D: Dependent variable is log change from 1977-1987
Shock size -0.0287 0.0936 0.141 0.107 0.224
using estabs. (0.0702) (0.250) (0.224) (0.215) (0.182)
R2 0.368 0.071 0.102 0.132 0.265
Source of
employment data: BLS BLS BEA BEA N/A
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326
Notes: The employment rate is 1 minus the unemployment rate. Shock size is the 1977-1982 employment
change in the auto and steel industries divided by 1977 total employment. As defined by FSS, the em-
ployment change comes from CBP employment counts, which are frequently suppressed. Shock size using
establishments uses CBP establishment counts, which are never suppressed. See text for details. All re-
gressions include Census division indicators and an indicator for whether the county is in an MSA in 2000.
Sample limited to counties with at least 10,000 residents in 1977. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
in parentheses.
Sources: BLS Local Area Statistics, Census County Business Patterns, and Census Annual Population
Estimates
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Table A.3: Comparison to Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007): Results from Different Shock
Measures and Different Samples
Dependent variable: 1977-1987 log change in
Employment Employment- Earnings
rate pop. 15+ ratio per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Counties with at least 10,000 residents in 1977, OLS (N = 2, 326)
Shock size -0.0261 0.419** 0.647***
(0.0723) (0.182) (0.237)
Panel B: Counties with at least 10,000 residents in 1977, OLS (N = 2, 326)
Shock size using estabs. -0.0303 0.136 0.219
(0.0708) (0.241) (0.197)
Panel C: All counties, OLS (N = 3, 076)
Shock size using estabs. -0.0274 0.131 0.187
(0.0684) (0.219) (0.177)
Panel D: All counties, OLS (N = 3, 076)
Change in log earnings per capita, 1978-1982 0.00891 0.295*** 0.399***
(0.00884) (0.0439) (0.0568)
Panel E: All counties, 2SLS, all industries (N = 3, 076)
Change in log earnings per capita, 1978-1982 -0.0969 0.370** 0.102
(0.0689) (0.169) (0.234)
Panel F: Low mining counties, OLS (N = 2, 550)
Shock size using estabs. -0.0513 0.0903 0.134
(0.0688) (0.233) (0.187)
Panel G: Low mining counties, OLS (N = 2, 550)
Change in log earnings per capita, 1978-1982 0.0253** 0.357*** 0.478***
(0.0102) (0.0591) (0.0617)
Panel H: Low mining counties, 2SLS, all industries (N = 2, 550)
Change in log earnings per capita, 1978-1982 0.130** 1.111*** 0.962***
(0.0542) (0.212) (0.184)
Panel I: Low mining counties, 2SLS, shock size (N = 2, 550)
Change in log earnings per capita, 1978-1982 -0.190 0.335 0.496
(0.312) (0.750) (0.530)
Source of employment data: BLS BEA N/A
Notes: The employment rate is 1 minus the unemployment rate. Shock size is the 1977-1982 employment
change in the auto and steel industries divided by 1977 total employment. As defined by FSS, the
employment change comes from CBP employment counts, which are frequently suppressed. Shock size
using establishments uses CBP establishment counts, which are never suppressed. All regressions include
Census division indicators. Low mining counties have less than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the
mining sector. Panels E and H use the predicted log employment change in all industries from 1978-1982
as an IV. Panel I uses the FSS shock size using establishments as an IV. Standard errors clustered by state
in parentheses.
Sources: BLS Local Area Statistics, Census County Business Patterns, Census Annual Population Esti-
mates, and BEA Regional Economic Accounts data
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Table A.4: The Persistence of the 1980-1982 Recession for Earnings per Capita, OLS and 2SLS
Estimates
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument: - All Industries All Industries Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS estimates (dependent variable: log earnings per capita, 1992)
Log earnings per capita, 1982 (β̂) 0.636*** 1.318*** 0.447* 1.157***
(0.0574) (0.119) (0.254) (0.105)
Log earnings per capita, 1978 (γ̂) 0.289*** -0.348*** 0.469* -0.206*
(0.0558) (0.112) (0.241) (0.107)
β̂ + γ̂ 0.925*** 0.971*** 0.916*** 0.951***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018)
Panel B: First stage estimates (dependent variable: log earnings per capita, 1982)
Predicted log employment change, 0.412*** 0.386*** 0.537***
1978-1982 (0.0666) (0.0679) (0.108)
F-statistic, slope coefficient equals 0 38.19 32.42 24.73
Exclude high mining counties No Yes No No
Observations 3,076 2,550 3,076 3,076
Notes: Panel A reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (A.7), where the dependent variable
is log real earnings per capita in 1992. Panel B reports the associated first stage coefficient on the
predicted log employment change, where the dependent variable is log real earnings per capita in
1982. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for log real earnings per capita in 1978
and the 1950-1970 change in log real median family income. High mining counties have at least 5
percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books,
Minnesota Population Center (2011)
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Table A.5: The Persistence of the 1980-1982 Recession for Employment-Population Ratio, OLS
and 2SLS Estimates
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instrument: - All industries All industries Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS estimates (dependent variable: log employment-population ratio, 1992)
Log employment-pop. ratio, 1982 (β̂) 0.610*** 1.430*** 0.369 1.006***
(0.118) (0.156) (0.235) (0.184)
Log employment-pop. ratio, 1978 (γ̂) 0.288** -0.491*** 0.521** -0.0949
(0.109) (0.153) (0.223) (0.180)
β̂ + γ̂ 0.898*** 0.939*** 0.890*** 0.911***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016)
Panel B: First stage estimates (dependent variable: log employment-population ratio, 1982)
Predicted log employment change, 0.355*** 0.375*** 0.458***
1978-82 (0.0456) (0.0395) (0.0668)
F-statistic, slope coefficient equals 0 60.39 90.13 46.96
Exclude high mining counties No Yes No No
Observations 3,076 2,550 3,076 3,076
Notes: Panel A reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (A.7), where the dependent variable is
the log employment-population ratio in 1992. Panel B reports the associated first stage coefficient on
the predicted log employment change, where the dependent variable is the log employment-population
ratio in 1982. See notes to Appendix Table A.4.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books,
Minnesota Population Center (2011)
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Table A.6: The Persistence of the 1980-1982 Recession, OLS and 2SLS Estimates, At Different Horizons
Persistence Horizon: 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS and 2SLS estimates (dependent variable: log earnings per capita in indicated year)
Log earnings per capita, 1982 (β̂) 1.236*** 1.318*** 1.310*** 1.742*** 2.251*** 2.556***
(0.122) (0.119) (0.134) (0.204) (0.249) (0.294)
Log earnings per capita, 1978 (γ̂) -0.250** -0.348*** -0.330*** -0.748*** -1.207*** -1.576***
(0.118) (0.112) (0.127) (0.203) (0.248) (0.294)
β̂ + γ̂ 0.986*** 0.971*** 0.980*** 0.994*** 1.044*** 0.981***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.035)
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550
Panel B: OLS and 2SLS estimates (dependent variable: log employment-population ratio in indicated year)
Log employment-pop. ratio, 1982 (β̂) 1.269*** 1.430*** 1.745*** 2.659*** 3.031*** 3.238***
(0.136) (0.156) (0.249) (0.339) (0.394) (0.372)
Log employment-pop. ratio, 1978 (γ̂) -0.317** -0.491*** -0.843*** -1.759*** -2.147*** -2.374***
(0.136) (0.153) (0.239) (0.327) (0.382) (0.366)
β̂ + γ̂ 0.951*** 0.939*** 0.902*** 0.900*** 0.885*** 0.864***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042)
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550
Notes: Panel A reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (A.7), where the dependent variable is log real earnings
per capita in the indicated year. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the log employment-population ratio in the
indicated year. I use the predicted log employment change in all industries as the IV and exclude counties with at
least 5 percent employment in the mining sector in 1976. All regressions include state fixed effects and control for
log real earnings per capita in 1978 and the 1950-1970 change in log real median family income. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Minnesota
Population Center (2011)
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Table A.7: The Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Log Median Family Income, Rents, and
House Values, 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: 1980-1990 change in
Log median Log median Log median
family income rent house value
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Excluding high mining counties
Change in log real earnings 1.004*** 0.721*** 0.780**
per capita, 1978-1982 (0.166) (0.246) (0.349)
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550
Panel B: All counties
Change in log real earnings 0.221 0.003 0.220
per capita, 1978-1982 (0.182) (0.156) (0.244)
Observations 3,076 3,076 3,076
Notes: I use the predicted log employment change in all industries as the IV. Regressions
include state fixed effects and the change in log real median family income from 1950-
1970. High mining counties have at least 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining
sector. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Census
County Data Books, Minnesota Population Center (2011)
165
Table A.8: The Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Local Government Expenditures, 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: Log expenditure
By purpose By type
General direct Public Welfare Infra-
expenditures Education safety and health structure Other Current Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and year
1972 -0.0398 -0.450 -0.0823 -0.270 -0.0145 -0.0320 0.181 -1.158
(0.275) (0.519) (0.575) (1.425) (0.558) (0.568) (0.273) (1.219)
1982 0.117 0.200 1.069** -0.624 0.420 -0.0687 0.0849 -0.363
(0.226) (0.239) (0.435) (1.410) (0.635) (0.441) (0.189) (1.240)
1987 -0.245 0.212 0.494 0.0258 -0.709 -0.549 -0.153 -1.770
(0.245) (0.227) (0.552) (1.461) (0.830) (0.564) (0.199) (1.341)
1992 -1.123*** -0.145 0.0639 -5.317*** -0.812 -1.751*** -1.021*** -2.299**
(0.308) (0.284) (0.593) (1.813) (0.844) (0.625) (0.313) (1.080)
1997 -0.878*** -0.168 0.604 -3.071** -0.861 -1.887*** -0.812*** -1.484
(0.318) (0.325) (0.511) (1.416) (0.793) (0.661) (0.296) (1.184)
Observations 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270
Real per capita mean, 1977 $2,444 $1,287 $137 $293 $328 $400 $2,109 $335
Share of total, 1977 1.000 0.527 0.056 0.120 0.134 0.164 0.863 0.137
Notes: The interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and year 1977 is normalized to equal 0. Regressions are estimated
by 2SLS, using the predicted log employment change in all industries from 1978-1982 as an IV. Regressions include fixed effects for county and state-
by-year, interactions between year and the 1950-1970 change in log median family income, log population, and the share of the population which is age
0-4, 5-19, and 20-64. I transform dependent variables using the inverse hyperbolic sine instead of the log because a small number of observations equal
zero. Sample limited to counties with no more than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector, and sample excludes 5 counties in New York
City. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
Sources: Census of Governments, BEA Regional Economic Accounts , Census County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Minnesota
Population Center (2011)
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Table A.9: The Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Local Government Revenues, 2SLS Estimates
Dependent variable: Log revenue
By broad source By selected detailed source
General direct Intergov’t Property Federal State Local
revenue Taxes Charges transfers taxes transfers transfers transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and year
1972 0.206 0.552 0.766 0.244 0.750* -3.204 -0.419 -0.0115
(0.294) (0.374) (0.828) (0.342) (0.443) (3.306) (0.367) (2.397)
1982 -0.132 -0.581** 0.290 0.167 -0.482 -0.0531 -0.0775 1.683
(0.225) (0.276) (0.589) (0.280) (0.295) (0.921) (0.236) (1.593)
1987 -0.304 -1.101** -0.353 0.499 -0.927* 1.833 -0.450 2.162
(0.262) (0.493) (0.633) (0.503) (0.522) (1.411) (0.564) (2.728)
1992 -0.964*** -1.493*** -1.756*** -0.0838 -1.748*** -0.921 -0.994* 0.916
(0.284) (0.559) (0.654) (0.482) (0.597) (2.220) (0.524) (2.924)
1997 -0.654** -0.448 -1.310* -0.313 -0.467 1.607 -1.281** -0.764
(0.290) (0.477) (0.782) (0.490) (0.419) (1.737) (0.612) (2.489)
Observations 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270 15,270
Real per capita mean, 1977 $2,566 $943 $437 $1,186 $840 $182 $934 $70
Share of total, 1977 1.000 0.367 0.170 0.462 0.327 0.071 0.364 0.027
Notes: See notes to Appendix Table A.8.
Sources: Census of Governments, BEA Regional Economic Accounts , Census County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Minnesota
Population Center (2011)
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Table A.10: Sample Construction and Match Statistics
Panel A: Basic sample construction
Individuals who meet baseline demographic criteria 27,374,000
Individuals with non-missing PIK 26,253,000
Individuals with non-duplicate PIK 26,147,000
Individuals with unique birth county 24,462,000
Panel B: Birth county match type, as share of total
Exact 0.7685




Notes: The baseline demographic criteria are having non-imputed values for state
of birth, birth year, sex, and race, plus being born in the U.S. according to the
Census/ACS survey. A duplicate PIK is one which appears more than once in
survey year. Sample contains individuals born from 1950-1980.
Source: Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMI-
DENT file
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Table A.11: Correlation of County-Level Shocks Across Recessions
Log earnings Log earnings Log earnings Log earnings Log earnings Predicted
per capita per capita per capita per capita per capita log employment
change change change change change change
1973-75 1978-82 1989-91 2000-02 2007-10 1978-82
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Raw correlations
Log earnings per capita change, 1973-75 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,1978-82 -0.027 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,1989-91 -0.023 0.050 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,2000-02 0.132 0.117 -0.010 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,2007-10 -0.171 -0.013 0.107 -0.104 1.000
Predicted log employment change, 1978-82 0.036 0.366 0.201 0.149 0.025 1.000
Panel B: Conditional on state fixed effects
Log earnings per capita change, 1973-75 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,1978-82 -0.064 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,1989-91 0.026 0.022 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,2000-02 0.077 0.063 0.004 1.000
Log earnings per capita change,2007-10 -0.072 -0.056 0.013 -0.090 1.000
Predicted log employment change, 1978-82 -0.061 0.212 0.088 0.033 0.060 1.000
Notes: The predicted log employment change from 1978-82 is constructed using a county’s 1976 industrial structure and the industry-level log employment
change from 1978-1982 in other states within the same region, as defined in equation (1.1). Sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, County Business Patterns
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Table A.12: Stability of the Relationship between Severity of 1980-1982 Recession in County of
Residence and County of Birth Across Cohorts
Dependent variable: 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita in county of residence in year
1979 1991 2003 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita in county of birth and age
0-1 0.969*** 0.973*** 1*** 1***
(0.0277) (0.0214) (0.000) (0.000)
2-4 0.854*** 0.878*** 0.919*** 0.856***
(0.0321) (0.0262) (0.0314) (0.0266)
5-7 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.778*** 0.807***
(0.0499) (0.0580) (0.0481) (0.0313)
8-10 0.747*** 0.621*** 0.715*** 0.811***
(0.0468) (0.0606) (0.0774) (0.0415)
11-13 0.715*** 0.704*** 0.667***
(0.0844) (0.118) (0.0713)
Observations 3,684 4,028 3,336 3,358
p-value, coefficients equal to column 1 - 0.355 0.273 0.713
Sample: individuals born in years 1968-1979 1980-1991 1992-2003 2004-2013
Notes: Table reports estimates of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita in individuals’ county of residence in the indicated year. Regressions include fixed effects
for birth year-by-birth state and birth year interacted with the 1950-1970 change in log median family income in
individuals’ county of birth. The coefficients in column 1 are plotted in Appendix Figure A.11.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Confidential PSID data
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Table A.13: Maternal Education and Infant Health Did Not Evolve Differentially Before the 1980-
1982 Recession
Dependent variable:
Average Share Share Share Median
mothers’ years low very low extremely low birth weight,
of schooling birth weight birth weight birth weight grams
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and birth year
1971-1973 0.476 0.0096 -0.0149 -0.0030 252.4
(0.391) (0.0562) (0.0161) (0.0128) (174.3)
1974-1976 0.518 0.0180 -0.0042 0.0088 94.54
(0.392) (0.0433) (0.0123) (0.0123) (113.1)
1977-1979 0.0459 -0.0005 0.0022 0.0128 84.54
(0.448) (0.0423) (0.0145) (0.0116) (125.3)
Observations 21,084 25,497 25,497 25,497 25,497
p-value, all coefs. equal 0 0.416 0.884 0.782 0.131 0.341
Dep. var. mean, 1970-1979 11.87 0.0698 0.0103 0.0040 3,356
Notes: The interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and birth year 1970 is
normalized to equal zero. Regressions are estimated by 2SLS, using the predicted log employment change
in all industries from 1978-1982 as an IV. Regressions include fixed effects for county and state-by-year,
plus interactions between year and the 1950-1970 change in log median family income. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state. Low birth weight is defined as no more than 2,500 grams, very low birth
weight is no more than 1,500 grams, and extremely low birth weight is no more than 1,000 grams.
Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (1970-1979), BEA Regional Economic Accounts, County
Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Minnesota Population Center (2011)
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Any college college college
HS/GED college degree degree degree Years of
attainment attendance attainment attainment attainment schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 0.0295** 0.0345 -0.0104 -0.0521* 0.0417** 0.0686
(0.0130) (0.0260) (0.0296) (0.0278) (0.0187) (0.166)
11-19 0.0242*** 0.0519** 0.0309 0.0159 0.0150 0.279**
(0.0089) (0.0224) (0.0212) (0.0182) (0.0141) (0.119)
20-28 0.0149** 0.0268* 0.0311** 0.0308** 0.0003 0.234***
(0.0060) (0.0155) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0102) (0.0748)
Panel B: Reduced-form estimates
Interaction between 1978-1982 predicted log employment decrease and age in 1979
0-10 0.0198 -0.0154 -0.0987*** -0.163*** 0.0648** -0.242
(0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0305) (0.0427) (0.0245) (0.184)
11-19 0.0186 -0.0491 -0.0610** -0.0785** 0.0175 -0.0462
(0.0150) (0.0310) (0.0280) (0.0330) (0.0216) (0.152)
20-28 0.0078 -0.0253 0.0156 0.0190 -0.0033 0.182*
(0.0128) (0.0231) (0.0170) (0.0210) (0.0161) (0.100)
Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita
in individuals’ county of birth and indicators for age in 1979. Panel B reports estimates of the interaction between
the 1978-1982 predicted log employment decrease in individuals’ county of birth and indicators for age in 1979.
See notes to Table 1.2.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
172
Table A.15: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Educational Attainment, First
Stage Estimates
Dependent variable: Interaction between 1978-1982
decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
20-28 11-19 0-10
(1) (2) (3)
Interaction between 1978-1982 predicted log employment decrease and age in 1979
0-10 -0.0397*** -0.0336*** 0.552***
(0.00874) (0.00791) (0.0761)
11-19 -0.0251*** 0.516*** -0.0138***
(0.00722) (0.0744) (0.00458)
20-28 0.494*** -0.0110*** -0.00699***
(0.0714) (0.00363) (0.00250)
F-statistic, all coefficients equal 0 20.20 18.13 19.55
Notes: Table reports first stage estimates of the 2SLS system. See notes to Table 1.2.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table A.16: Aggregate Employment Changes from 1978-1992, by Industry
Share of Log
total 1978 employment Employment
employment change change
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Overall and one-digit industries
All industries 1.000 0.317 25,861,062
Manufacturing 0.289 -0.105 -2,007,089
Mining 0.012 -0.223 -164,018
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.004 0.878 378,609
Construction 0.058 0.167 732,219
Transportation and public utilities 0.062 0.257 1,258,595
Wholesale trade 0.070 0.262 1,464,533
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.070 0.379 2,251,947
Retail trade 0.206 0.356 6,115,470
Services 0.221 0.717 16,066,416
Panel B: Two-digit industries with largest employment decrease
Primary metal (manufacturing) 0.017 -0.507 -439,712
Industrial machinery (manufacturing) 0.033 -0.191 -383,492
Electronic equipment (manufacturing) 0.027 -0.236 -383,070
Apparel and other textile products (manufacturing) 0.019 -0.255 -289,581
Textile mill products (manufacturing) 0.013 -0.321 -235,813
Transportation equipment (manufacturing) 0.025 -0.145 -220,057
Fabricated metal products (manufacturing) 0.024 -0.140 -210,290
Stone, clay, and glass products (manufacturing) 0.010 -0.276 -154,170
Leather (manufacturing) 0.004 -0.827 -134,162
Heavy construction (construction) 0.011 -0.111 -76,597
Panel C: Two-digit industries with largest employment increase
Durables (wholesale trade) 0.041 0.251 782,035
Miscellaneous retail (retail trade) 0.027 0.378 829,284
Depository institutions (finance) 0.021 0.481 841,251
Membership organizations (services) 0.019 0.526 861,985
Food stores (retail trade) 0.031 0.446 1,146,502
Social services (services) 0.013 0.831 1,147,737
Miscellaneous services (services) 0.011 1.324 2,071,041
Eating and drinking places (retail trade) 0.060 0.534 2,829,410
Business services (services) 0.038 0.771 2,966,886
Health services (services) 0.070 0.752 5,226,976
Notes: I construct this table by aggregating county-level data for the continental United States. Because em-
ployment is often suppressed at the county-level, I impute employment using the number of establishments
and nationwide information on employment by establishment size, as described in Appendix A.1.
Source: Census County Business Patterns
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Table A.17: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Educational Attainment, Sepa-
rating the Temporary and Persistent Decline in Log Earnings per Capita
Dependent variable:
Any Four-year Two-year
Any college college college
HS/GED college degree degree degree Years of
attainment attendance attainment attainment attainment schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.0073 0.0806 -0.118 -0.0693 -0.0485 -0.464
(0.0455) (0.189) (0.0744) (0.101) (0.0537) (0.467)
11-19 0.0567 0.110 -0.117** -0.0729 -0.0443 -0.218
(0.0363) (0.194) (0.0517) (0.0585) (0.0457) (0.286)
20-28 0.0173 0.283 -0.0039 0.0297 -0.0336 0.0688
(0.0296) (0.203) (0.0431) (0.0453) (0.0347) (0.223)
Interaction between 1978-1992 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 0.0352 -0.0694 -0.0496 -0.175*** 0.125*** 0.0357
(0.0223) (0.102) (0.0437) (0.0446) (0.0308) (0.266)
11-19 -0.0136 -0.143 -0.0027 -0.0621** 0.0593*** 0.103
(0.0133) (0.111) (0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0151) (0.160)
20-28 -0.0003 -0.191 0.0235 0.0031 0.0204** 0.221**
(0.0123) (0.117) (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0089) (0.0946)
Notes: Table reports estimates of the interaction between the 1978-1982 and 1978-1992 decrease in log real
earnings per capita in individuals’ birth county and indicators for age in 1979. Regressions are estimated by
2SLS, using the predicted log employment change in all industries from 1978-1982 and 1978-1992 as instrumental
variables. See notes to Table 1.2.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table A.18: The Long-Run Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree At-
tainment, Robustness to Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.303*** -0.244*** -0.223***
(0.109) (0.0830) (0.0789)
11-19 -0.159** -0.102* -0.0999*
(0.0801) (0.0614) (0.0599)
20-28 0.0306 0.0409 0.0407
(0.0426) (0.0365) (0.0345)
Age in 1979 by birth state fixed effects X
Age in 1979 by birth division fixed effects X
Age in 1979 by birth region fixed effects X
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. See notes to Table
1.2. There are nine divisions and four regions, as defined by the Census Bureau.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013
Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
Table A.19: The Long-Run Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree At-
tainment, Robustness to Controlling for Pre-Recession Evolution of Family Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.241** -0.303*** -0.316*** -0.311***
(0.102) (0.109) (0.113) (0.115)
11-19 -0.0989 -0.159** -0.165** -0.162*
(0.0821) (0.0801) (0.0829) (0.0830)
20-28 0.0784 0.0306 0.0257 0.0280
(0.0487) (0.0426) (0.0428) (0.0427)




Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. See notes to Table
1.2.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013
Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table A.20: The Long-Run Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree At-
tainment, Robustness to Measure of Recession Severity
Measure of recession: 1978-1982 change in
Log earnings Log earnings Log income Log Earnings per
per capita per capita employment capita, $10k
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction between measure of recession severity and age in 1979
0-10 -0.303*** -0.249*** -0.470** -0.220*** -0.159**
(0.109) (0.0850) (0.194) (0.0580) (0.0686)
11-19 -0.159** -0.129** -0.252* -0.113** -0.0851*
(0.0801) (0.0651) (0.141) (0.0467) (0.0498)
20-28 0.0306 0.0238 0.0452 0.0227 0.0143
(0.0426) (0.0351) (0.0675) (0.0315) (0.0235)
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. Table reports esti-
mates of the interaction between the indicated measure of recession severity in individuals’ birth county and
indicators for age in 1979. See notes to Table 1.2.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013
Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
Table A.21: The Long-Run Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree At-
tainment, Robustness to Instrumental Variable
Instrumental variable: Predicted log employment decrease from 1978-1982 in
All industries All industries Manufacturing
All regions Same region Same region
(1) (2) (3)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.389*** -0.303*** -0.278*
(0.112) (0.109) (0.155)
11-19 -0.191** -0.159** -0.159*
(0.0873) (0.0801) (0.0917)
20-28 0.00831 0.0306 0.0423
(0.0480) (0.0426) (0.0477)
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. See notes to Table
1.2. See equation (1.1) for definition of instrumental variables.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013
Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
177
Table A.22: The Long-Run Effect of the 1980-1982 Recession on Four-Year College Degree Attainment, Robustness to Level of Geog-
raphy Used to Measure Recession Severity
Level of geography used to measure recession severity:
County CZ County CZ County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.303*** -0.0693 -0.0371 0.0126 -0.311*** 0.0190 -0.0343 0.0753 -0.283** -0.0529
(0.109) (0.101) (0.0747) (0.0869) (0.115) (0.114) (0.0773) (0.0957) (0.126) (0.144)
11-19 -0.159** -0.0729 0.0137 0.0155 -0.162* -0.0271 0.0161 0.0438 -0.138 -0.0771
(0.0801) (0.0585) (0.0569) (0.0674) (0.0830) (0.0582) (0.0577) (0.0615) (0.0867) (0.0813)
20-28 0.0306 0.0297 0.0467 0.0520 0.0280 0.0590 0.0487 0.0726 0.0368 0.0361
(0.0426) (0.0453) (0.0490) (0.0578) (0.0427) (0.0476) (0.0491) (0.0550) (0.0541) (0.0641)
Interaction between 1978-1992 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.175*** -0.0755 -0.250*** -0.168*** -0.237***
(0.0446) (0.0582) (0.0477) (0.0543) (0.0654)
11-19 -0.0621** -0.0056 -0.0999*** -0.0491 -0.0657
(0.0298) (0.0392) (0.0289) (0.0373) (0.0485)
20-28 0.0031 -0.0094 -0.0202 -0.0405 0.0023
(0.0209) (0.0282) (0.0211) (0.0302) (0.0307)
Includes neighboring counties
X X
Interaction between age in 1979 and change in log median family income from 1970-1980
X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for four-year college degree attainment. See notes to Table 1.2. The decrease in log real earnings per capita and the
predicted log employment decrease are measured at the same level of geography. In Columns 9 and 10, the measure of the recession and instrumental variable are
the weighted average among counties within 100 miles, as described in the text.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table A.23: State-Level Heterogeneity
State recession State mean transfers State transfer slope
More Change in log More More
vs. real earnings vs. vs.
less per capita, less less
State severe 1978-82 generous Residual progressive Slope
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AL More -0.081 Less 0.023 Less -0.645
AZ Less -0.047 Less -0.398 More -1.470
AR More -0.105 More 0.142 More -1.197
CA Less -0.048 More 0.349 More -0.902
CO Less 0.009 Less 0.008 Less -0.713
CT Less 0.026 Less -0.030 Less 0.148
DE Less -0.028 Less -0.183 Less 0.633
DC More -0.120 More 0.159 Less -0.824
FL Less -0.017 Less -0.741 Less -0.563
GA Less -0.048 More 0.126 More -1.071
ID More -0.141 Less -0.012 Less 0.984
IL More -0.083 Less -0.063 More -1.287
IN More -0.136 Less -0.522 More -1.334
IA More -0.134 Less -0.046 Less -0.308
KS Less -0.001 More 0.108 Less 0.002
KY More -0.071 More 0.395 More -1.339
LA Less 0.012 More 0.364 More -1.073
ME Less -0.026 Less -0.144 More -1.627
MD Less -0.036 More 0.033 More -0.838
MA Less 0.025 More 0.046 More -1.849
MI More -0.174 More 0.226 Less -0.647
MN More -0.063 More 0.292 Less -0.531
MS More -0.072 More 0.185 Less -0.673
MO Less -0.059 More 0.118 More -1.233
MT More -0.098 Less -0.069 Less -0.650
NE More -0.061 Less -0.189 Less -0.630
NV More -0.122 Less 0.031 Less -0.608
NH Less 0.031 Less -0.476 More -1.082
NJ Less 0.001 Less -0.154 More -0.981
NM Less -0.043 Less -0.080 More -1.514
NY Less -0.004 More 0.119 Less 0.034
NC Less -0.059 Less -0.375 More -0.957
ND More -0.111 More 0.134 Less -0.790
OH More -0.116 Less -0.186 More -0.969
OK Less 0.071 More 0.260 More -1.693
OR More -0.157 More 0.050 Less -0.705
PA Less -0.061 More 0.205 More -1.482
RI Less -0.001 More 0.384 More -1.039
SC More -0.063 Less -0.225 More -1.332
SD More -0.115 Less -0.247 Less -0.711
TN More -0.085 Less -0.147 More -1.000
TX Less 0.016 Less -0.353 More -1.347
UT More -0.101 More 0.094 Less -0.739
VT Less -0.018 More 0.294 Less -0.560
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Table A.23: State-Level Heterogeneity
State recession State mean transfers State transfer slope
More Change in log More More
vs. real earnings vs. vs.
less per capita, less less
State severe 1978-82 generous Residual progressive Slope
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VA Less -0.020 Less -0.508 Less -0.488
WA More -0.075 More 0.542 Less -0.216
WV More -0.096 More 0.304 More -1.131
WI More -0.094 More 0.234 More -1.326
WY More -0.072 Less -0.077 Less -0.098
Notes: States with a more severe recession are those with an above-median
decrease in log real earnings per capita from 1978-1982. States with less gen-
erous mean transfers are those with below-median transfers per capita in 1970,
conditional on demographic and economic covariates. States with a less pro-
gressive transfer slope are those with an above-median slope coefficient from
a regression of log transfers per capita on log median family income in 1970,
conditional on demographic and economic covariates. See text for details. The
mean (median) of column 3 is -0.059 (-0.061). The mean (median) of column
5 is 0 (0.031). The mean (median) of column 7 is -0.824 (-0.838).
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Pat-
terns, Census County Data Book, U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics (1978)
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Table A.24: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Additional Individual and
Spousal Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Migration Migration Positive Total
from from In labor hours hours
birth county birth state force worked worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -0.121 -0.0186 0.220*** 0.151*** 112.2
(0.0934) (0.117) (0.0567) (0.0479) (100.2)
11-19 -0.161* -0.0547 0.299*** 0.237*** 426.0***
(0.0916) (0.0898) (0.0784) (0.0670) (141.1)
20-28 -0.0363 0.0039 0.179*** 0.146*** 297.4**
(0.0559) (0.0554) (0.0593) (0.0561) (125.8)
Panel B: Average value of dependent variable in years 2000-2013, by age in 1979, in levels
0-10 - 0.353 0.844 0.856 1692
11-19 - 0.383 0.829 0.838 1692
20-28 - 0.399 0.790 0.802 1613
Dependent variable:
Positive Positive Positive
personal earned spousal Personal Earned Spousal
income income income income income Income
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 0.0309 0.152*** -0.156* 9,324* 2,927 5,174
(0.0287) (0.0483) (0.0888) (5,237) (4,771) (4,107)
11-19 0.0929** 0.236*** -0.0652 -8,276 -11,799** -462.3
(0.0409) (0.0673) (0.0643) (5,216) (5,667) (4,693)
20-28 0.0519* 0.148** 0.0760* -5,051 -5,844 4,386
(0.0289) (0.0574) (0.0399) (3,838) (3,644) (3,435)
Panel B: Average value of dependent variable in years 2000-2013, by age in 1979, in levels
0-10 0.910 0.855 0.319 42,728 41,004 21,592
11-19 0.910 0.838 0.388 51,325 48,484 27,176
20-28 0.916 0.801 0.505 54,198 48,988 31,581
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. The sample in columns 1 and 2 contains 23.5 million individuals born from 1950-
1979 in the continental U.S. with a unique birth county and non-imputed demographic and education variables.
The sample in columns 3-11 contains 18.4 million individuals born from 1950-1979 in the continental U.S. with
a unique birth county and non-imputed demographic, education, and labor market variables. Information on
migration from birth county is not available from publicly available Census/ACS data, and I have not disclosed
these statistics from the confidential Census/ACS data. For people born from 1950-1986 who were age 25-54 in
2000-2013, the average rate of migration from birth county is 0.687.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data from Ruggles
et al. (2015)
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Table A.25: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Additional Family Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Income to Positive
Family poverty family Family
income ratio × 100 income Married size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Interaction between 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita and age in 1979
0-10 -5,573 -17.18 -0.0068 0.114** 1.874***
(11,576) (64.97) (0.0117) (0.0450) (0.544)
11-19 -25,028* 2.577 -0.0036 -0.107* 0.384
(12,818) (56.16) (0.0117) (0.0647) (0.277)
20-28 -10,010 32.89 0.0013 -0.0109 -0.206*
(7,604) (40.30) (0.0120) (0.0440) (0.107)
Panel B: Average value of dependent variable in years 2000-2013, by age in 1979
0-10 80,971 412.8 0.977 0.585 3.19
11-19 94,026 468.2 0.977 0.661 3.19
20-28 98,311 543.2 0.979 0.679 2.65
Notes: See notes to Table 1.2. The sample contains 18.4 million individuals born from 1950-1979 in the conti-
nental U.S. with a unique birth county and non-imputed education and labor market variables.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Cen-
sus/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Publicly available 2000-2013 Census/ACS data from Ruggles
et al. (2015)
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Table A.26: Summary Statistics, Across Birth Counties
Percentile
5 25 50 75 95 Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education outcomes
HS/GED attainment 0.756 0.843 0.903 0.939 0.967 0.884 0.073
Any college attendance 0.325 0.456 0.549 0.634 0.715 0.538 0.121
Any college degree attainment 0.153 0.241 0.310 0.374 0.461 0.306 0.095
Four-year college degree attainment 0.098 0.167 0.216 0.268 0.357 0.217 0.077
Two-year degree attainment 0.043 0.067 0.087 0.109 0.146 0.089 0.032
Years of education 12.06 12.70 13.14 13.49 13.92 13.07 0.59
Labor market outcomes
Log personal income 10.28 10.40 10.47 10.53 10.67 10.46 0.127
Log earned income 10.22 10.34 10.41 10.48 10.61 10.41 0.128
Log hourly wage 2.754 2.846 2.909 2.970 3.113 2.912 0.110
Log family income 10.83 10.97 11.05 11.13 11.25 11.04 0.137
In poverty 0.051 0.081 0.107 0.142 0.211 0.117 0.056
Migration from birth county 0.518 0.625 0.701 0.777 0.896 0.700 0.112
Migration from birth state 0.136 0.226 0.303 0.402 0.581 0.321 0.134
In labor force 0.711 0.784 0.824 0.856 0.905 0.816 0.062
Positive hours worked 0.728 0.802 0.843 0.876 0.924 0.835 0.063
Total hours worked 1419 1597 1692 1783 1965 1687 165
Positive personal income 0.870 0.902 0.918 0.935 0.959 0.916 0.033
Positive earned income 0.726 0.800 0.841 0.873 0.920 0.832 0.062
Positive spousal income 0.373 0.433 0.467 0.502 0.561 0.465 0.063
Personal income 30,921 36,883 41,009 44,703 51,505 40,839 6,516
Earned income 27,940 34,300 38,624 42,277 48,717 38,277 6,501
Spousal income 14,414 18,700 20,726 22,694 25,868 20,502 3,835
Family income 56,080 66,807 74,172 80,555 91,572 73,673 11,067
Income to poverty ratio × 100 301.9 356.5 395.5 429.2 491.0 393.4 58.8
Positive family income 0.956 0.973 0.981 0.986 0.994 0.978 0.015
Married 0.583 0.671 0.707 0.739 0.787 0.699 0.064
Family size 2.59 2.80 2.88 2.95 3.18 2.88 0.19
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for outcomes at the birth county level. I collapse variables across years
2000-2013 and across cohorts 1950-1979. To ensure that no confidential information is disclosed, I estimate the
5th percentile as the average among counties in percentiles 4-6; other percentiles are calculated similarly.
Source: Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Table A.27: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Average Long-Run Outcome and Earnings per
Capita in Birth County in 1978
Log earnings per capita, 1978
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard Error R2 Observations
HS/GED attainment 0.152*** (0.0154) 0.266 3,074
Any college attendance 0.273*** (0.0237) 0.315 3,074
Any college degree attainment 0.217*** (0.0170) 0.322 3,074
Four-year college degree attainment 0.177*** (0.0127) 0.325 3,074
Two-year college degree attainment 0.0396*** (0.00690) 0.093 3,074
Years of education 1.374*** (0.111) 0.335 3,074
Log personal income 0.290*** (0.0174) 0.323 3,071
Log earned income 0.287*** (0.0177) 0.310 3,071
Log wage 0.254*** (0.0212) 0.326 3,071
Log family income 0.334*** (0.0206) 0.364 3,071
In poverty -0.121*** (0.0111) 0.287 3,072
Migration from birth county 0.103*** (0.0167) 0.052 3,074
Migration from birth state 0.141*** (0.0235) 0.068 3,074
In labor force 0.124*** (0.0143) 0.245 3,072
Positive hours worked 0.132*** (0.0151) 0.274 3,072
Total hours worked 319.5*** (38.85) 0.231 3,072
Positive personal income 0.0430*** (0.00572) 0.103 3,072
Positive earned income 0.131*** (0.0150) 0.275 3,072
Positive spousal income 0.0267 (0.0184) 0.011 3,072
Personal income 17,375*** (988.1) 0.438 3,072
Earned income 17,562*** (1,003) 0.450 3,072
Spousal income 7,472*** (569.9) 0.234 3,072
Family income 30,187*** (1,748) 0.458 3,072
Income to poverty ratio × 100 158.4*** (8.379) 0.446 3,072
Positive family income 0.0217*** (0.00279) 0.138 3,072
Married 0.0387* (0.0197) 0.023 3,072
Small family size 0.0858** (0.0351) 0.012 3,072
Notes: Table reports bivariate regressions of average long-run outcome for a birth county, averaged
across survey years 2000-2013 and birth cohorts 1950-1979, on log real earnings per capita in that
county in 1978. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-
2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure A.1: Normalized Mean Real Earnings per Capita, by County-Level Severity of the 1980-
1982 Recession, 1969-2013
1978: Before



































Notes: Figure extends the data in Figure 1.1 from 2002-2013. See notes to Figure 1.1.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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Figure A.2: Normalized Mean Employment-Population Ratio, by County-Level Severity of the
1980-1982 Recession

























Notes: Figure displays the population-weighted mean employment-population ratio, among counties with a below
and above median 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita. I calculate the median using 1978 population
weights. I adjust the less severe recession line to equal the more severe recession line in 1978, which amounts to an
upward shift of 0.024. Sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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Log real earnings per capita change, 1978-1982
Notes: Sample limited to 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
187
Figure A.4: The Role of County Business Patterns Employment Suppression in Constructing the
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Shock size based on CBP establishment counts
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Shock size based on CBP establishment counts
(b) All counties
Notes: Shock size is the 1977-1982 employment change in the auto and steel industries divided by 1977 total em-
ployment. FSS construct the shock size based on CBP employment counts, which are frequently suppressed. An
alternative approach is to use CBP establishment counts, which are never suppressed. See text for details.
Sources: BLS Local Area Statistics and Census County Business Patterns
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Figure A.5: Comparison of Predicted Log Employment Change to Shock Size Variable used by
Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern (2007)
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FSS shock size
(a) Using CBP Employment Counts to Construct Shock Size
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FSS shock size
(b) Using CBP Establishment Counts to Construct Shock Size
Notes: Predicted log employment change is based on a county’s 1976 industrial structure and aggregate industry-level
employment changes, as defined in equation (1.1). Shock size is the 1977-1982 employment change in the auto and
steel industries divided by 1977 total employment. Panel A constructs the shock size variable using CBP employment
counts, as in FSS. Panel B uses CBP establishment counts. Standard errors are clustered by state.
Sources: BLS Local Area Statistics and Census County Business Patterns data
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Figure A.6: Log Real Median Family Income Before and After the 1980-1982 Recession, 2SLS

























1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Model 1: County and state-by-year fixed effects
Model 2:    + year-by-1950-1970 log median income change
Notes: See notes to Figure 1.4. Sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Min-
nesota Population Center (2011)
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Figure A.7: Log Real Median Family Income Before and After the 1980-1982 Recession, 2SLS

























1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Model 1: County and state-by-year fixed effects
Model 2:    + year-by-1950-1970 log median income change
Model 3:    + year-by-1970-1980 log median income change
Notes: Figure plots the estimated coefficients on interactions between year and the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita, where the coefficient for 1980 is normalized to equal zero. The dependent variable is log real
median family income for 1950-1990 and log real median household income for 2000. Regressions are estimated by
2SLS, using the predicted log employment change from 1978-1982 as an instrumental variable. The change in log
earnings per capita and the predicted employment change are measured at the commuting zone level. The dashed lines
are pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by state. Sample is limited to the
2,550 counties with less than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Census County Data Books, Min-
nesota Population Center (2011)
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Figure A.8: Normalized Mean Real Earnings per Capita, by Commuting Zone-Level Severity of
the 1980-1982 Recession



































Note: Figure displays population-weighted mean real earnings per capita, among commuting zones with a below
and above median 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita. I calculate the median using 1978 population
weights. I adjust the less severe recession line to equal the more severe recession line in 1978, which amounts to a
downwards shift of $2,361. Sample contains 722 commuting zones in the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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Figure A.9: Normalized Mean Employment-Population Ratio, by Commuting-Zone Level Severity
of the 1980-1982 Recession


























Note: Figure displays the population-weighted mean employment-population ratio, among commuting zones with
a below and above median 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita. I calculate the median using 1978
population weights. I adjust the less severe recession line to equal the more severe recession line in 1978, which
amounts to a downwards shift of 0.021. Sample contains 722 commuting zones in the continental U.S.
Source: BEA Regional Economic Accounts
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(b) Share with a Four-Year College Degree, Relative to Age 45 Attainment
Notes: Panel A displays the share of individuals with a four-year college degree, for a constant sample of individuals
born in the U.S. from 1957-1964. Panel B displays the share of attainment divided by attainment at age 45. I use
custom weights from the NLS to account for the fact that these tabulations use multiple years of data.
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (1979-2010)
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Census/ACS data, born 1990-2013
PSID data, born 1968-1979
Notes: Figure plots OLS estimates of the interaction between the 1978-1982 decrease in log real earnings per capita
in individuals’ county of birth and indicators for age. The dependent variable is the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita in individuals’ county of residence. I estimate this relationship using confidential Census/ACS data
for individuals born from 1990-2013 and confidential PSID data for individuals born from 1968-1979. All regressions
include fixed effects for birth year-by-birth state and birth-year interacted with the 1950-1970 change in log median
family income in individuals’ birth county. The Census/ACS regression also includes fixed effects for race, sex, and
survey year. The dashed lines are pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by
state. The Census/ACS sample contains 11.7 million individuals born in the continental U.S. from 1990-2013 with a
unique birth county and non-imputed variables. The PSID sample contains 3,684 individuals born in the continental
U.S. from 1968-1979.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMI-
DENT file, Confidental PSID data
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Age
Migration from birth county
Migration from birth CZ
Migration from birth state
Notes: Figure displays the share of individuals living outside of their birth county, commuting zone, and state. The
Census/ACS data provide information on county of birth, but not county of residence at time of birth. The sample
contains 11.7 million individuals born in the continental U.S. from 1990-2013 with a unique birth county and non-
imputed variables. For reference, birth certificate data for individuals born in 1990, 1995, and 2000 indicate that 18.6
percent of individuals are born outside their county of residence and 2.3 percent of individuals are born outside their
state of residence.
Source: Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Age
Census/ACS data, born 1990-2013
PSID data, born 1990-2013
Notes: The Census/ACS data provide information on county of birth, but not county of residence at time of birth.
The PSID data provide information on county of residence (where the interview took place) during infancy. The
Census/ACS sample contains 11.7 million individuals born in the continental U.S. from 1990-2013 with a unique
birth county and non-imputed variables. The PSID sample contains 32,295 person-year observations for individuals
born in the continental U.S. from 1990-2013.
Sources: Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file, Confidental PSID data
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Notes: Figure displays the share of individuals living outside of their birth county for different birth cohorts. The PSID
data provide information on county of residence (where the interview took place).
Source: Confidental PSID data
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Figure A.15: Infant Mortality Did Not Evolve Differentially Before the 1980-1982 Recession
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Birth Year
Notes: Figure plots the estimated coefficients on interactions between birth year and the 1978-1982 decrease in log real
earnings per capita, where the coefficient for 1950 is normalized to equal zero. The dependent variable is the infant
mortality rate (deaths pers 1,000 births). The regression is estimated by 2SLS, using the predicted log employment
change from 1978-1982 as an IV. The regression includes fixed effects for birth county and birth year-by-birth state,
plus interactions between birth year and the 1950-1970 change in log median family income. The dashed lines are
pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the birth county level. Sample is limited
to the 2,550 counties with less than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector.
Sources: Bailey et al. (2016), BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Census County
Data Books, Minnesota Population Center (2011)
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Figure A.16: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on High School or GED Attain-
ment
Comparison Group:
Age 23-28 in 1979
Exposed to Recession:
Age 0-22 in 1979
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Age in 1979
Unadjusted for pre-recession migration
Adjusted for pre-recession migration
Notes: See notes to Figure 1.6. The dependent variable is an indicator for high school or GED attainment.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS
data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure A.17: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Any College Attendance
Comparison Group:
Age 23-28 in 1979
Exposed to Recession:
Age 0-22 in 1979
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Age in 1979
Unadjusted for pre-recession migration
Adjusted for pre-recession migration
Notes: See notes to Figure 1.6. The dependent variable is an indicator for any college attendance.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS
data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure A.18: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Any College Degree Attain-
ment
Comparison Group:
Age 23-28 in 1979
Exposed to Recession:
Age 0-22 in 1979
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Age in 1979
Unadjusted for pre-recession migration
Adjusted for pre-recession migration
Notes: See notes to Figure 1.6. The dependent variable is an indicator for any college degree attainment.
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS
data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure A.19: The Long-Run Effects of the 1980-1982 Recession on Two-Year College Degree
Attainment
Comparison Group:
Age 23-28 in 1979
Exposed to Recession:
Age 0-22 in 1979
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Age in 1979
Unadjusted for pre-recession migration
Adjusted for pre-recession migration
Notes: See notes to Figure 1.6. The dependent variable is an indicator for two-year college degree attainment (exactly).
Sources: BEA Regional Economic Accounts, Census County Business Patterns, Confidential 2000-2013 Census/ACS
data linked to the SSA NUMIDENT file
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Figure A.20: Predicted Log Employment Change, 1978-1992 and Predicted Log Employment
Change, 1978-1982
Overall R2
   All counties  = 0.452
   Low mining  = 0.848
   High mining = 0.388
Partial R2, 1978-1982 change
   All counties  = 0.076
   Low mining  = 0.355
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Predicted log employment change, 1978-1982
High mining counties
Low mining counties
Notes: Predicted log employment change from 1978-1992 and 1978-1982 are constructed using a county’s 1976
industrial structure and the change in industry-level employment from 1978-1992 and 1978-1982 in other states within
the same region, as defined in equation (1.1). The overall R2 includes the variation explained by state fixed effects.
Overall sample contains 3,076 counties in the continental U.S. Low mining counties are the 2,550 counties with less
than 5 percent of 1976 employment in the mining sector.
Source: Census County Business Patterns
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Notes: Sample contains men age 25-54 who are not in the armed forces. Hourly wage is constructed as annual
wage and salary income divided by the product of weeks worked last year and hours worked last week. Each line is




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of Social Interactions Index
Appendix B.1 derives the expression for the social interactions (SI) index in equation (C.16).
First, recall the definition of the SI index, ∆j,k ≡ E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]− E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 0].
We do not distinguish among migrants within each town, implying
∆j,k = (Nj − 1) (E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]− E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 0]) , i 6= i′. (B.1)
The law of iterated expectations implies that the probability of moving from birth town g to desti-
nation k can be written
Pg,k = E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]Pg,k + E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 0](1− Pg,k). (B.2)
Using the definition µj,k ≡ E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 1] and rearranging equation (B.2) yields














Substituting equation (B.5) into equation (B.1) yields






Applying the law of iterated expectations to the first term of the covariance of location decisions,
Cj,k, yields
Cj,k ≡ E[Di′,j,kDi,j,k]− E[Di′,j,k]E[Di,j,k] (B.7)
= E[Di′,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]Pg,k − (Pg,k)2 (B.8)
Using the definition of µj,k and rearranging yields µj,k − Pg,k = Cj,k/Pg,k. Substituting this
expression into (B.6) yields equation (C.16).
B.2 Method of Moments Formulation
B.2.1 Basic Model
As described in the text, we can derive the destination level SI index, ∆k, in two ways: as a
weighted sum of birth town-specific SI indices, ∆j,k, or by assuming that the SI index is constant
across birth towns within a birth state. Both approaches lead to the same point estimate of the
destination level SI index, but the latter approach allows us to use the method of moments to
estimate standard errors.
If we assume that the SI index, ∆j,k, is constant across birth towns within a birth state, the
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destination level SI index, ∆k, can be written
∆k = ∆j,k =
Cj,k(Nj − 1)
Pj,k − P 2j,k
. (B.9)
It is useful to rewrite this as
∆k
(
Pj,k − P 2j,k
)
− Cj,k(Nj − 1) = 0. (B.10)
To conduct inference, we treat the birth town group as the level of observation. Aggregating across
towns within a birth town group yields









Pj,k − P 2j,k. (B.13)
In the text, we describe how we construct our estimates P̂j,k, P̂ 2j,k, and Ĉj,k. These estimates
immediately lead to estimates X̂g,k and Ŷg,k, which can be written as deviations from the underlying
parameters,
X̂g,k = Xg,k + u
X
g,k (B.14)
Ŷg,k = Yg,k + u
Y
g,k. (B.15)
This allows us to rewrite equation (B.11),
∆kŶg,k − X̂g,k + (∆kuYg,k − uXg,k) = 0. (B.16)
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Because we have unbiased estimators of Pj,k, P 2j,k, and Cj,k, we have unbiased estimators of















where G is the number of birth town groups in a state. This can be rewritten
∆̂k =
∑
j Ĉj,k(Nj − 1)∑
j′ P̂j′,k − P̂ 2j′,k
. (B.19)
Equation (B.19) is identical to equation (2.9).
The above derivation is for a single destination level SI index parameter, but can easily be ex-






∆K Ŷg,K − X̂g,K
 ≡ E [f(wg,∆)] = 0 (B.20)
where wg is observed data used to construct X̂g and Ŷg.
Let ∆ ≡ (∆1, . . . ,∆K)′ be a K × 1 vector of destination level SI index parameters. Under

























Ŷg,1 0 0 · · · 0

















While it is convenient to describe the asymptotic properties when grouping all destinations
together into ∆, each destination level SI index parameter ∆k is estimated independently of the
other estimates.
B.2.2 Comparing Estimates from Two Models
The method of moments framework facilitates a comparison of estimates from different mod-
els. Under the null hypothesis we wish to test, we have two unbiased estimates for Xg,k and Yg,k:
X̂1g,k = Xg,k + u
X
g,k (B.25)
Ŷ 1g,k = Yg,k + u
Y
g,k (B.26)
X̂2g,k = Xg,k + v
X
g,k (B.27)
Ŷ 2g,k = Yg,k + v
Y
g,k (B.28)
We estimate the unrestricted version of the model using the method of moments, for which the
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We simply stack the two estimates of the destination level SI index, ∆k into a single, exactly-
identified system.
Let ∆1 ≡ N−1
∑
kNk∆k be the migrant-weighted average of the destination level SI index
parameters, whereN ≡
∑
kNk is the total number of migrants from a birth state. We are interested





Given destination level SI index estimates ∆̂1k and ∆̂
2
k, it is straightforward to construct the averages
∆̂1 and ∆̂2. To estimate the variance in the denominator of the test statistic, we assume that
destination level SI index estimates are independent of each other. Given the large number of
sending birth towns, and the large number of destinations, we believe that the covariance between
two destination level social interaction estimates is likely small. Furthermore, we are not confident
in our ability to reliably estimate the covariance of the covariances of location decisions, as would
be necessary if we did not assume independence. Under the independence assumption, we can
estimate V̂[∆̂1 − ∆̂2] as the appropriately weighted sum of
V̂[∆̂1k − ∆̂2k] = V̂[∆̂1k] + V̂[∆̂2k]− 2Ĉ[∆̂1k, ∆̂2k] (B.31)
which we obtain from the method of moments variance estimate.
B.3 Estimating Cross-Group Social Interactions
Appendix B.3 discusses the estimation procedure and results for social interactions across dif-
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ferent groups of migrants.
Consider the average number of people of type b induced to move from birth town j to desti-





j,k|Dwi,j,k = 1]− E[N bj,k|Dwi,j,k = 0]. (B.32)









where Cb,wj,k is the covariance of location decisions between migrants of type b and w, N
b
j is the
number of type b migrants born in j, and Pwj,k is the probability that a migrant of type w moves
from j to k.
We estimate Pwj,k as described in the text. To estimate C
b,w
j,k , consider the model
Dbi,j(i),k ·Dwi′,j(i′),k = αg,k +
∑
j∈g
βb,wj,k 1[j(i) = j(i
′) = j] + εi,i′,k. (B.34)








































We only estimate social interactions for destinations which received at least ten black and white
migrants from a given state. When calculating weighted averages of ∆̂b|wk , we use the number of
type w individuals who moved to each destination.
Panel A of appendix table B.6 reports estimates of the average number of Southern black
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migrants induced to move from birth town j to destination county k when a randomly chosen
Southern white makes the same move. Our preferred specification in column 4 excludes the largest
CMSAs. Weighted averages are small and/or indistinguishable from zero, varying from -0.079
(0.084) in Florida to 0.391 (0.260) in Alabama. Panel B reports estimates of the average number
of white migrants induced to move from j to k when a randomly chosen black migrant makes
the same move. When excluding the largest CMSAs, we find little evidence that Southern whites
co-located with black migrants. The lack of social influence between black and white migrants is
consistent with the segregation of the Jim Crow South.
B.4 Additional Detail on Measurement Error due to Incomplete Migration
Data
This section discusses the implications of measurement error due to incomplete migration data
without making a missing at random (MAR) assumption. We derive a lower bound on the so-
cial interactions (SI) index and show that estimates of this lower bound still reveal sizable social
interactions.
As described in the text, the SI index, ∆j,k, depends on the covariance of location decisions for
migrants from birth town j to destination k, Cj,k, the probability of moving from birth town group
g to destination k, Pg,k, and the number of migrants from town j, Nj . To focus on the key issues,
we assume that the moving probability is measured accurately and consider the consequences





j be the true values of the SI index, covariance of location decisions, and number





Pg,k − P 2g,k
. (B.37)
As in the text, we let α denote the coverage rate, defined by the relationship between the observed
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Using the definition of the covariance of location decisions, it is straightforward to show that
C∗j,k = α
2Cj,k + 2α(1− α)C in, outj,k + (1− α)
2Cout, outj,k , (B.39)
where Cj,k is the covariance of location decisions between migrants who are covered by our data,
C in, outj,k is the covariance of location decisions between a migrant who is covered by our data (“in”)
and a migrant who is not (“out”), and Cout, outj,k is the covariance of location decisions between
migrants who are not covered by our data.
When not assuming that data are MAR, the covariance of location decisions among migrants
not in our data (C in, outj,k and C
out, out
j,k ) could differ from the covariance of location decisions between
migrants who are in our data (Cj,k). As a result, the SI index based on our data, ∆j,k, might not
simply be attenuated, as implied by the MAR assumption. In general, we cannot point identify the
SI index under this more general measurement error model. However, we can construct a lower
bound for the strength of social interactions. In particular, we make the extreme assumptions that
there are no social interactions between migrants in and out of our sample, so that C in, outj,k = 0, and
that there are no social interactions between migrants out of our sample, so that Cout, outj,k = 0. In
this case, equations (B.37), (B.38), and (B.39) imply that
∆∗j,k ≥ α∆j,k, (B.40)
so that we can estimate a lower bound on the true SI index by multiplying the estimated SI index
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by the coverage rate.1 The average coverage rate is 52.5% for African American migrants from the
South and 69.7% for white migrants from the Great Plains. Combined with the average destination
level SI index estimates from Table 2.3, we estimate a lower bound for the SI index of 1.017
for African Americans and 0.265 for whites. These lower bounds, which depend on extremely
conservative assumptions about the migration behavior of individuals not in our sample, still reveal
sizable social interactions, especially among African Americans.
B.5 A Richer Model of Local Social Interactions
This section extends the local social interactions model in Section 2.4.5. In particular, we allow
the probability that a migrant follows his neighbor to vary with birth town and destination.
We categorize preferences of individual i so that each destination k belongs in one and only
one of three preference groups: high (Hi), medium (Mi), or low (Li). The high preference group is
non-empty and contains a single destination. In the absence of social interactions, the destination in
Hi is most preferred, while destinations in Mi are preferred relative to those in Li.2 An individual
never moves to a place in Li. A migrant chooses a destination inMi if and only if his neighbor also
chose the same location. An individual chooses a location in Hi if his neighbor chose the same
location or his neighbor selected a destination in Li.
The probability that k is in the high preference group for a migrant from town j is hj,k ≡ P[k ∈
Hi|i ∈ j]. Similarly, let mj,k ≡ P[k ∈ Mi|i ∈ j]. The probability that a migrant moves to k,
conditional on k not being in the high preference group, is νj,k ≡ P[k ∈ Mi|k /∈ Hi, i ∈ j]. Using
1Proof: If C in, outj,k = C
out, out
















Pg,k − P 2g,k
= α∆j,k,
where the inequality comes from noting that α ∈ [0, 1] and assuming Cj,k ≥ 0, and the final equality comes from
equation (C.16) in the text. One could also construct upper bounds, but these are not particularly informative.
2The assumption that Hi is a non-empty singleton ensures that person i has a well-defined location decision in
the absence of social interactions. We could relax the model to allow Hi to contain many destinations and specify a
decision rule among the elements of Hi. This extension complicates the model without adding any new insights.
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the conditional probability definition for νj,k, it is straightforward to show thatmj,k = νj,k(1−hj,k).
The probability that i moves to k given that his neighbor moves to k is
P[Di,j,k = 1|Di−1,j,k = 1] = P[k ∈ Hi] + P[k ∈Mi] (B.41)
= hj,k + νj,k(1− hj,k), i = 2, . . . , Nj. (B.42)
In equilibrium, we have
Pj,k ≡ P[Di,j,k = 1] = P[Di−1,j,k = 1, k ∈ Hi] + P[Di−1,j,k = 1, k ∈Mi]
+ P[Di−1,j,k = 0, k ∈ Hi, ki−1 /∈Mi] (B.43)











where ki−1 denotes the choice of i’s neighbor. The first term on the right hand side of equation
(C.11) is the probability that an individual’s neighbor moves to k, and k is in the high preference
group; social interaction reinforces the migrant’s desire to move to k. The second term is the
probability that a migrant follows his neighbor to k because of social interactions. The third term
is the probability that a migrant resists the pull of social interactions because town k offers high
inherent utility and the neighbor’s chosen destination offers low utility.
We now propose an estimation strategy. Recall that in the simple model, P[Di,j,k = 1|Di−1,j,k =
1] = χ+(1−χ)Pj,k. Letting ρj,k ≡ P[Di,j,k = 1|Di−1,j,k = 1], we have χ = (ρj,k−Pj,k)/(1−Pj,k).

















which can be used to obtain an estimate ρ̂j,k given (∆̂j,k, P̂j,k). Note that equation (C.13) implies




There are J ·K equations of the form (C.20), which yield a GMM estimator of the J ·K parameters
in νj after plugging in estimates (P̂j,k, ρ̂j,k). Finally, equation (C.10) implies that hj,k = (ρj,k −
νj,k)/(1 − νj,k), so that we can estimate hj,k using (ρ̂j,k, ν̂j,k). One could reduce the number of
reported parameters by imposing restrictions (e.g., assuming that νj,k is constant over some j).
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Table B.1: Number of Birth Towns and Migrants per State
Birth State Birth Towns Migrants Migrants Per Town
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 693 96,269 138.9
Florida 203 19,158 94.4
Georgia 566 77,038 136.1
Louisiana 460 55,974 121.7
Mississippi 660 120,454 182.5
North Carolina 586 78,420 133.8
South Carolina 461 69,399 150.5
All States 3,629 516,712 142.4
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 883 139,374 157.8
Nebraska 643 134,011 208.4
North Dakota 592 92,205 155.8
Oklahoma 966 200,392 207.4
South Dakota 474 78,541 165.7
All States 3,558 644,523 181.1
Notes: Table B.1 shows counts for all towns with at least 10 migrants in the
data.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.2: Average Destination Level Social Interactions Index Estimates, Birth Town Groups
Defined by Cross Validation and Counties
Cross Validation Counties
Type of Average: Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 0.770 1.888 0.616 1.393
(0.049) (0.195) (0.034) (0.170)
Florida 0.536 0.813 0.597 0.811
(0.052) (0.117) (0.087) (0.317)
Georgia 0.735 1.657 0.544 0.887
(0.048) (0.177) (0.039) (0.279)
Louisiana 0.462 1.723 0.399 2.209
(0.039) (0.478) (0.039) (0.920)
Mississippi 0.901 2.303 0.742 2.166
(0.050) (0.313) (0.051) (0.401)
North Carolina 0.566 1.539 0.402 1.022
(0.039) (0.130) (0.028) (0.123)
South Carolina 0.874 2.618 0.774 2.132
(0.054) (0.301) (0.049) (0.224)
All States 0.736 1.938 0.599 1.608
(0.020) (0.110) (0.017) (0.151)
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.128 0.255 0.106 0.194
(0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.028)
North Dakota 0.174 0.464 0.156 0.385
(0.012) (0.036) (0.010) (0.029)
Nebraska 0.141 0.361 0.121 0.399
(0.008) (0.082) (0.009) (0.117)
Oklahoma 0.112 0.453 0.102 0.372
(0.008) (0.036) (0.007) (0.036)
South Dakota 0.163 0.350 0.135 0.273
(0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.027)
All States 0.137 0.380 0.119 0.329
(0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.028)
Notes: Column 1 is an unweighted average of destination level social interaction es-
timates, ∆̂k. Column 2 is a weighted average, where the weights are the number of
people who move from each state to destination k. Birth town groups are defined by
counties. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.3: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, White Moves out of South
Number Type of Average
of Migrants Unweighted Weighted
Birth State (1) (2) (3)
Alabama 43,157 0.204 0.516
(0.014) (0.052)
Florida 27,426 0.046 0.072
(0.006) (0.100)
Georgia 31,299 0.082 0.117
(0.007) (0.021)
Louisiana 31,303 0.122 0.269
(0.011) (0.071)
Mississippi 28,001 0.118 0.186
(0.010) (0.021)
North Carolina 47,146 0.179 0.412
(0.012) (0.040)
South Carolina 14,605 0.068 0.094
(0.005) (0.029)
All States 222,937 0.131 0.280
(0.004) (0.021)
Notes: Column 2 is an unweighted av***erage of destination level
social interaction estimates, ∆̂k. Column 3 is a weighted average,
where the weights are the number of people who move from each
state to destination k. Birth town groups are defined by cross vali-
dation. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.4: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, By Size of Birth Town and Destination,
White Moves out of South
Exclude Largest Birth Towns No Yes No Yes
Exclude Largest Destinations No No Yes Yes
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4)
Alabama 0.516 0.458 0.531 0.481
(0.052) (0.045) (0.071) (0.062)
Florida 0.072 0.074 0.134 0.030
(0.100) (0.012) (0.082) (0.009)
Georgia 0.117 0.101 0.119 0.088
(0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013)
Louisiana 0.269 0.207 0.198 0.143
(0.071) (0.022) (0.035) (0.017)
Mississippi 0.186 0.185 0.135 0.134
(0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
North Carolina 0.412 0.395 0.337 0.319
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.034)
South Carolina 0.094 0.090 0.058 0.055
(0.029) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012)
All States 0.280 0.254 0.262 0.223
(0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015)
Notes: Column 1 is a weighted average of destination level social interaction es-
timates, ∆̂k, where the weights are the number of people who move from each
state to destination k. In column 2, we exclude birth towns with 1920 popula-
tion greater than 20,000 when estimating each ∆̂k. In column 3, we exclude all
counties which intersect in 2000 with the ten largest non-South CMSAs as of
1950: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Washing-
ton D.C., San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, in addition to counties which
receive fewer than 10 migrants. Column 4 excludes large birth towns and large
destinations. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.5: Average Social Interactions Index Estimates, by Destination Region, White Moves out
of South
Destination Region
Northeast Midwest West South
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alabama 0.140 1.048 0.208 -
(0.021) (0.123) (0.034) -
Florida 0.090 0.070 0.277 -
(0.017) (0.020) (0.104) -
Georgia 0.104 0.307 0.082 -
(0.013) (0.049) (0.023) -
Louisiana 0.159 0.450 0.331 -
(0.027) (0.100) (0.100) -
Mississippi 0.067 0.301 0.127 -
(0.014) (0.052) (0.014) -
North Carolina 0.549 0.489 0.302 -
(0.063) (0.122) (0.048) -
South Carolina 0.111 0.081 0.073 -
(0.011) (0.012) (0.022) -
All States 0.275 0.534 0.220 -
(0.024) (0.044) (0.026) -
Notes: All columns contain weighted averages of social interac-
tion estimates, ∆̂k, where the weights are the number of people
who move from each state to destination k. See footnote 36 for re-
gion definitions. We do not estimate social interactions for blacks
which move to the South. Birth town groups are defined by cross
validation. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.6: Average Cross-Race Social Interactions Index Estimates, Southern White and Black
Migrants
Excluding
All Counties Largest CMSAs
Birth State (1) (2)











North Carolina -0.010 -0.005
(0.062) (0.011)
South Carolina 0.197 -0.025
(0.161) (0.027)
All States 0.071 0.050
(0.048) (0.033)











North Carolina 0.021 -0.002
(0.029) (0.022)
South Carolina -0.019 0.020
(0.013) (0.018)
All States -0.019 0.019
(0.015) (0.013)
Notes: Table B.6 contains averages of cross-group social interaction estimates. See note
to Table 2.3. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.7: Fraction of Population from 1960/1970 Census in Duke Data
Group
Born Born
All Men Women 1916-25 1926-36
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: African Americans Born in South
Alabama 55.4% 53.0% 57.4% 47.6% 63.3%
Florida 50.1% 51.7% 48.8% 44.5% 55.0%
Georgia 49.3% 46.5% 51.4% 43.2% 56.1%
Louisiana 57.8% 57.6% 58.0% 52.7% 62.7%
Mississippi 55.9% 56.0% 55.9% 48.2% 64.1%
North Carolina 50.3% 46.5% 53.0% 42.2% 58.6%
South Carolina 46.0% 43.2% 48.1% 38.7% 54.8%
Panel B: Whites Born in Great Plains
Kansas 70.5% 71.2% 69.8% 66.5% 74.8%
Nebraska 69.4% 68.8% 70.0% 64.9% 74.2%
North Dakota 67.7% 64.4% 70.8% 62.9% 72.7%
Oklahoma 69.3% 67.6% 70.8% 64.4% 73.9%
South Dakota 72.5% 73.0% 72.0% 66.6% 79.2%
Notes: We use the 1960 Census for individuals born from 1916-1925 and the
1970 Census for individuals born from 1926-1936.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data and Ruggles et al.
(2010) data
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Table B.8: Weighted Averages of Destination Level Social Interactions Index Estimates, Adjusted
for Coverage Rate
All Men Women Born 1916-25 Born 1926-36
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Black Moves out of South
Alabama 3.408 1.600 1.825 1.742 1.859
(0.352) (0.166) (0.197) (0.198) (0.183)
Florida 1.623 0.746 0.867 0.669 1.022
(0.234) (0.119) (0.175) (0.150) (0.161)
Georgia 3.362 1.345 2.017 2.072 1.549
(0.359) (0.156) (0.240) (0.281) (0.142)
Louisiana 2.981 1.528 1.202 1.246 2.031
(0.827) (0.407) (0.471) (0.289) (0.694)
Mississippi 4.119 1.813 2.342 1.850 2.393
(0.560) (0.252) (0.341) (0.279) (0.328)
North Carolina 3.061 1.420 1.693 1.771 1.505
(0.259) (0.138) (0.146) (0.167) (0.123)
South Carolina 5.692 2.567 3.186 3.273 2.654
(0.654) (0.264) (0.439) (0.429) (0.278)
All States 3.739 1.678 2.066 1.994 1.978
(0.201) (0.090) (0.125) (0.115) (0.120)
Panel B: White Moves out of Great Plains
Kansas 0.362 0.179 0.201 0.241 0.188
(0.034) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015)
Nebraska 0.520 0.224 0.292 0.337 0.270
(0.118) (0.064) (0.057) (0.071) (0.053)
North Dakota 0.685 0.318 0.366 0.457 0.320
(0.054) (0.027) (0.034) (0.038) (0.024)
Oklahoma 0.653 0.318 0.336 0.352 0.379
(0.052) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
South Dakota 0.483 0.212 0.274 0.314 0.237
(0.036) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018)
All States 0.548 0.256 0.295 0.336 0.292
(0.032) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
Table B.8 contains weighted averages of destination level social interaction estimates for each
cohort. Columns 1 and 2 are not adjusted for differences in undercount among each cohort.
Columns 3 and 4 are adjusted using results from table B.7. See note to Table 2.3. Standard
errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.9: Summary Statistics, Destination Characteristics
Variable Mean S.D.
Panel A: Black Moves out of South (N=1469)
Social interaction estimate, ∆̂k 0.732 1.373
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 0.24 0.14
Direct railroad connection 0.093 0.291
One-stop railroad connection 0.557 0.497
Log distance from birth state 6.684 0.517
Log number of migrants from birth state 4.211 1.5
Log Population, 1900 11.004 1.105
Percent African-American, 1900 0.045 0.082
Panel B: White Moves Out of South (N=3153)
Social interaction estimate, ∆̂k 0.131 0.566
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 0.195 0.141
Direct railroad connection 0.084 0.278
One-stop railroad connection 0.492 0.5
Log distance from birth state 6.766 0.593
Log number of migrants from birth state 3.453 0.961
Log Population, 1900 10.418 1.143
Percent African-American, 1900 0.038 0.077
Panel C: White Moves out of Great Plains (N=3822)
Social interaction estimate, ∆̂k 0.14 0.441
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 0.169 0.134
Direct railroad connection 0.112 0.315
One-stop railroad connection 0.504 0.5
Log distance from birth state 6.788 0.355
Log number of migrants from birth state 3.748 1.281
Log Population, 1900 10.122 1.08
Percent African-American, 1900 0.121 0.197
Notes: Sample includes destination counties which existed
from 1900-2000 and for which we estimate social interac-
tions. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation.
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data, Haines and ICPSR
(2010) data
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Table B.10: Social Interaction Estimates and Destination County Characteristics, Black Moves out
of South, Groups Defined by Counties
Dependent Variable: Destination Level Social Interaction Estimate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 1.529** 0.741** 0.710**
(0.595) (0.325) (0.344)
Manufacturing employment share X 1.533** 1.516**
small destination indicator (0.774) (0.717)
Small destination indicator -0.059 -0.061
(0.165) (0.146)
Direct railroad connection 0.168 0.151 0.124
(0.126) (0.131) (0.157)
One-stop railroad connection 0.120 0.100 0.065
(0.106) (0.101) (0.104)
Log distance from birth state -0.273*** -0.220*** -0.280***
(0.074) (0.079) (0.066)
Log number of migrants from birth state 0.202*** 0.227*** 0.233***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.038)
Log Population, 1900 -0.066** -0.046 -0.054
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036)
Percent African-American, 1900 -1.604*** -1.256*** -1.348***
(0.326) (0.342) (0.325)
Birth state fixed effects x
Observations 1,469 1,469 1,469
R-squared 0.084 0.098 0.107
Clusters 371 371 371
Notes: See note to table 2.7. The sample does not include any counties which intersect with
the largest cities or counties which received fewer than 10 migrants (see note to table 2.3).
Standard errors, clustered by destination county, in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data and Haines and ICPSR (2010)
data
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Table B.11: Social Interaction Estimates and Destination County Characteristics, Whites Moves
from Great Plains
Dependent Variable: Destination Level Social Interaction Estimate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 0.025 -0.151* -0.145*
(0.076) (0.077) (0.077)
Manufacturing employment share X 0.226** 0.221**
small destination indicator (0.111) (0.111)
Small destination indicator 0.028 0.028
(0.033) (0.033)
Direct railroad connection 0.097** 0.098** 0.073
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045)
One-stop railroad connection 0.037** 0.033** 0.029*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Log distance from birth state -0.064* -0.048 -0.071*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
Log number of migrants from birth state 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Log Population, 1900 0.010 0.019** 0.019**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Percent African-American, 1900 -0.185*** -0.198*** -0.190***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
Birth state fixed effects x
Observations 3,822 3,822 3,822
R-squared 0.066 0.070 0.072
Clusters 1148 1148 1148
Notes: See note to table 2.7. Standard errors, clustered by destination county, in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data and Haines and ICPSR (2010)
data
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Table B.12: Social Interaction Estimates and Destination County Characteristics, Whites Moves
out of South
Dependent Variable: Destination Level Social Interaction Estimate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing employment share, 1910 0.467*** 0.223 0.210
(0.163) (0.142) (0.141)
Manufacturing employment share X 0.371** 0.391**
small destination indicator (0.184) (0.187)
Small destination indicator -0.023 -0.030
(0.047) (0.047)
Direct railroad connection -0.017 -0.022 -0.042
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
One-stop railroad connection 0.012 0.009 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Log distance from birth state -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.135***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Log number of migrants from birth state 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.159***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Log Population, 1900 -0.071*** -0.064*** -0.060***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Percent African-American, 1900 -0.544*** -0.518*** -0.478***
(0.119) (0.116) (0.114)
Birth state fixed effects x
Observations 3,153 3,153 3,153
R-squared 0.071 0.074 0.079
Clusters 728 728 728
Notes: See note to table 2.7. Standard errors, clustered by destination county, in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data and Haines and ICPSR (2010)
data
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Table B.13: Summary Statistics, Birth County Characteristics
Variable Mean S.D.
A: Black Moves out of South (N=551)
Social interaction estimate, ∆̂c 1.717 3.538
Share with income less than $2,000 (1950) 0.629 0.144
Percent rural, 1950 0.769 0.231
Rosenwald exposure 0.204 0.217
Railroad exposure 0.540 0.405
Percent African-American, 1920 0.407 0.209
Notes: Sample includes Southern counties containing at
least one town with at least 10 migrants.
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data, Haines and ICPSR
(2010) data
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Table B.14: Estimated Share of Migrants Which Chose Their Destination Because of Social Inter-
actions, White Moves out of South
Destination Region
All Northeast Midwest West South
Birth State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Alabama 0.205 0.065 0.344 0.094 -
(0.016) (0.009) (0.027) (0.014) -
Florida 0.035 0.043 0.034 0.122 -
(0.047) (0.008) (0.009) (0.040) -
Georgia 0.055 0.049 0.133 0.039 -
(0.009) (0.006) (0.018) (0.010) -
Louisiana 0.119 0.074 0.184 0.142 -
(0.028) (0.011) (0.033) (0.037) -
Mississippi 0.085 0.032 0.131 0.060 -
(0.009) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) -
North Carolina 0.171 0.215 0.196 0.131 -
(0.014) (0.020) (0.039) (0.018) -
South Carolina 0.045 0.052 0.039 0.035 -
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) -
All States 0.123 0.121 0.211 0.099 -
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) -
Notes: Table contains estimates and standard errors of χ = ∆/(2 + ∆), the
share of migrants which chose their destination because of social interactions,
based on weighted average estimates from column 2 of table B.3 and columns
1-4 of table B.5. Standard errors, estimated using the Delta method, are in
parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
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Table B.15: Industry of Migrants and Non-Migrants, Southern Blacks and Great Plains Whites,
1950
Percent of Group Working in Industry
Southern Blacks Great Plains Whites
Migrants Non-Migrants Migrants Non-Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1.23% 35.92% 9.38% 31.60%
Mining 1.33% 1.21% 2.02% 3.65%
Construction 10.19% 8.12% 11.98% 9.14%
Manufacturing 37.87% 22.09% 23.79% 10.98%
Transportation, Communication, 11.80% 7.89% 9.58% 9.59%
and Other Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade 13.61% 10.46% 16.47% 16.87%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 2.21% 0.78% 2.39% 2.20%
Business and Repair Services 2.98% 1.67% 4.11% 3.49%
Personal Services 6.30% 5.24% 2.16% 1.83%
Entertainment and Recreation Services 1.03% 0.63% 1.15% 0.76%
Professional and Related Services 3.95% 3.31% 5.67% 4.27%
Public Administration 6.57% 2.33% 11.08% 5.17%
Other 0.92% 0.35% 0.22% 0.43%
Total count 558,538 1,265,691 638,039 1,446,053
Note: Sample contains currently employed males, age 20-60 in the 1950 Census.
Source: Ruggles et al. (2010)
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(b) Great Plains Whites
Notes: Figure B.1 displays the locally mean-smoothed relationship between the proportion living outside the South
and age. See notes to figures 2.3a and 2.3b for definitions of home region.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Ruggles et al. (2010) data
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(b) Cumulative Distribution
Notes: Figure excludes groups with a single town, as these are not used in the analysis. Bin width in panel (a) is 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare Data.
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(b) Cumulative Distribution
Notes: Figure excludes groups with a single town, as these are not used in the analysis. Bin width in panel (a) is 5.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare Data.
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(b) Cumulative Distribution
Notes: Figure excludes groups with a single town, as these are not used in the analysis. Bin width in panel (a) is 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare Data.
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(b) Cumulative Distribution
Notes: Figure excludes groups with a single town, as these are not used in the analysis. Bin width in panel (a) is 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare Data.
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Figure B.6: Distribution of Destination Level Social Interaction t-statistics
     29.23% of t-stats > 1.96
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(a) Black Moves out of South
     12.40% of t-stats > 1.96
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t-statistic of Social Interaction Estimate
(b) White Moves out of Great Plains
Notes: Bin width is 1/2. Birth town groups are defined by cross validation. Panel (a) omits the t-statistic of 13.7 from
South Carolina to Hancock, WV.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Duke SSA/Medicare data
238

















-2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Social Interaction Estimate
Note: Bin width is 1/2. Figure omits estimate of ∆̂k = 19.3 from Alabama to St. Joseph County, IN.
Figure B.8: Distribution of Social Interaction t-statistics, White Moves to North
     10.17% of t-stats > 1.96
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Note: Bin width is 1/2.
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Figure B.9: Spatial Distribution of Destination-Level Social Interaction Estimates, South Carolina-born Blacks
Notes: See note to Figure 2.5.
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Figure B.10: Spatial Distribution of Destination-Level Social Interaction Estimates, Kansas-born Whites
Notes: See note to Figure 2.6.
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Figure B.11: Relationship between Southern Black Destination Level Social Interaction Estimates
and 1950 Manufacturing Employment Share
New Haven, CT from NC
Freeport, IL from MS
Rockford, IL from AL
Fort Wayne, IN from AL
Paterson, NJ from GA
Niagara Falls, NY from AL
Troy, NY from SC
Hamilton, OH from GA
Racine, WI from MS




















0 .2 .4 .6
Manufacturing Employment Share, 1910
Social Interaction Estimate
Linear Prediction: 2.38 (0.31)
Note: Linear prediction comes from an OLS regression which includes a constant and 1910 manufacturing employ-
ment share. See table 2.7 for results when including a richer set of covariates. Listed are the cities in Table 2.2.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Theoretical Details
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we show that the assumptions of a stable equilibrium and non-negative
peer effects (i.e., elements of J) imply that the peer effect multipliers ms, mn, and mw are non-
negative.
Let λ1, λ2, λ3 be the eigenvalues of the 3 × 3 matrix J . The spectral radius of J is defined as
ρ(J) ≡ max{|λ1|, |λ2|, |λ3|}. To ensure the equilibrium is stable, we assume that ρ(J) < 1. In
each peer effect parametrization considered in Table 3.9, all eigenvalues are real and lie in [0, 1),
and this condition is satisfied.
The on-diagonal elements of J (J11, J22, J33) are less than one in a stable equilibrium. This
follows from the facts that the spectral radius is less than one if and only if limk→∞ Jk = 0 and
limk→∞ J
k = 0 implies that the on-diagonal elements of J are less than one.
In a stable equilibrium, we also have that det(I − J) > 0, where I is the 3× 3 identity matrix.
This follows from our assumption that ρ(J) < 1, the fact that det(J) = λ1λ2λ3, and the fact that
det(J) = λ1λ2λ3 if and only if det(I − J) = (1− λ1)(1− λ2)(1− λ3).
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It is straightforward to show that
det(I − J) = (1− J11)[(1− J22)(1− J33)− J23J32] (C.1)
− J12[J23J31 + J21(1− J33)]− J13[J21J32 + J31(1− J22)]
= (1− J11)ms − J12mn − J13mw, (C.2)
where the second equality uses the peer effect multipliers defined in equations (3.7)-(3.9). Because
the off-diagonal elements of J are non-negative (by assumption) and the on-diagonal elements of
J are less than 1 (as implied by a stable equilibrium), we have that mn and mw are non-negative.
As a result,
0 < det(I − J) ≤ (1− J11)ms. (C.3)
Because J11 < 1, this implies that ms is non-negative. QED.
C.1.2 Discussion of Proposition 2
As noted in the text, two jointly sufficient conditions for Proposition 2 are (a): dC̄s/dHHIs <
dC̄w/dHHIs and (b): dC̄n/dHHIs ≤ dC̄w/dHHIs. Assuming that ∂F s/∂HHIs < 0, conditions (a)
and (b) are equivalent to ms > mw and mn ≥ mw. Rearranging equations (3.7) and (3.9) shows
that condition (a) is satisfied if and only if
(1− J22)(1− J33) > J32(J21 + J23) + J31(1− J22). (C.4)
The left hand side of inequality (C.4) is positive because J22, J33 ∈ [0, 1) in a stable equilibrium
with non-negative peer effects. Hence, condition (a) will be true as long as cross-group peer effects,
on the right hand side, are small enough.
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Similarly, equations (3.8) and (3.9) imply that condition (b) is satisfied if and only if
J21(1− J33 − J32) ≥ J31(1− J22 − J23). (C.5)
If blacks with ties to the South have a larger peer effect on blacks without ties to the South than
non-blacks, J21 > J31 ≥ 0, then inequality (C.5) is satisfied if (J22−J33)+(J23−J32) ≥ 0, which
will hold insofar as own-group peer effects among blacks without ties to the South are at least as
strong as own-group peer effects among non-blacks (J22 ≥ J33) and an increase in the non-black
crime rate leads to a greater increase in the crime rate among blacks without ties to the South than
vice versa (J32 ≥ J23), which is plausible because baseline crime rates are higher among blacks
than non-blacks.
It is useful to consider the simple case where there are no cross-group peer effects between
black and non-black youth, J13 = J23 = J31 = J32 = 0. In this case, the peer effect multipliers are
ms =
1− J22




(1− J11)(1− J22)− J12J21
(C.7)
mw = 0 (C.8)
In a stable equilibrium, J22 ∈ [0, 1) and (1− J11)(1− J22) > J12J21, ensuring that ms > mw and
condition (a) holds. Condition (b) additionally requires non-negative peer effects between blacks
with and without ties to the South, J21 ≥ 0.
C.2 Estimating a Model of Social Interactions in Location Decisions
Appendix C.2 describes a structural model of social interactions in location decisions. This
model allows us to estimate the share of migrants that chose their destination because of social
interactions. We include this variable in our regressions to examine whether the effect of social
connectedness is driven by variation across cities in unobserved characteristics of migrants.
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C.2.1 Model of Social Interactions in Location Decisions
Migrants from birth town j are indexed on a line by i ∈ {1, . . . , Nj}, where Nj is the total
number of migrants from town j. For migrant i, destination k belongs to one of three preference
groups: high (Hi), medium (Mi), or low (Li). The high preference group contains a single destina-
tion. In the absence of social interactions, the destination in Hi is most preferred, and destinations
in Mi are preferred over those in Li.1 A migrant never moves to a destination in Li. A migrant
chooses a destination in Mi if and only if his neighbor, i − 1, chooses the same destination. A
migrant chooses a destination in Hi if his neighbor chooses the same destination or his neighbor
selects a destination in Li.2
Migrants from the same birth town can differ in their preferences over destinations. The prob-
ability that destination k is in the high preference group for a migrant from town j is hj,k ≡
P[k ∈ Hi|i ∈ j], and the probability that destination k is in the medium preference group is
mj,k ≡ P[k ∈Mi|i ∈ j].
Migrants with many destinations in their medium preference group will tend to be influenced by
the decisions of other migrants. For our empirical work, distinguishing between types of migrants
is important because migrants that are more influenced by social interactions might differ along
several dimensions. For example, migrants with many destinations in their medium preference
group might be negatively selected in terms of earnings ability or be more pro-social, as discussed
in the text.
The probability that migrant i moves to destination k given that his neighbor moves there is
ρj,k ≡ P[Di,j,k = 1|Di−1,j,k = 1] = P[k ∈ Hi] + P[k ∈Mi] (C.9)
= hj,k +mj,k, (C.10)
1The assumption that Hi is a non-empty singleton ensures that migrant i has a well-defined location decision in
the absence of social interactions. We could allow Hi to contain many destinations and specify a decision rule among
the elements of Hi. This extension would complicate the model without adding any new insights.
2This model shares a similar structure as Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) in that some agents imitate
their neighbors. However, we differ from Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) in that we model the interdepen-
dence between various destinations (i.e., this is a multinomial choice problem) and allow for more than two types of
agents.
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where Di,j,k equals one if migrant i moves from j to k and zero otherwise.
The probability that destination k is in the medium preference group, conditional on not being
in the high preference group, is νj,k ≡ P[k ∈ Mi|k /∈ Hi, i ∈ j]. The conditional probability
definition for νj,k implies that mj,k = νj,k(1 − hj,k). We use νj,k to derive a simple sequential
estimation approach.
In equilibrium, the probability that a randomly chosen migrant i moves from j to k is




P[Di−1,j,k′ = 1, k ∈ Hi, k′ ∈ Li] (C.11)











The first term on the right hand side of equation (C.11) is the probability that a migrant’s neighbor
moves to k, and k is in the migrant’s high preference group; in this case, social interaction rein-
forces the migrant’s desire to move to k. The second term is the probability that a migrant follows
his neighbor to k because of social interactions. The third term is the probability that a migrant
resists the pull of social interactions because town k is in the migrant’s high preference group and
the neighbor’s chosen destination is in the migrant’s low preference group.
The share of migrants from birth town j living in destination k that chose their destination
because of social interactions equals mj,k. As a result, the share of migrants in destination k that









To facilitate estimation, we connect this model to the social interactions (SI) index introduced
by Stuart and Taylor (2017). The SI index is the expected increase in the number of people from
birth town j that move to destination k when an arbitrarily chosen person i is observed to make the
same move,
∆j,k ≡ E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 1]− E[N−i,j,k|Di,j,k = 0], (C.15)
where N−i,j,k is the number of people who move from j to k, excluding person i. A positive value
of ∆j,k indicates positive social interactions in moving from j to k, while ∆j,k = 0 indicates the





where Cj,k is the average covariance of location decisions between migrants from town j, Cj,k ≡∑
i 6=i′∈j C[Di,j,k, Di′,j,k]/(Nj(Nj − 1)). We follow the approach described in Stuart and Taylor
(2017) to estimate Pj,k and ∆j,k using information on migrants’ location decisions from the Duke
SSA/Medicare data.3
















3We use cross validation to define birth town groups. See Stuart and Taylor (2017) for details.
4This follows from the fact that the covariance of location decisions for individuals i and i + n is






5Equation (C.18) results from taking the limit as Nj →∞, and so relies on Nj being sufficiently large.
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We use equation (C.19) to estimate ρj,k with our estimates of Pj,k and ∆j,k.
Equations (C.10) and (C.13), plus the fact that mj,k = νj,k(1− hj,k), imply that




We use equation (C.20) to estimate νj ≡ (νj,1, . . . , νj,K) using our estimates of (Pj,1, . . . , Pj,K ,
ρj,1, . . . , ρj,K). We employ a computationally efficient algorithm that leverages the fact that equa-
tion (C.20) is a quadratic equation in νj,k, conditional on
∑K
k′=1 Pj,k′(1−νj,k′). We initially assume
that
∑K
k′=1 Pj,k′(1− νj,k′) =
∑K
k′=1 Pj,k′ = 1, then solve for νj,k using the quadratic formula, then
construct an updated estimate of
∑K
k′=1 Pj,k′(1 − νj,k′), and then solve again for νj,k using the
quadratic formula. We require that each estimate of νj,k lies in [0, 1]. This iterated algorithm
converges very rapidly in the vast majority of cases.6
We use equation (C.13) to estimate hj,k with our estimates of ρj,k and νj,k. Finally, we estimate
mj,k using the fact that mj,k = ρj,k − hj,k. We use equation (C.14) to estimate our parameter of
interest, mk, using estimates of mj,k and observed migration flows, Nj,k.
C.2.3 Results
Appendix Figure C.2 displays a histogram of our estimates of the share of migrants that chose
their destination because of social interactions, mk, for cities in the North, Midwest, and West
regions. The estimates range from 0 to 0.62. The unweighted average of mk across cities is 0.26,
6For 10 birth towns, the algorithm does not converge because our estimates of Pj,k and ρj,k do not yield a real
solution to the quadratic formula. We examined the sensitivity of our results to these cases by (1) dropping birth towns
for which the algorithm did not converge, (2) estimating νj,k and
∑K
k′=1 Pj,k′(1− νj,k′) as the average of the values
in the final four iterations, and (3) forcing ν̂j,k to equal zero for any (j, k) observation for which the quadratic formula
solution does not exist. The motivation for (3) is that our estimates of Pj,k and ρj,k in these 10 cases were consistent
with negative values of νj,k, even though this was not a feasible solution. All three options yielded nearly identical
estimates of our variable of interest, mk. This is not surprising because these 10 birth towns account for a negligible
share of the over 5,000 birth towns used to estimate mk.
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and the 1980 population weighted average is 0.39.
Appendix Table C.10 examines the relationship between log HHI, the log number of migrants,
and mk. The raw correlation between log HHI and mk is negative, but when we control for the log
number of migrants, log HHI and mk are positively correlated, as expected. This relationship is
similar when including state fixed effects.
Appendix Figure C.3 further describes the relationship between log HHI and mk. Panel A
plots the unconditional relationship between log HHI and mk, while Panel B plots the relationship
conditional on the log number of migrants.7 When we control for mk in equation (3.12), we
identify the effect of social connectedness on crime using variation in the vertical dimension of
Panel B.
Conditional on the number of migrants in a destination and the share of migrants that chose
their destination because of social interactions, variation in social connectedness continues to arise
from concentrated birth town to destination city population flows. To see this, consider two hy-
pothetical cities that each have 20 migrants, one-fourth of whom chose their destination because
of social interactions. In the low HHI city, the 20 migrants come from five birth towns. Each
town sends four migrants, one of whom moves there because of social interactions. As a result,
HHILow = 0.2. In the high HHI city, the 20 migrants also come from five birth towns. One town
sends 12 migrants, three of whom move there because of social interactions. Two towns each send
two migrants, one of whom moves there because of social interactions, and two towns each send
two migrants, neither of whom is influenced by social interactions. As a result, HHIHigh = 0.4.8
This example is consistent with Figure 3.2 in that variation in social connectedness arises from the
top sending town.
The structural model features local social interactions: each migrant directly influences no
more than one migrant.9 As a result, the model does not distinguish between the case where 12
7In particular, Panel B plots the residuals from regression log HHI and mk on the log number of migrants.
8Alternatively, suppose that in the high HHI city, the 20 migrants come from three birth towns. One town sends
12 migrants, three of whom move there because of social interactions, and two towns each send four migrants, one of
whom moves there because of social interactions. As a result, HHIHigh = 0.44.
9However, a single migrant can indirectly influence several migrants.
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migrants come from one town, with three migrants influenced by social interactions, and the case
where 12 migrants come from three towns, with three migrants influenced by social interactions.
Although this simple model does not capture all possible forms of social interactions, we believe
that it likely captures the most relevant threats to our empirical strategy for this paper.
C.3 Details on Peer Effect Parametrization
Appendix C.3 provides additional details on the literature that guides our parametrization of
peer effects in Section 3.6.
Case and Katz (1991) find that a one percent increase in the neighborhood crime rate leads to a
0.1 percent increase in a Boston youth’s self-reported propensity of committing a crime during the
last year (Table 10). This implies that a one percentage point increase in the neighborhood crime
rate leads to a 0.1 percentage point increase in youth’s crime rate, suggesting on-diagonal elements
of J close to 0.1.
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) estimate a local social interactions model in which
there are two types of agents. Fixed agents are not affected by their peers, and compliers imitate
their neighbor.10 The probability that an agent is a complier thus maps to the on-diagonal elements
of J . In Table IIA, the authors report estimates of f(π) = (2 − π)/π, where π is the probability
that an agent is a fixed type. The probability that an agent is a complier is 1 − π = 1 − 2/(1 +
f(π)). Using FBI UCR data on murders across cities for 1970 and 1985, Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996) report estimates of f(π) between 2 and 4.5, implying on-diagonal elements of
J between 1/3 and 2/3. For robbery and motor vehicle theft, the authors estimate f(π) in the range
of 37-155 and 141-382, suggesting diagonal elements of J very close to 1.
Ludwig and Kling (2007) find no evidence that neighborhood violent crime rates affect violent
crime arrests among MTO participants age 15-25 (Table 4). These estimates suggest on-diagonal
elements of J close to zero.
Damm and Dustmann (2014) estimate the effect of municipality crime rates on refugees’ crim-
10Their model is similar to the one described in Appendix C.2.
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inal convictions in Denmark. For males, they find that a one percentage point increase in the
municipality crime rate leads to a 7-13 percent increase in the probability of conviction over a
seven year period from ages 15-21 (Table 3, also see p. 1820). Given an average conviction rate
of 46 percent, this translates into a 3-6 percentage point increase in the probability of conviction;
we take the midpoint of 4.5. For females, the municipality crime rate has no effect on convictions.
Consequently, these estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the municipality crime
rate leads to a (0.5 · 4.5)/7 ≈ 0.32 percentage point increase in refugees’ annual conviction rate.
This suggests on-diagonal elements of J close to 1/3. Damm and Dustmann (2014) find that, be-
yond the impact of the municipality crime rate, the crime rate of co-nationals has an additional
impact while the crime rate of immigrants from other countries does not (Table 7). This suggests
that cross-group peer effects might be small.
In sum, estimates from Case and Katz (1991) suggest on-diagonal values of J close to 0.1,
estimates from Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) suggest on-diagonal elements of J
close to 0.5 for murder, estimates from Ludwig and Kling (2007) suggest on-diagonal elements of
J close to zero, and estimates from Damm and Dustmann (2014) suggest on-diagonal values of J
close to 0.3 and off-diagonal elements near zero.
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics: Crime and Social Connectedness, 1960-2009
First Third Fraction
Mean SD Quartile Quartile Zero
Offenses reported to police per 100,000 residents
Murder 6.7 8.8 1.7 8.7 0.184
Rape 29 28 10 40 0.070
Robbery 215 252 68 270 0.004
Assault 1,134 1,099 287 1,622 0.005
Burglary 1,234 846 670 1,630 0.000
Larceny 3,228 1,785 2,023 4,198 0.000
Motor Vehicle Theft 582 513 260 742 0.000
Population 93,074 94,505 39,476 104,217 -
HHI, Southern Black Migrants 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.028 -
Log HHI, Southern Black Migrants -4.220 0.781 -4.852 -3.563 -
Top Sending Town Share, Southern Black Migrants 0.061 0.041 0.036 0.074 -
Number, Southern Black Migrants 630 1,315 58 596 -
Notes: Each observation is a city-year. HHI and migrant counts are calculated among all individuals
born in the former Confederacy states from 1916-1936. Data on rape is only available starting in 1964.
Sample is restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980.
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare dataset
Table C.2: Summary Statistics: Cities’ Average Crime Rates
Percentile
Mean SD 5 25 50 75 95
Murder 6.7 6.8 1.3 2.7 4.5 8.0 19.2
Rape 29.1 18.3 6.5 16.0 26.3 36.9 65.8
Robbery 212.6 183.1 41.9 93.0 153.0 269.1 611.5
Assault 1,121.6 626.5 326.7 647.5 1,013.1 1,469.5 2,320.4
Burglary 1,233.1 474.0 541.8 891.9 1,185.3 1,510.2 2,095.9
Larceny 3,221.5 1,213.2 1,517.0 2,351.4 3,186.4 3,918.5 5,030.8
Motor Vehicle Theft 576.9 369.8 178.7 309.4 460.6 746.6 1,300.1
Notes: For each city, we construct an average crime rate across years 1960-2009. Table C.2 reports summary
statistics of these average crime rates. Sample is restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980.
Sources: FBI UCR
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Table C.3: Summary Statistics: Cities With and Without 1911-1916 Homicide Rates
1911-1916 Homicide Rates Observed
Yes No
(1) (2)
HHI, Southern black migrants 0.007 0.021
(0.006) (0.016)
Number, Southern black migrants 7,999 540
(16,068) (2,079)
Population, 1980 549,344 80,839
(1,099,422) (170,680)
Percent black, 1980 0.237 0.103
(0.152) (0.148)
Percent female, 1980 0.530 0.519
(0.008) (0.019)
Percent 25+ with HS, 1980 0.489 0.560
(0.080) (0.098)
Percent 25+ with College, 1980 0.118 0.137
(0.048) (0.078)
Log area, square miles, 1980 3.886 2.729
(0.986) (0.888)
Log median family income, 1979 10.85 11.06
(0.148) (0.205)
Unemployment rate, 1980 0.0886 0.0708
(0.033) (0.030)
Labor force participation rate, 1980 0.458 0.483
(0.041) (0.052)
Manufacturing emp. share, 1980 0.213 0.233
(0.072) (0.094)
N (cities) 46 369
Notes: Table reports means and, in parentheses, standard deviations. Column 1 contains
cities in the North, Midwest, and West regions that are in our main analysis sample and
for which we observe homicide rates for at least one year from 1911-1916. These cities
have at least 100,000 residents in 1920 and at least 5 deaths each year. Column 2 contains
cities in the North, Midwest, and West regions that are in our main analysis sample but
for which we do not observe homicide rates from 1911-1916. Unlike our main analysis
sample, we do not restrict to cities with fewer than 500,000 residents in 1980.
Sources: Census (1922, p. 64-65) , Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table C.4: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and City Covariates, 1960-2009, In-
cluding African American-Specific Covariates
Dependent variable: Log HHI, Southern black migrants
Year covariates are measured: 1970 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log number, Southern black migrants -0.806*** -0.779*** -0.744*** -0.750***
(0.068) (0.076) (0.088) (0.097)
Log population -0.006 0.002 -0.022 0.025
(0.073) (0.078) (0.089) (0.089)
Percent black -0.018 -0.000 -0.035 -0.075
(0.059) (0.077) (0.073) (0.066)
Percent female -0.074 0.025 -0.008 0.018
(0.060) (0.079) (0.089) (0.076)
Percent age 5-17 -0.080 0.141 0.463* 0.448
(0.226) (0.262) (0.267) (0.332)
Percent age 18-64 -0.140 0.179 0.500* 0.577
(0.235) (0.277) (0.280) (0.365)
Percent age 65+ 0.007 0.218 0.440** 0.444**
(0.162) (0.214) (0.207) (0.224)
Percent with high school degree 0.065 -0.131 0.017 -0.015
(0.132) (0.107) (0.091) (0.101)
Percent with college degree 0.027 0.017 -0.007 -0.016
(0.073) (0.054) (0.082) (0.086)
Log area, square miles 0.021 -0.028 -0.013 -0.028
(0.062) (0.070) (0.077) (0.083)
Log median family income -0.075 -0.011 -0.202** -0.067
(0.096) (0.089) (0.099) (0.082)
Unemployment rate 0.176** -0.025 -0.070 0.029
(0.083) (0.087) (0.092) (0.058)
Labor force participation rate 0.073 0.007 0.085 -0.035
(0.052) (0.088) (0.105) (0.056)
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Table C.4: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and City Covariates, 1960-2009, In-
cluding African American-Specific Covariates
Dependent variable: Log HHI, Southern black migrants
Year covariates are measured: 1970 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing employment share 0.203*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.191***
(0.065) (0.059) (0.053) (0.047)
African American-Specific Covariates:
Percent female 0.040 -0.085 0.012 0.077
(0.046) (0.062) (0.074) (0.072)
Percent age 5-17 0.122 0.098 0.160 -0.114
(0.078) (0.115) (0.152) (0.174)
Percent age 18-64 0.130 0.034 0.215 -0.025
(0.088) (0.131) (0.180) (0.212)
Percent age 65+ 0.044 0.044 0.093 -0.017
(0.055) (0.070) (0.087) (0.103)
Percent with high school degree -0.195*** -0.060 -0.112 -0.033
(0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074)
Percent with college degree 0.160*** 0.122* 0.125 0.059
(0.053) (0.064) (0.079) (0.079)
Unemployment rate -0.083* 0.065 0.119** 0.101**
(0.048) (0.074) (0.059) (0.041)
State fixed effects x x x x
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.757 0.763 0.771
N (cities) 228 228 228 228
p-value: Wald test that parameters equal zero
Demographic covariates 0.909 0.604 0.434 0.041
Economic covariates 0.023 0.990 0.220 0.521
African American-specific covariates 0.001 0.274 0.389 0.131
Notes: African American-specific covariates are not available for 1960. See note to Table 3.3.
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book, NHGIS
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Table C.5: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and Measures of Social Capital
Dependent variable: Log HHI, Southern black migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: All Cities
Associational density 0.0818 0.0601 0.135 0.109*
(0.0571) (0.0489) (0.0908) (0.0594)
Social capital index 0.0469 -0.00181 -0.0645 -0.0783
(0.0558) (0.0510) (0.0920) (0.0633)
Social capital composite index 0.0378 -0.00995
(0.0547) (0.0477)
Log number, Southern black migrants -0.850*** -0.852*** -0.852*** -0.851***
(0.0330) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0331)
State fixed effects x x x x
R2 0.007 0.741 0.002 0.739 0.001 0.740 0.008 0.742
N (cities) 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490
Counties 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
Panel B: Cities with Above Median Black Population Share in 1990
Associational density 0.309*** 0.118 0.514*** 0.213**
(0.0645) (0.0746) (0.103) (0.103)
Social capital index 0.189*** 0.0367 -0.264*** -0.149
(0.0579) (0.0767) (0.0957) (0.0979)
Social capital composite index 0.170*** 0.0225
(0.0563) (0.0719)
Log number migrants -0.629*** -0.653*** -0.655*** -0.621***
(0.0600) (0.0562) (0.0559) (0.0595)
State fixed effects x x x x
R2 0.129 0.598 0.043 0.591 0.034 0.590 0.155 0.603
N (cities) 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229
Counties 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Notes: All variables are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the sample used in Panel A. See Rupasingha and Goetz
(2008) for definitions of associational density and social capital indices, which are measured at the county level using data from 1988 and 1990.
The correlation between the social capital index and the social capital composite index is 0.99. Sample limited to cities with at least 25,000
residents in each decade and which received at least 25 Southern black migrants in the Duke dataset. Standard errors, clustered at the county
level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data, Rupasingha and Goetz (2008)
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Table C.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Results for All Explanatory Variables
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log HHI, Southern black migrants -0.181*** -0.083** -0.251*** -0.142*** -0.095*** -0.049 -0.163***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.022) (0.030) (0.041)
Log number, Southern black migrants 0.150*** 0.060** 0.146*** 0.075** 0.051*** 0.038 0.041
(0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.024) (0.029)
Log population 0.944*** 0.837*** 1.118*** 0.864*** 0.947*** 0.871*** 1.273***
(0.053) (0.042) (0.052) (0.049) (0.030) (0.042) (0.053)
Percent black, 1960 2.615*** 3.717*** 2.703*** 3.520*** 1.683*** 0.588 1.585***
(0.394) (0.488) (0.422) (0.541) (0.378) (0.412) (0.400)
Percent black, 1970 1.898*** 2.512*** 1.522*** 0.890*** 0.904*** 0.066 1.204***
(0.225) (0.248) (0.223) (0.298) (0.161) (0.255) (0.268)
Percent black, 1980 1.598*** 1.556*** 1.184*** 0.592** 0.315** -0.177 0.872***
(0.167) (0.162) (0.192) (0.265) (0.140) (0.243) (0.235)
Percent black, 1990 1.544*** 0.730*** 0.737*** 0.183 0.060 -0.085 0.616**
(0.205) (0.216) (0.201) (0.238) (0.165) (0.303) (0.291)
Percent black, 2000 1.880*** 0.117 0.418* -0.132 0.127 -0.447* 0.890***
(0.226) (0.234) (0.234) (0.218) (0.174) (0.265) (0.246)
Percent female, 1960 -0.235 2.965 -2.321 1.183 3.846 1.469 1.113
(3.323) (3.972) (4.267) (4.217) (2.643) (2.287) (3.278)
Percent female, 1970 1.142 2.396 -0.379 -5.374* -0.069 -0.241 1.260
(1.880) (1.971) (2.195) (2.880) (1.258) (1.451) (2.595)
Percent female, 1980 -1.743 -1.131 -1.689 -4.141 1.588 -2.773 -0.973
(2.047) (2.317) (2.549) (3.038) (1.574) (2.143) (3.114)
Percent female, 1990 -3.829 -2.197 0.538 -1.329 1.103 -1.298 4.573
(2.706) (2.904) (3.728) (2.574) (2.226) (2.251) (4.266)
Percent female, 2000 4.335 1.984 -0.818 3.643* -1.443 -0.649 -2.015
(3.008) (2.383) (2.603) (1.959) (1.611) (1.809) (3.010)
Percent age 5-17, 1960 -1.476 -18.408*** 0.751 -16.009** 1.816 -7.283** 6.275
(5.192) (5.431) (6.667) (6.454) (3.536) (3.305) (4.411)
Percent age 18-64, 1960 -1.143 -11.610** 4.168 -8.046 1.531 -6.607*** 5.548*
(4.056) (4.685) (5.295) (4.982) (2.750) (2.448) (3.371)
258
Table C.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Results for All Explanatory Variables
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent age 65+, 1960 -2.843 -13.297*** 0.545 -14.016*** -0.145 -5.873*** 0.182
(3.270) (3.851) (4.903) (4.282) (2.601) (2.092) (3.248)
Percent age 5-17, 1970 -6.603** -9.194*** -7.336** -7.073 -3.975** -3.004 -0.515
(2.937) (2.969) (3.033) (4.493) (1.811) (2.151) (3.307)
Percent age 18-64, 1970 -3.771 -4.638* -3.465 -7.827* -4.797*** -3.551* 1.888
(2.705) (2.514) (2.751) (4.153) (1.588) (1.913) (2.775)
Percent age 65+, 1970 -4.117* -7.088*** -4.046* -5.228 -3.043** -2.272 -1.347
(2.255) (2.167) (2.413) (3.303) (1.414) (1.600) (2.709)
Percent age 5-17, 1980 -8.082*** -10.612*** -3.334 -12.578*** -6.098** 1.356 11.437***
(2.917) (2.932) (4.021) (4.662) (2.709) (4.058) (4.338)
Percent age 18-64, 1980 -9.361*** -8.200*** -3.751 -11.294*** -5.998*** -0.036 8.985***
(2.162) (2.090) (2.854) (3.314) (1.903) (2.330) (3.225)
Percent age 65+, 1980 -4.834** -7.669*** -0.178 -7.982** -3.899** 2.976 10.184***
(2.421) (2.327) (3.241) (3.659) (1.902) (3.708) (3.435)
Percent age 5-17, 1990 -17.701*** -9.090** -7.317* -8.706* -4.683* 1.342 6.294
(4.289) (4.108) (4.114) (4.456) (2.632) (3.324) (5.232)
Percent age 18-64, 1990 -14.688*** -7.455*** -4.407* -7.640** -6.078*** 0.464 6.159*
(2.996) (2.697) (2.587) (3.152) (1.865) (2.536) (3.250)
Percent age 65+, 1990 -10.878*** -6.553** -3.425 -6.599** -3.676* 2.157 5.563
(3.419) (3.059) (3.106) (3.335) (1.923) (2.183) (3.845)
Percent age 5-17, 2000 -4.741 -9.525* -2.977 -0.087 6.760** 2.669 8.752*
(5.067) (5.145) (4.226) (4.047) (3.400) (4.091) (5.190)
Percent age 18-64, 2000 -5.702 -6.522 -2.049 -1.315 5.537** 2.441 9.519**
(3.819) (4.205) (3.511) (3.163) (2.731) (3.220) (4.100)
Percent age 65+, 2000 -4.116 -6.737* -1.575 0.202 6.110** 2.847 7.808**
(3.921) (3.900) (3.226) (3.061) (2.590) (3.131) (3.827)
Percent with high school degree, 1960 -1.444** -0.341 0.134 -0.178 0.041 -0.487 -1.186
(0.631) (0.651) (0.878) (0.806) (0.572) (0.663) (0.722)
Percent with high school degree, 1970 -2.494*** -1.387*** -1.844*** -3.207*** -0.832** -0.171 -2.596***
(0.566) (0.499) (0.570) (0.616) (0.325) (0.385) (0.667)
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Table C.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Results for All Explanatory Variables
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent with high school degree, 1980 -2.298*** -0.405 -1.495** -1.244* -1.413*** -1.353** -1.145*
(0.528) (0.472) (0.653) (0.673) (0.335) (0.553) (0.625)
Percent with high school degree, 1990 -1.893*** 1.513*** -1.325** 1.097** 0.841** 0.542 -1.125*
(0.470) (0.466) (0.531) (0.500) (0.366) (0.420) (0.645)
Percent with high school degree, 2000 -1.397*** 2.796*** -0.705 1.561*** 1.419*** 1.033*** -0.636
(0.507) (0.530) (0.553) (0.456) (0.370) (0.390) (0.609)
Percent with college degree, 1960 -0.425 1.146 -1.973* -0.447 0.849 2.421*** 0.168
(1.061) (1.349) (1.178) (1.405) (0.793) (0.698) (1.187)
Percent with college degree, 1970 -0.308 1.252** -0.221 2.245*** 1.548*** 1.605*** 0.316
(0.765) (0.609) (0.764) (0.686) (0.370) (0.387) (0.802)
Percent with college degree, 1980 0.420 0.032 0.187 0.244 0.875*** 1.434*** -1.306*
(0.482) (0.484) (0.596) (0.700) (0.326) (0.402) (0.725)
Percent with college degree, 1990 -0.324 -0.574 -0.046 -0.661* 0.725*** 0.911*** -1.505***
(0.414) (0.376) (0.373) (0.361) (0.281) (0.285) (0.548)
Percent with college degree, 2000 0.035 -1.091** -0.081 -0.320 -0.065 0.615* -2.208***
(0.456) (0.501) (0.448) (0.422) (0.339) (0.320) (0.621)
Log area, square miles, 1960 -0.004 0.282*** -0.108 0.080 0.048 0.060 -0.169***
(0.059) (0.058) (0.084) (0.070) (0.043) (0.045) (0.058)
Log area, square miles, 1970 0.042 0.270*** -0.136** 0.127*** 0.063*** 0.090** -0.218***
(0.052) (0.040) (0.053) (0.047) (0.024) (0.039) (0.048)
Log area, square miles, 1980 0.098* 0.272*** -0.105* 0.127*** 0.086*** 0.133*** -0.186***
(0.051) (0.038) (0.056) (0.044) (0.026) (0.034) (0.052)
Log area, square miles, 1990 0.092* 0.183*** -0.126** 0.113*** 0.081*** 0.125*** -0.054
(0.047) (0.040) (0.053) (0.043) (0.029) (0.037) (0.052)
Log area, square miles, 2000 0.067 0.121*** -0.188*** 0.098** 0.061** 0.106*** -0.127***
(0.049) (0.040) (0.048) (0.042) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044)
Log median family income, 1960 -1.335** -0.763 -0.736 -0.848 -1.117*** -0.585* -0.477
(0.527) (0.665) (0.686) (0.688) (0.371) (0.325) (0.537)
Log median family income, 1970 -0.434 -0.983*** -0.264 -0.049 -0.757*** -0.848*** 0.635
(0.298) (0.294) (0.369) (0.373) (0.196) (0.198) (0.388)
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Table C.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Results for All Explanatory Variables
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log median family income, 1980 -0.783*** -1.525*** -0.953*** -0.468 -0.377* -0.866*** 0.028
(0.216) (0.241) (0.342) (0.361) (0.217) (0.235) (0.355)
Log median family income, 1990 -0.512** -1.912*** -1.030*** -1.319*** -1.215*** -1.517*** -0.280
(0.260) (0.240) (0.315) (0.260) (0.165) (0.186) (0.382)
Log median family income, 2000 -1.281*** -2.149*** -1.227*** -1.722*** -1.310*** -1.216*** -0.616***
(0.189) (0.197) (0.152) (0.174) (0.153) (0.160) (0.229)
Unemployment rate, 1960 -0.628 2.086 6.734** 3.018 2.871 2.433 1.905
(2.272) (3.165) (3.431) (3.369) (2.125) (1.977) (2.538)
Unemployment rate, 1970 -0.603 -1.855 0.905 1.376 -0.356 -0.128 0.883
(1.686) (1.635) (2.171) (2.114) (1.257) (1.270) (2.256)
Unemployment rate, 1980 1.473 2.048* -0.629 2.811* 2.180** 2.787*** 1.122
(1.306) (1.132) (1.503) (1.534) (0.977) (0.895) (1.801)
Unemployment rate, 1990 6.720*** 0.768 2.448* 0.672 3.206** -1.041 2.081
(2.130) (1.735) (1.451) (1.651) (1.247) (1.658) (2.566)
Unemployment rate, 2000 -1.312 -1.369 -2.271* 0.627 2.313** 2.087* -0.583
(1.587) (1.384) (1.285) (0.932) (1.072) (1.104) (1.107)
Labor force participation rate, 1960 4.029* 3.201 5.054** 4.236** 3.114** 2.727*** 2.575
(2.162) (2.349) (2.143) (2.016) (1.291) (0.989) (1.599)
Labor force participation rate, 1970 1.072 1.114 2.498** 3.674*** 1.987*** 1.827** 0.845
(1.102) (0.911) (1.260) (1.398) (0.623) (0.760) (1.283)
Labor force participation rate, 1980 2.912*** 3.393*** 3.105** 3.142** 2.077*** 4.067*** 1.398
(1.012) (0.945) (1.351) (1.506) (0.668) (1.138) (1.370)
Labor force participation rate, 1990 2.653*** 2.965*** 3.234** 2.009** 2.280*** 3.077*** 1.682
(0.985) (1.017) (1.401) (0.966) (0.765) (0.833) (1.559)
Labor force participation rate, 2000 0.545 1.144*** 1.137*** 1.371*** 0.223 1.266*** 0.238
(0.429) (0.372) (0.388) (0.300) (0.302) (0.325) (0.482)
Manufacturing employment share, 1960 0.022 0.724 0.969** 1.489*** 0.314 -0.069 0.000
(0.344) (0.451) (0.479) (0.515) (0.308) (0.280) (0.405)
Manufacturing employment share, 1970 0.058 0.476 0.170 0.141 0.062 -0.161 -0.398
(0.292) (0.293) (0.340) (0.430) (0.192) (0.230) (0.321)
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Table C.6: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Results for All Explanatory Variables
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manufacturing employment share, 1980 0.619** 0.063 0.239 -0.049 -0.300 -0.832** 0.106
(0.298) (0.278) (0.377) (0.463) (0.259) (0.419) (0.452)
Manufacturing employment share, 1990 0.294 0.209 0.371 0.197 0.370 -0.255 0.002
(0.350) (0.360) (0.381) (0.425) (0.320) (0.423) (0.465)
Manufacturing employment share, 2000 0.322 0.988** 0.068 0.688 0.641** 0.415 -0.118
(0.388) (0.447) (0.372) (0.429) (0.323) (0.314) (0.515)
State fixed effects x x x x x x x
Pseudo R2 0.773 0.838 0.931 0.913 0.938 0.926 0.906
N (city-years) 18,854 17,690 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854
Cities 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Notes: See note to Table 3.4.
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table C.7: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 2000-2009, by Predicted Crimes
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Cities -0.091 0.078 -0.074 -0.129** 0.002 -0.029 -0.011
(0.071) (0.078) (0.058) (0.059) (0.044) (0.044) (0.064)
Below Median Predicted Crimes -0.064 0.171 0.190 -0.041 0.021 0.065 0.285**
(0.162) (0.144) (0.138) (0.120) (0.075) (0.073) (0.114)
Above Median Predicted Crimes -0.073 0.044 -0.047 -0.167*** -0.034 -0.042 -0.015
(0.075) (0.090) (0.062) (0.064) (0.045) (0.049) (0.071)
Notes: Table displays estimates of equation (3.12). Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents
in 1980. Regressions include the same covariates used in Table 3.4. To generate the predicted number of crimes
for each city, we estimate equation (3.12) using data from 1995-1999, replacing state-year fixed effects with
state-specific linear time trends. We then predict the number of crimes with these coefficients and covariates
from 2000-2009, using the average value of log HHI and log number of migrants for all cities when generating
the prediction. We estimate regressions using data from 2000-2009. Standard errors, clustered at the city level,
are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table C.8: Negative Selection of Southern Black Migrants into Network Destinations
Sample: Men and Women Men Women
Dependent variable: Years of Log Log Years of Log Log Years of Log Log
Schooling Income Income Schooling Income Income Schooling Income Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Selection into state of residence
Share of migrants from birth -1.594*** -0.107*** -0.041 -1.768*** -0.058** 0.019 -1.516*** -0.025 0.090*
state in state of residence (0.154) (0.031) (0.030) (0.176) (0.022) (0.019) (0.152) (0.051) (0.052)
Years of schooling 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.076***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
N 97,132 77,760 77,760 45,187 42,960 42,960 51,945 34,800 34,800
R2 0.080 0.084 0.099 0.082 0.120 0.147 0.082 0.110 0.150
Panel B: Selection into metropolitan area of residence
Share of migrants from birth -1.990*** -0.182*** -0.108** -2.057*** -0.118*** -0.036 -1.995*** -0.154*** -0.002
state in metro of residence (0.117) (0.044) (0.044) (0.108) (0.035) (0.036) (0.154) (0.057) (0.059)
Years of schooling 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.070***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
N 66,359 52,958 52,958 30,533 29,201 29,201 35,826 23,757 23,757
R2 0.084 0.070 0.081 0.086 0.102 0.125 0.088 0.096 0.131
Quartic in age x x x x x x x x x
Year of birth fixed effects x x x x x x x x x
Birth state fixed effects x x x x x x x x x
State/metro of residence fixed effects x x x x x x x x x
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x
Notes: Sample limited to African Americans born in the South from 1916-1936 who are living in the North, Midwest, or West regions. Standard errors,
clustered at the state of residence level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: 1960 and 1970 Census IPUMS
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Table C.9: The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime, 1960-2009, Additional Robustness
Checks
Dependent variable: Number of offenses reported to police
Motor
Vehicle
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Including cities with at least 500,000 residents in 1980
Log HHI, Southern -0.168*** -0.159*** -0.187*** -0.194*** -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.235***
black migrants (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.935 0.921 0.983 0.947 0.974 0.971 0.968
N (city-years) 19,543 18,324 19,543 19,543 19,543 19,543 19,543
Cities 485 485 485 485 485 485 485
Panel B: Negative binomial model
Log HHI, Southern -0.120*** -0.052 -0.129*** -0.079** -0.039 -0.037 -0.115***
black migrants (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.036) (0.027) (0.029) (0.043)
Pseudo R2 0.283 0.217 0.187 0.143 0.148 0.123 0.144
N (city-years) 18,854 17,690 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854
Cities 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Panel C: Drop observations if dependent variable is below 1/6 or above 6 times city mean
Log HHI, Southern -0.128*** -0.076** -0.247*** -0.133*** -0.091*** -0.045 -0.158***
black migrants (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.022) (0.029) (0.041)
Pseudo R2 0.766 0.846 0.935 0.902 0.943 0.933 0.910
N (city-years) 15,192 15,695 17,823 15,250 18,712 18,715 18,613
Cities 470 471 471 471 471 471 471
Panel D: Drop observations if dependent variable is below 1/6 or above 6 times city median
Log HHI, Southern -0.156*** -0.080** -0.246*** -0.133*** -0.090*** -0.044 -0.158***
black migrants (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.022) (0.029) (0.041)
Pseudo R2 0.776 0.848 0.935 0.901 0.943 0.933 0.909
N (city-years) 15,711 15,799 17,844 15,246 18,705 18,693 18,652
Cities 471 470 471 471 471 471 471
Panel E: Measure HHI using birth county to destination city population flows
Log HHI, Southern -0.154*** -0.053 -0.214*** -0.120*** -0.066*** -0.042 -0.137***
black migrants (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.023) (0.032) (0.041)
Pseudo R2 0.772 0.837 0.930 0.913 0.937 0.926 0.906
N (city-years) 18,854 17,690 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854 18,854
Cities 471 471 471 471 471 471 471
Notes: In Panel B, we estimate a negative binomial model instead of equation (3.12). For Panels C and D,
we construct mean and median number of crimes for each city from 1960-2009. Regressions include the same
covariates used in Table 3.4. Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Sources: FBI UCR, Duke SSA/Medicare data, Census city data book
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Table C.10: The Relationship between Social Connectedness, the Number of Migrants, and the
Share of Migrants that Chose their Destination Because of Social Interactions
Dependent variable: Log HHI, Southern black migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log number, Southern black migrants -0.457*** -0.666*** -0.669***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.023)
Share of migrants that chose destination -2.423*** 2.896*** 2.993***
because of social interactions (0.282) (0.229) (0.259)
State fixed effects x
R2 0.723 0.184 0.834 0.848
N (cities) 471 471 471 471
Notes: Sample restricted to cities with less than 500,000 residents in 1980. We estimate the share
of migrants that chose their destination because of social interactions using a structural model, as
described in the text.
Sources: Duke SSA/Medicare data,
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Notes: The UCR data contain the total number of murders per police agency. To construct a similar measure from the
ASR data, we calculate the sum of murders committed by adult whites, adult blacks, adult other races, juvenile whites,
juvenile blacks, and juvenile other races.
Source: FBI UCR
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Figure C.3: The Relationship between Social Connectedness and the Share of Migrants that Chose
their Destination Because of Social Interactions
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Notes: We estimate the share of migrants that chose their destination because of social interactions using a structural
model, as described in the text. Panel B plots the residuals from regressing log HHI and the share of migrants that
chose their destination because of social interactions on the log number of migrants.





Aaronson, Daniel, and Bhashkar Mazumder. 2011. “The Impact of Rosenwald Schools on
Black Achievement.” Journal of Political Economy, 119: 821–888.
Aguiar, Mark, Erik Hurst, and Loukas Karabarbounis. 2013. “Time Use during the Great
Recession.” American Economic Review, 103(5): 1664–1696.
Aizer, Anna, and Flávio Cunha. 2012. “The Production of Human Capital: Endowments, Invest-
ments and Fertility.” NBER Working Paper 18429.
Aizer, Anna, Shari Eli, Joseph Ferrie, and Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2016. “The Long Term
Impact of Cash Transfers to Poor Families.” American Economic Review, 106(4): 935–971.
Akee, Randall, Emilia Simeonova, E. Jane Costello, and William Copeland. 2015. “How Does
Household Income Affect Child Personality Traits and Behaviors?” NBER Working Paper
21562.
Albouy, David Y. 2012. “Are Big Cities Bad Places to Live? Estimating Quality of Life across
Metropolitan Areas.”
Albouy, David Y., and Bryan A. Stuart. 2016. “Urban Population and Amenities: The Neoclas-
sical Model of Location.”
Alder, Simeon, David Lagakos, and Lee Ohanian. 2017. “Labor Market Conflict and the Decline
of the Rust Belt.”
Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2000. “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3): 847–904.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1243–1284.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 2000. “Redistributive Public Employment.”
Journal of Urban Economics, 48(2): 219–241.
Almond, Douglas, and Janet Currie. 2011. “Human Capital Development before Age Five.” In
Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 4B, ed. David Card and Orley Ashenfelter, 1315–1486.
Elsevier.
Ananat, Elizabeth Oltmans, Anna Gassman-Pines, Dania V. Francis, and Christina M.
Gibson-Davis. 2013. “Children Left Behind: The Effects of Statewide Job Loss on Student
Achievement.” NBER Working Paper 17104.
271
Associated Press. 1983. “Blacks in Pennsylvania Town Recall Southern Past.” The Baytown Sun.
Atkin, David. 2016. “Endogenous Skill Acquisition and Export Manufacturing in Mexico.” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 106(8): 2046–2085.
Autor, David, David Figlio, Krzysztof Karbownik, Jeffrey Roth, and Melanie Wasserman.
2016. “Family Disadvantage and the Gender Gap in Behavioral and Educational Outcomes.”
NBER Working Paper 22267.
Autor, David H., and David Dorn. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polar-
ization of the US Labor Market.” American Economic Review, 103(5): 1553–1597.
Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local
Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review,
103(6): 2121–2168.
Bailey, Martha J., and Susan M. Dynarski. 2011. “Inequality in Postsecondary Education.” In
An Economic Perspective on the Problems of Disadvantaged Youth. ed. Greg J. Duncan and
Richard J. Murnane, 117–131. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Bailey, Martha J., Price Fishback, Michael Haines, Shawn Kantor, Edson Severnini, and
Anna Wentz. 2016. “U.S. County-Level Natality and Mortality Data, 1915-2007. Ann Arbor,
MI: ICPSR [distributor].”
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Tim Watts. 2010. “Long-Run Health
Impacts of Income Shocks: Wine and Phylloxera in Nineteenth-Century France.” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 92(4): 714–728.
Barlevy, Gadi. 2002. “The Sullying Effect of Recessions.” Review of Economic Studies, 69(1): 65–
96.
Barnett, Barry J. 2000. “The U.S. Farm Financial Crisis of the 1980s.” Agricultural History,
74(2): 366–380.
Bartel, Ann P. 1989. “Where do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics,
7(4): 371–391.
Bartik, Alexander W., Janet Currie, Michael Greenstone, and Christopher R. Knittel. 2016.
“The Local Economic and Welfare Consequences of Hydraulic Fracturing.”
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Bartik, Timothy J. 1993. “Who Benefits from Local Job Growth: Migrants or the Original Resi-
dents?” Regional Studies, 27(4): 297–311.
Bartik, Timothy J. 1996. “The Distributional Effects of Local Labor Demand and Industrial Mix:
Estimates Using Individual Panel Data.” Journal of Urban Economics, 40(2): 150–178.
272
Bauer, Thomas, Gil S. Epstein, and Ira N. Gang. 2005. “Enclaves, Language, and the Location
Choice of Migrants.” Journal of Population Economics, 18(4): 649–662.
Bayer, Patrick, Stephen L. Ross, and Giorgio Topa. 2008. “Place of Work and Place of Resi-
dence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes.” Journal of Political Economy,
116(6): 1150–1196.
Becker, Gary S. 1962. “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis.” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 70(5): 9–49.
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political
Economy, 76(2): 169–217.
Behr, Peter. 1980. “Firestone to Close 6 U.S. Plants.” Washington Post.
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